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An important question in the cognitive neuroscience of language regards the nature of the 
conceptual representations that make up semantic memory. Amodal accounts argue that 
conceptual representations of objects and their processing is functionally distinct from 
sensory or motor brain systems. On the other hand, sensorimotor theories maintain that 
the conceptual representations of objects and their processing involve the same perceptual 
and action brain areas active when experiencing them online. In a break from current 
orthodoxy, the current thesis seeks to explore whether concepts and semantic processing 
are best considered as functionally grounded in sensorimotor systems and contextually 
sensitive. To this end we report four studies using behavioural-psycholinguistic and 
neuroimaging techniques in healthy and clinical populations.  
In part 1 we show that online perceptual processing in the visual (study 1) and olfactory 
(study 2) modalities can influence language comprehension, that lifetime sensory 
experience shapes the representational structure of object concepts, and that the outcome 
of semantic processing differs depending on an interaction of people’s experience and 
their immediate perceptual context. In part 2, we examine whether motor system 
degradation due to Parkinson’s disease leads to impairments or measurable differences in 
processing manipulable objects compared to healthy controls. While we do not observe 
behavioural differences in the way individuals with Parkinson’s access the 
representations of manipulable objects (study 3), this may be due to their treatment 
context. However, the neuroimaging evidence we report (study 4) does suggest that 
changes in people’s motor capacities lead to measurable alterations in the way that they 
process action semantics, at the neural level. 
Taken together the experiments presented in this thesis provide evidence that the content 
and format of the conceptual representations of objects is multimodal and grounded in 
sensory and motor brain systems and people’s lifetime sensory and motor experience with 
objects shapes their representations. Therefore, contrary to amodal accounts, there is 
functional overlap between sensorimotor and semantic processing, such that sensory, 
motor and semantic processes mutually interact with context (at many levels) meaning 
that each time a noun is processed its representational outcome and content varies 
dynamically. This suggests that exploring the relationship between concepts and context 
is both necessary and vital in order to properly understand the semantic representations 
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Resumen amplio en castellano 
Introducción 
El objetivo general de la presente tesis era ampliar nuestro conocimiento sobre la manera 
en la que se estructuran las representaciones conceptuales a largo plazo de los objetos 
concretos en la memoria semántica. Estas representaciones conceptuales de los objetos 
concretos no solo forman la base del significado de los sustantivos que les nombran, sino 
que además son la base del conocimiento que se deriva de la percepción de dichos 
referentes y de la actuación con ellos. Rompiendo con la ortodoxia imperante, el trabajo 
aquí presentado buscó proporcionar pruebas de que los conceptos efectivamente se 
conciben mejor como representaciones multimodales basadas en el sistema sensomotor, 
pero también sensibles al contexto. 
La presente tesis contó con tres objetivos experimentales. En primer lugar, poner a prueba 
las predicciones de las teorías sensomotoras del procesamiento semántico (ej. Allport, 
1985). Concretamente, que los atributos funcionalmente importantes de las 
representaciones conceptuales de los objetos concretos están representados en regiones 
cerebrales dispersas y de distintas modalidades sensoriales, las cuales se activan durante 
la percepción e interacción motora con dichos objetos. El segundo objetivo era examinar 
si, como resultado de lo anterior, el procesamiento semántico y el procesamiento 
sensomotor en línea son interdependientes e interactúan entre sí. El tercer y último 
objetivo era interpretar los hallazgos a la luz de una predicción de las teorías 
sensomotoras, hasta ahora relativamente poco investigada: que el contenido de las 
representaciones semánticas multimodales varía en función del contexto, entendido tanto 
como contexto inmediato como contexto personal, es decir, la experiencia previa de cada 
persona con estos objetos a lo largo de su vida. 
Estas predicciones son incompatibles con las teorías que sostienen que el formato de las 
representaciones conceptuales y su procesamiento semántico son de carácter amodal (p. 
ej. Fodor, 1983), funcionalmente distintos del procesamiento sensorial y motor. 
Defienden, además, que los contenidos nucleares de la representación conceptual son 
unidades de significado fidedignas, infrangibles y contextualmente inmutables. 
Con el fin de explorar las predicciones anteriores, realizamos cuatro estudios empleando 
técnicas conductuales y de neuroimágen, e incluyendo tanto participantes sanos como 




Parte 1 – La modalidad visual y la olfativa 
Los dos primeros capítulos experimentales de esta tesis presentan dos estudios que 
exploran los componentes visuales y olfativos de las representaciones de objetos 
empleando paradigmas conductuales de “interferencia”. 
1.1.1 Visual 
En primer lugar, presentamos dos experimentos (N = 83) diseñados para comprobar si las 
regiones cerebrales visuales tienen una importancia funcional para los componentes 
visuales de las representaciones de objetos, y en ese caso, para explorar cómo interactúan 
mutuamente el procesamiento semántico y el visual. Empleamos un paradigma de 
“interferencia” visual multi-tarea para comprobar: A) si ocupar el sistema visual con una 
tarea visual causa más interferencia en el procesamiento semántico concurrente de 
palabras referentes a objetos con una asociación a la experiencia visual relativamente 
mayor (más visuales) que con aquellos asociados con una experiencia visual 
relativamente menor (menos visuales); y B) si procesar nombres de objetos más visuales 
causa una interferencia relativamente mayor sobre el desempeño de la tarea visual que 
procesar nombres de objetos menos visuales. En consonancia con las predicciones 
sensomotoras, en el experimento 1 observamos que los participantes cometían 
relativamente más errores en la tarea visual cuando procesaban semánticamente nombres 
de objetos más visuales que cuando lo hacían con nombres de objetos menos visuales, y 
en el experimento 2 comprobamos que los participantes tardaban relativamente más en 
procesar semánticamente nombres de objetos más visuales que menos visuales cuando 
desarrollaban de forma simultánea una tarea visual. Ambos hallazgos fueron 
corroborados por un análisis estadístico exploratorio más potente, en el que analizamos 
ambos experimentos de forma conjunta, revelando resultados generales 
complementarios. 
Estos resultados indican que los procesamientos visuales y semánticos concurrentes 
pueden competir por recursos cognitivos, de manera que las representaciones semánticas 
de objetos frecuentemente vistos pueden solaparse con áreas cerebrales involucradas en 
el desarrollo de tareas visuales (es decir, áreas involucradas en el procesamiento visual). 
Por lo tanto, dichas representaciones semánticas son, al menos en parte, de naturaleza 
visual. Los resultados también sugieren que el procesamiento semántico y el visual 
interactúan mutuamente, y que, por lo tanto, el contexto en el que se procesan nombres 
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de objetos afecta al resultado del acceso semántico. Además, ya que los objetos se 
asignaron a las categorías para cada participante en base a su propia experiencia, las 
interacciones semántico-perceptuales que observamos sugieren que el grado en el que la 
representación de un objeto involucra áreas visuales depende de la cantidad de 
experiencia vital que un participante dado haya tenido, personalmente, con dicho objeto. 
En conjunto, parece que lo que vemos en un momento dado depende de lo que estamos 
pensando en ese momento, y lo que estamos pensando, a su vez, depende de lo que 
estamos viendo. 
1.1.2 Olfativo 
A continuación, presentamos un experimento (N = 62) diseñado con un doble objetivo: 
comprobar si las regiones cerebrales olfativas son funcionalmente relevantes a la hora de 
procesar los componentes olfativos de las representaciones semánticas de los objetos y, 
en tal caso, examinar si la experiencia olfativa individual a lo largo de la vida moldea los 
elementos de estas representaciones. Para tales fines, empleamos un paradigma innovador 
de “interferencia” pasiva olfativa. En el mismo, la tarea de los participantes era realizar 
juicios semánticos sobre dos tipos de objetos: objetos fuertemente asociados a olores 
(olorosos, p. ej. ajo) y objetos olfativamente neutros (neutros, p. ej. martillo). A su vez, 
los participantes realizaban los juicios en dos contextos perceptuales distintos: sin aroma 
o expuestos a un aroma ambiental fuerte. Nuestra hipótesis principal era que el aroma 
ambiental fuerte “ocuparía” el sistema olfativo, produciendo una interferencia en la 
comprensión de las palabras de objetos olorosos en dicho contexto, al compararlo con el 
mismo procesamiento en un ambiente sin aroma. Además, otra de nuestras predicciones 
era que el nivel de interferencia sería proporcional a la experiencia de los participantes 
con el olor del objeto a lo largo de la vida. En consonancia con nuestras hipótesis, los 
resultados revelaron que la exposición a un olor ambiental fuerte dificulta (esto es, 
ralentiza) ligeramente el procesamiento de objetos olorosos en comparación con objetos 
neutros, y que esta interferencia es proporcional a la experiencia olfativa con los objetos. 
En conclusión, estos resultados avalan la hipótesis sensomotora de que los 
procesamientos conceptual y perceptual no son modulares sino continuos y capaces de 
interacción mutua. La mera presencia de un aroma ambiental es suficiente para provocar 
interferencia selectiva mientras se procesan objetos olorosos (pero no objetos neutrales), 
incluso cuando no se requiere atención explícita a la información olfativa. Asimismo, 
observamos que la interacción entre el procesamiento semántico y olfativo depende en 
gran manera del contexto inmediato y de la experiencia del individuo. 
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Resumen 
En términos generales, los hallazgos expuestos en la Parte 1 indican que la comprensión 
del lenguaje puede influir sobre el procesamiento perceptual en línea, que la experiencia 
sensorial a lo largo de la vida determina la estructura representacional de los conceptos 
relativos a objetos y que el resultado del procesamiento semántico depende de la 
interacción entre la experiencia personal y el contexto perceptual inmediato. 
Parte 2 - Parkinson y la modalidad manual 
La segunda mitad de la tesis pasó a comprobar las predicciones sensomotoras en el campo 
manual. Así, examinamos si la degradación del sistema motor debido a la Enfermedad de 
Parkinson (EP) conduce a deficiencias o diferencias medibles en el procesamiento de 
nombres de objetos manipulables en comparación con personas sanas. 
1.1.3 EP – Parte conductual 
Primero, presentamos un experimento (N = 38) diseñado para probar si el sistema motor 
es importante para los componentes de acción de las representaciones de los objetos. 
Utilizando un paradigma conductual de denominación de objetos, evaluamos si los 
pacientes con la EP muestran una mayor interferencia al nombrar objetos más manuales 
como "martillo", que objetos menos manuales como "avión", en comparación con 
controles sanos equiparados. En contra de nuestras predicciones, no encontramos 
evidencia conductual de deficiencias semántico-motoras. Sin embargo, debido a que los 
pacientes con EP estaban bajo los efectos de su medicación contar el Parkinson en el 
momento de la prueba (es decir, habían recuperado su función de bucle motora) este 
resultado nulo es difícil de interpretar. Podría ser que la EP no provoque impedimentos 
en el procesamiento de objetos manipulables, pero también puede haber sido 
consecuencia de una interacción del estado del tratamiento con dichas deficiencias. Si 
esto fuera así, convendría señalar que esto estaría en línea con las ideas expuestas en esta 
tesis de que el contexto es clave para la comprensión de conceptos. En este caso, el 
contexto del tratamiento podría llevar a variaciones en contenido conceptual. Todo ello 
evidencia la necesidad de más investigación.   
1.1.4 EP - fMRI 
Teniendo en cuenta la información del estudio conductual, creamos un experimento (N = 
34) diseñado para explorar si, a nivel neuronal, las deficiencias motoras debidas a la EP 
interactúan con las redes cerebrales involucradas en el procesamiento semántico de los 
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nombres de objetos manipulables. En línea con nuestras predicciones, observamos 
diferencias de conectividad debido a influencias semánticas entre los controles sanos y 
los pacientes con la EP cuando procesaban nombres de objetos más manuales. En 
particular, observamos una conectividad funcional relativamente reducida para nombres 
de objetos más manuales para pacientes con la EP en redes cerebrales asociadas con la 
acción sobre los objetos. Este patrón de resultados sugiere variaciones sutiles en el 
procesamiento de objetos manipulables debido a un trastorno motor, en línea con las 
predicciones sensomotoras. 
Resumen 
En esta segunda parte de la tesis no observamos diferencias conductuales en la forma en 
la que los pacientes con la EP acceden a las representaciones de objetos manipulables, 
pero esto puede deberse al contexto de su tratamiento. Sin embargo, sí que encontramos 
evidencia de neuroimágen que sugiere que cambios en las capacidades motoras de los 
participantes pueden conducir a alteraciones medibles en la forma en la que procesan la 
semántica relativa a la acción, a nivel neuronal. 
Conclusiones 
Tomando los experimentos presentados en esta tesis de forma conjunta, tenemos 
evidencia de que el contenido y el formato de la representación conceptual de los objetos 
son multimodales y de que están basados en los sistemas cerebrales sensoriales y motores. 
También hemos mostrado evidencia de que la experiencia vital motora y sensorial de las 
personas modula sus representaciones de forma profundamente personal. Así, 
contrariamente a lo que defienden las teorías amodales, existe un solapamiento entre el 
procesamiento semántico y el sensomotor, de tal forma que los procesamientos sensorial, 
motor y semántico interactúan mutuamente con el contexto a varios niveles. Así, cada 
vez que se procesa un nombre, su representación final y su contenido varían 
dinámicamente.  
El trabajo presentado en esta tesis es novedoso y notable en varios aspectos. Para 
empezar, nuestros resultados se obtuvieron de tres modalidades o campos sensoriales: el 
visual, manual y (el gran ignorado) olfativo. El hecho de que encontremos patrones 
similares en las diferentes modalidades, utilizando paradigmas novedosos, refuerza 
nuestras conclusiones considerablemente. Como segundo aspecto, destacamos que 
nuestros resultados de interferencia de multi-tarea en los campos olfativos y visuales 
variaron acorde a la experiencia vital. Varios estudios que han comprobado hipótesis 
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similares utilizan puntuaciones de experiencia individuales agrupadas en medias 
grupales, o las obtienen de otros estudios o corpus. Nosotros, en cambio, mostramos los 
efectos a nivel individual. El tercer elemento a subrayar es que nuestras metodologías de 
interferencia son demostraciones no correlacionales de una relación funcional entre el 
procesamiento sensorial y semántico. Esto lo hace libre de cualquier crítica potencial 
relacionada con el argumento (asiduamente usado contra evidencias de neuroimágen) que 
la activación en áreas sensoriales y motoras no guarda ninguna relación con el 
procesamiento semántico, argumentando que sería simplemente una activación posterior 
epifenoménica o una activación extendida. Como cuarto aspecto, la evidencia de 
neuroimagen presentada en el cuarto capítulo experimental mejora el trabajo previo, ya 
que incluye un grupo control saludable, por lo que es informativo respecto a las 
diferencias en el procesamiento semántico debido a la EP. También emplea métodos de 
conectividad funcional, lo cual puede ser más informativo que las comparaciones de 
activaciones respecto a cuestiones relativas a la compensación conceptual y variaciones 
debido a cambios de larga duración en las capacidades de las personas.  Para terminar, 
cabe destacar que una gran parte del trabajo realizado en torno a las hipótesis 
sensomotoras se concentra en estudiar verbos, como ejemplos canónicos de semántica de 
acción. Sin embargo, aquí examinamos una predicción sensomotora sin explorar hasta 
ahora, concentrándonos en objetos concretos del día a día con los que las personas tienen 
diferentes grados de experiencia en diversos ámbitos. Aunque esto haya hecho que 
nuestra aproximación a estas hipótesis haya sido más arriesgada en términos de poder 
observar un efecto, también hace que nuestros descubrimientos sean más novedosos.  
En conjunto, nuestros resultados están en línea con teorías más recientes que hablan de 
conceptos “fluidos” (p.ej., Yee & Thompson-Schill, 2016), negando que las 
representaciones conceptuales estén delimitadas y sean unidades de significado 
fidedignas, y abogando por procesos dependientes del contexto. Esto sugiere que el 
contenido de una representación conceptual obtenido en un momento particular sería 
diferente del contenido de una representación similar en otro momento. Este contenido 
depende de la interacción entre lo que el cerebro esté ocupado haciendo en el momento 
que accede a la representación, y la naturaleza y cantidad de la experiencia vital de las 
personas con el referente de ese concepto. En general, esto sugiere que explorar la 
relación entre los conceptos y el contexto es necesario y vital para poder entender 




Chapter 1: General introduction 
1.1 Semantic memory 
People know things about the world. I know, for example, that Tbilisi is the capital of 
Georgia, spoons are better than forks for eating soup, the British flag features three 
colours and Melton-Mowbray pork pies are delicious. We learn about the world 
through our senses as we develop from newborns to geriatrics, acquiring knowledge, 
storing it and then, more often than not (with luck), using it to behave intelligently. 
The faculty which allows us to store and access knowledge is called long-term 
memory, the purpose of which, succinctly, is to permit us to successfully perceive the 
world and act within it (Glenberg, 1997). Early accounts of long-term memory (e.g., 
Squire, 1987) separate it into procedural (or implicit) and declarative (or explicit) 
memory systems. We do not usually have conscious access to the content of the former 
and cannot readily express it with words (i.e., how to walk on slippery ice). The latter, 
declarative memory (i.e., “fact-like” memory) stores knowledge available to conscious 
consideration which is, for the most part, expressible with language (e.g., Donald 
Trump won the 2016 US presidential election). Declarative memory has traditionally 
been further separated into semantic and episodic memory (Tulving, 1972). Generally 
speaking, semantic memory is thought of as distinct from episodic memory in that it 
contains general knowledge stored about the world abstracted from particular 
encounters while episodic knowledge is ephemeral and connected to a particular time 
or place; consider: “What is a car?” vs. “Where did I leave my car parked yesterday”. 
As we shall see, modern advances in the cognitive neuroscience of language challenge 
these distinctions and taxonomies in a number of interesting ways and prompt further 
questions about the nature of semantic memory. 
The conceptual representations or memory traces which constitute semantic memory 
are fundamental in cognition. One crucial role they play is to underlie the meaning of 
words and language. Though semantic memory includes the meaning of many classes 
of words such as verbs and nouns both concrete and abstract, the experiments I report 
in this thesis were confined to studying the nature of conceptual representations of 
concrete objects that are commonly referred to with noun words. While in the past 
semantics has focussed on words and their meanings (Tulving, 1972), nowadays, the 
term semantic memory means more than just word meaning. For cognitive 
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neuroscience, semantic memory includes not only words but also other kinds of 
conceptual knowledge which play a central role in sensory perception, action and 
information processing. Semantic knowledge, in this thesis, is synonymous with 
conceptual knowledge.  
The empirical literature reviewed in this introduction primarily focuses on relevant 
research into semantic memory focused on concrete objects. In the following 
introduction I briefly outline an influential cluster of theories of semantics (generally 
referred to as the amodal account), the characterisations of concepts which emerge 
from it, and then some challenging criticisms of it. I then outline the prevailing 
alternative approach to characterising semantic memory; namely, the sensorimotor 
account, and review empirical evidence in its favour. In turn, I describe prominent 
critiques of the sensorimotor approach and detail some important open questions for 
study. Finally, I outline my approach to answering them, thereby contributing to the 
debate; the experiments reported here. 
1.2 Amodal accounts 
For much of the history of research into lexical semantics, concepts have been 
characterised as units in an amodal semantic system called the mental lexicon. 
According to amodal accounts, the mental lexicon is something like a mental 
dictionary of word meanings which correspond to bounded and reliably reproduced 
lexical units. The contents of the mental lexicon include the word’s grammatical class, 
pronunciation and its meaning. In general, understanding the meaning of a noun word 
means accessing its unitary lexical concept by grasping the semantic entailments that 
it possesses. These semantic entailments have variously been characterised as; 
propositional (similar to sentence-like feature lists e.g., Fodor, 1983), evaluable for 
truth or falsity (Davidson, 1967) & hierarchical (i.e., structured in ontologies which 
involve hyponymy or hypernymy; Collins & Quillian, 1969). Concepts are 
compositional (combinable), fundamentally bounded discrete units of meaning and 
even innate (Chomsky & Smith, 2000). Conceptual representations of object nouns 
(i.e., lexical knowledge) are symbolic representations, stored in an amodal word-like 
code (sometimes referred to as “mentalese”), which are arbitrarily related to their 
referent. This means that irrespective of what specific knowledge is represented i.e., 
whether the semantic entailments include, e.g., what an object looks like or how it 
smells, the same symbolic code is used. According to the amodal approach, conceptual 
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representation and processing is functionally separate from other aspects of cognition 
like perception or action.  
1.2.1 Amodal accounts and cognitivism 
Amodal accounts are attractive from the perspective of cognitivism, the view that 
computation is the best theoretical metaphor for what the mind does (i.e., that what the 
brain does is in essence, what computers do). As a metaphor it is tempting; computers 
(or robots) can receive information from sensors, transduce it into a single (amodal) 
computable code format, process it according to algorithms, and return outputs; 
potentially even motor or linguistic outputs. Can’t human brains be said to do the 
same? Another advantage of computational metaphor is that computation is agnostic 
about hardware. In theory, any computation can be carried out on any hardware 
(Turing, 1937), even biological hardware like brains. Cognitivism has incredible 
explanatory use, and useful models of psychological phenomena that are based on it 
are plentiful. Its effects can be seen in many of the vast leaps forward in formal logic 
and linguistics, computer science, and artificial intelligence over the last 50 years. 
However, because cognition and amodal formal computation differ in important ways 
the amodal account of semantics faces a number of significant challenges.  
1.2.2 Criticisms of amodal accounts: Grounding problem 
Firstly, one major challenge for theorists is to explain how conceptual representations 
(either in computers or in brains) are “correctly” connected to their referents. In other 
words, what the nature is of the connection between signifiers (words or symbols) and 
denotations (referents or objects in the world). This problem is known as the grounding 
problem (Harnad, 1990) and is elegantly laid out in the Chinese room thought 
experiment (Searle, 1980) which asks us to imagine a monolingual English speaker 
seated in a cubicle, in possession of a Chinese to Chinese phrasebook. When slips of 
paper are slipped to him, covered with Mandarin characters, he dutifully transposes, 
using his trusty manual, the input to a suitable output and pushes responses out of the 
room. Presumably, if the phrasebook is any good, the responses should be suitable and 
meaningful to those Chinese speakers outside the room. But crucially, from his 
perspective, he has no idea whatsoever what any of the symbols mean. The strong 
intuition here is that computers cannot “understand” the meaning of what they 
compute, that symbolic systems alone cannot ground knowledge meaningfully. In the 
case of computers, humans ground the symbols for them. Thus, the work of meaning 
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is kicked down the road. How, then, are the conceptual representations involved in 
human cognition grounded in the world? 
1.2.3 Criticisms of amodal accounts: Architecture 
Another criticism of amodal accounts is that their modular structure does not seem to 
fit well with what we know about brains; that they are highly interconnected and plastic 
networks of organic neurons. Brains evolved over millions of years to be perfectly 
integrated with sensory organs and action systems in bodies so as to permit animals to 
act successfully in their environment. Because symbolic computers did not develop 
this way, an obvious worry is that the hardware of cognition seems different to that of 
computation. While architectural differences are not problematic per se (as mentioned, 
symbolic computation is hardware agnostic) it is possible that, because brain 
architecture is varied and different cortical and subcortical regions process different 
types of input or output (i.e., visual, auditory, haptic) the processing that symbolic 
computers do may differ importantly to the processing that brains in fact do.   
1.2.4 Criticisms of amodal accounts: Representational format 
This leads naturally on to a related criticism of amodal accounts – one that challenges 
the contention that conceptual content and processing is symbolic and amodal in 
nature. As we have seen, in amodal accounts computation involves abstract symbols 
which don’t reflect any features of its referents. However, content in human cognition 
seems to involve a variety of different formats of knowledge representation: visual, 
linguistic, olfactory, motor etc. In line with this, some theorists have tried to include 
further codes into their models (e.g., dual linguistic and visual codes; Paivio, 1990) 
however, these theories were developed before a number of important developments 
in cognitive neuroscience. It is interesting to note that Barsalou’s perceptual symbols 
system are an attempt to bridge the gap between the symbolic and the perceptual by 
positing perceptual symbols (Barsalou, 1999).  
To summarise, traditional amodal accounts are not considered to be readily compatible 
with current understanding of either the neural structure of the brain, or how it has 
been shown to process information. For example, they fail to adequately explain how 
meaning can be grounded in the world, capture and store information in formats 
sensitive to specific sensory modalities or how functional modularity could be 
implemented in the brain’s inter-connected architecture. 
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1.3 Sensorimotor accounts of semantics 
In light of these challenges, a number of competing explanations have developed for 
semantic content. For example, cognitive linguistics (Lakoff, 1987) sought to provide 
an implementable model of word meaning in terms of brain based meaningful content. 
In opposition to amodal theories (Chomsky & Smith, 2000; Fodor, 1983), according 
to cognitive linguistics, the faculty of language is not modular and separate from other 
areas of cognition such as perception and action. Language is just like other brain-
based processes and describing it accurately means making it consistent with our 
knowledge of the brain. By combining linguistics and psychology, cognitive 
linguistics posited a bi-directional relationship between language and cognition in 
which linguistic categories such as concrete object noun words are defined through 
embodied and situated experience with the world alongside language experience.  
Another influential alternative view, in line with cognitive linguistics, has developed, 
namely the sensorimotor approach1 (alternatively referred to as embodied approach) 
(Allport, 1985; Barsalou, 1999; Damasio, 1989; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). It argues 
that current amodal or cognitivist accounts are not compatible with our understanding 
of the brain and how it processes information and highlights that as embodied agents, 
our interactions with the world and objects within it are mediated through our 
sensorimotor capacities. It maintains that conceptual representations of objects are 
grounded in the world because their representations involve the same perceptual and 
action brain areas active when experiencing those objects and that the representational 
format of concepts, rather than being amodal, is multimodal. Given that the brain 
processes information from the senses in a variegated and distributed way over the 
cortex, representations can be said to resemble their referents insofar as the distribution 
of labour between sense modalities in experience is mirrored in long-term semantic 
memory. Specifically, when we identify objects or read their names, our successful 
recognition or comprehension of them is (at least partly) due to re-activation of those 
sensorimotor regions involved in our previous experiences of perceiving or interacting 
with them. 
                                               
1While not often associated with distributed and dynamic accounts of experience based 
sensorimotor semantics similar ideas were also suggested or explored by Wernicke & 
Freud (Gage & Hickok, 2005). 
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1.3.1 Distributed multimodal semantic representations 
Activating the mental representation of an object means re-activating parts of the brain 
generally active when it is experienced, recapitulating our learned experiences of it. 
Because of this, sensorimotor representations are sympathetic to featural models of 
semantics because fragmentary conceptual representations are distributed along a 
variety of dimensions including (but not limited to) functional (how something is used 
or what it does), visual (what it looks like), motor (how it can be interacted with) and 
emotional (what type of affect it is associated with). This information clusters around 
parts of the brain responsible for acquiring it, meaning that information about an 
object’s taste or odour is stored in olfactory or gustatory brain areas, its shape and 
colour in visual cortices and how it is manipulated in motor regions etc. For instance, 
when we hear the word pen, both visual regions and regions involved in coordinating 
the movement of the hand and arm should be activated, while hearing words like cloud 
or satellite, which refer to objects that are rarely touched, should in most people, 
activate predominately visual areas. The functional relationships between noun words 
(object labels) and their distributed sensorimotor representations may develop as a 
result of their regular coactivation. In Hebbian terms: those neuronal patterns which 
fire together, wire together (Hebb, 1949).    
1.3.2 Evidence in support of sensorimotor accounts – Neuroimaging 
Cognitive neuroscience uses neuroimaging methods such as functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalography (EEG), magnetoencephalography 
(MEG) to measure the activity of the brain while it performs cognitive tasks. Of 
particular interest to this review are insights gained from fMRI studies. fMRI is a non-
invasive method of measuring in-vivo and in context the amount activity happening in 
the brain at different locations over time. It has a very good spatial resolution (i.e., it 
is excellent at locating activation to millimetre precision) but relatively poor temporal 
resolution (on the order of seconds). Its dependent measure is the blood oxygen level 
dependent (BOLD) signal, which is a measure of the relative amount of oxygen and 
carbon dioxide present in a given brain location at a given time. The BOLD signal 
tracks glucose uptake in the neurones of the brain and is treated as a measure of 
metabolic activity. By comparing the functional brain activity (three dimensional maps 
of BOLD signal changing over time) of people while they perform different cognitive 
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tasks it is possible to identify which areas of the brain are involved in carrying them 
out.  
Functional maps of the brain have been developed based on the insights of and 
neuroimaging (along with many other fields such as neuropsychology, neurobiology, 
basic neuroscience, tractography etc.). These heterogenous functional maps have 
localised areas of the brain related to many cognitive functions. For the purposes of 
this review, of particular importance are the areas of the cortex associated with sensory 
and motor processing and the fact that these areas of the brain are commonly structured 
(at the structural, connectivity, neuronal and cytoarchitectonic levels etc.) in such a 
way as to be specialised for processing the peculiarities of the types of information 
they are associated with. This can be seen in the visual system, for example, where 
visual input from the eye is fed into a distributed processing stream of increasing 
complexity with units specialised for processing edges, colours, movement etc, or the 
motor system which is organised (somatotopically) such that spatially distinct areas 
are responsible for controlling the hands, legs, mouth etc., resulting in a map like 
distribution of specialisation. Summarizing, distinct cortical and subcortical parts of 
the brain are highly specialised to process information from different senses.  
In line with the predictions of the sensorimotor approach, cognitive neuroimaging 
fMRI studies indicate that processing objects (as the result of naming them or 
reading/hearing their names) results in the selective activation of brain areas involved 
in their experience (Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009; R. F. Goldberg, Perfetti, 
& Schneider, 2006; Robert F Goldberg, Perfetti, & Schneider, 2006; Alex Martin, 
2007; Noppeney & Price, 2003). In the case of vision, for example, visual features 
such as the shape (Wheatley, Weisberg, Beauchamp, & Martin, 2005) or colour 
(Simmons et al., 2007) of objects is stored in the ventral occipital cortex in an area 
known as the fusiform gyrus (the lateral mid FG in the case of the former and an area 
known as FG-alpha for the latter). Different classes of items such as tools and animals 
which differ in their typical visual features, and the relative importance of highly 
specific visual information for their recognition, lead to spatially distinct activation 
(medial for tools, lateral for animals) in this FG area (Chao & Martin, 1999). Another 
area, the lateral occipital complex (LOC) seems to represent “whole” objects, i.e., the 
viewpoint invariant visual composition of specific objects (Grill-Spector, Kourtzi, & 
Kanwisher, 2001). 
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In general, seeing photos and reading the names of objects associated with a particular 
modality leads to specific activation in relevant areas. For example tasty foods or 
smelly objects lead to activation of the orbitofrontal cortex and insula, parts of the 
brain involved in actually eating and smelling objects (Barrós-Loscertales et al., 2011; 
R. F. Goldberg et al., 2006; Robert F Goldberg et al., 2006; González et al., 2006; 
Simmons, Martin, & Barsalou, 2005), and objects associated with sound (such as 
musical instruments) cause the selective recruitment of left-lateralised and posterior 
regions of the superior and middle temporal gyri, areas predominately involved in 
processing input from the ears (Hoenig et al., 2011; Kiefer, Sim, Herrnberger, Grothe, 
& Hoenig, 2008). 
The representation of simple motor plans is associated with parietal regions, 
specifically the anterior intraparietal sulcus (aIPS) and the supramarginal gyrus. More 
sophisticated motor representations are associated with the ventro-lateral pre-motor 
cortex (vPMC) (for review see: Johnson-Frey, 2004). Activating functional 
information about how to use or manipulate objects associated with these regions 
occurs as a result of seeing images or processing their noun word labels (Chouinard & 
Goodale, 2010; Saccuman et al., 2006). A number of studies indicate that highly 
specific information about objects is represented in the motor system, for example, 
detailed knowledge of how they are manipulated (Boronat et al., 2005; Hargreaves et 
al., 2012; Rueschemeyer, van Rooij, Lindemann, Willems, & Bekkering, 2010; Yee, 
Drucker, & Thompson-Schill, 2010).  
Recent advances in fMRI data analysis and linguistic corpus analysis have resulted in 
a number of studies reporting that semantic information about nouns is distributed over 
the cortex in a tiled fashion in which the meaning of words similarly related to certain 
sensory dimensions cluster around relevant areas of the brain (cf Barsalou, 2017; Huth, 
de Heer, Griffiths, Theunissen, & Gallant, 2016; Mitchell et al., 2008).  
In general, neuroimaging research shows significant overlap in areas associated with 
online action and perception and accessing semantics through language. As outlined 
below complementary findings come from neuropsychology and patient data. 
1.3.3 Evidence in support of sensorimotor accounts - Neuropsychology 
Neuropsychology studies patient populations with cognitive deficits as a result of brain 
damage or non-standard development. The insights gained from studying cognitive 
deficits as a result of damage (lesions) are particularly useful because they inform us 
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of which areas of the brain are functionally associated with different cognitive 
functions. Early neuropsychological findings showing category specific deficits (i.e., 
living things vs non-living things) in some patients lead researchers to posit that object 
concepts are distributed in a domain specific way, according to categories (Warrington 
& Mccarthy, 1987). While some researchers argue for an approach like this because it 
considers that certain categories are more evolutionarily relevant for us than others 
(i.e., food, tools etc; Caramazza & Shelton, 1998), and there is some lesion evidence 
in support of it (Farah & Rabinowitz, 2003), a different account in line with 
sensorimotor theories has developed. The sensory functional view acknowledges that 
certain categories of objects tend to correlate with particular modalities, and that the 
importance of them for a category is differentially weighted (Warrington & Shallice, 
1984). For example, visual information about living objects is very important for 
specific identification or distinguishing of species, whereas the most relevant 
information about tools seems to be functional. This means that the features or 
attributes of objects are represented in relevant modalities, as suggested by the 
sensorimotor approach.  
If certain semantic knowledge is reliant on parts of the brain active during experience, 
as suggested by neuroimaging findings, then damage to those areas should lead to 
deficits in that knowledge, which seems to be the case: Lesions in sensorimotor regions 
do indeed lead to semantic deficits for objects which are reliant on that modality (G 
Gainotti, 2000). For example, lesions to the superior temporal gyrus (STG) lead to 
impairments to sound related concepts (Bonner & Grossman, 2012; Trumpp, Kliese, 
Hoenig, Haarmeier, & Kiefer, 2013). Lesions to the visual areas such as the lateral 
occipital complex (LOC) impair the visual recognition of objects but do not affect 
encyclopaedic knowledge of those objects (Wolk, Coslett, & Glosser, 2005). 
Furthermore, computational models of semantics based on the sensory functional 
approach show similar “semantic failures” in neural network models when their 
systems are experimentally lesioned (Farah & McClelland, 1991).  
It should be noted that it has been argued that neuropsychological data does not fit well 
with sensorimotor accounts (e.g., Caramazza & Shelton, 1998). However, the balance 
of evidence seems to be in its favour and that difficulties in activating and integrating 
stored semantic information from modality specific regions lies behind many semantic 
agnosias (difficulty naming) in which failures to recognise objects are frequently 
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resolved after individuals are provided with further cues through manipulating, hearing 
or smelling objects.  
1.3.4 Evidence in support of sensorimotor accounts - Psycholinguistics 
Further support for sensorimotor accounts comes from psycholinguistics. Eye tracking 
research shows that a great deal of sensory and motor information about the visual or 
manipulable characteristics of objects is automatically and quickly activated when we 
read their names (even when we are not conscious of having done so, (e.g., masked 
priming studies)) and which can prime us to look at other items which are similar along 
those dimensions (Yee & Sedivy, 2006). When reading language, we seem to activate 
visual representations of what the language describes in the visual system which 
speeds up our responses to matching and slows them to mismatching images later 
presented (Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002). 
1.3.5 Evidence in support of sensorimotor accounts – Multitasking paradigms 
Many behavioural studies designed to test sensorimotor accounts involve variants of 
multitasking paradigms which are (conceptually), an alternative to lesion studies that 
do not rely either on accidents of nature like brain damage or on artificial methods of 
interrupting the neuronal activity at a particular place on the cortex such as transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) or transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS).  
The logic behind the multitasking methodology paradigm is that if two concurrent 
cognitive processes share the same neural resources then; because the brain has limited 
processing resources, performing one of these cognitive tasks while simultaneously 
performing another may cause them to interact and affect performance on one or both 
tasks. In the case at hand, i.e., testing sensorimotor accounts of semantic processing; 
concurrent semantic processes and other, ostensibly unrelated, perceptual or motor 
processing should selectively interact only when the semantic content being accessed 
relies significantly on the sensorimotor modalities being taxed.  
The dynamics of the interactions in multitasking experiments are complex and depend 
on a number of factors. First, they may result in facilitation and interference (to one or 
both tasks) as a result of sympathetic vs antagonistic coactivation (Connell & Lynott, 
2012). Furthermore, following the logic of resource conflict in the brain, the degree to 
which multitasking interacts should scale, on an item by item basis, in relation to how 
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important a particular modality is for its conceptual representation, factors which 
influence this such as lifetime experience will be discussed below.  
One study found that a task which taxes visual brain areas (remembering three 
coloured shapes) made verifying visual properties of a concept (e.g., “is it green?”) 
more difficult and conversely a task which taxed the auditory modality (remembering 
three tones) interfered with verifying auditory properties (e.g., “does it buzz?”) 
(Vermeulen, Corneille, & Niedenthal, 2008). Other studies have shown similar effects 
for repetitive hand movement interfering with accessing the representations of 
manipulable objects (Yee, Chrysikou, Hoffman, & Thompson-Schill, 2013) 
These findings provide evidence that conceptual processing, to at least some degree, 
shares resources with those which are taxed by concurrent sensory or motor tasks and 
suggest that sensorimotor areas are not peripheral to semantic processing. 
1.4 Criticisms of sensorimotor accounts  
The convergent evidence in support of sensorimotor theories is sizeable. However, a 
number of challenges to the approach have been proposed. It is to these that I now 
turn.  
First, a number of behavioural studies which report findings in support of embodied 
cognition have been challenged on theoretical, design and statistical bases (Firestone 
& Scholl, 2014, 2016), others have failed to replicate in large pre-registered replication 
studies (Garrison, Tang, & Schmeichel, 2016). These “technical” criticisms are best 
addressed by ensuring that experimental design, analyses and adequate replications are 
carried out with due diligence. The work reported in this thesis was done with these 
considerations in mind.  
Second, the fact that most studies involving word processing do not involve total 
breakdown in accessing the meaning of nouns, i.e., participants and patients mostly 
“get there in the end just fine”, might suggest that sensorimotor areas are not “critical” 
for representing the meaning of nouns. With regards to this criticism, it should be 
highlighted that, in fact, sensorimotor models are well placed to provide an account 
for this. Given the highly distributed nature of conceptual representations, almost all 
objects will be structured along a number of sensory or functional dimensions over 
relevant parts of the cortex. This means that where one part of a representation is 
damaged or temporarily inaccessible, other, preserved parts of the representation can 
“take up the slack”. In other words, sensorimotor representations are, by their nature, 
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more robust to catastrophic failure than amodal representations, and particularly well 
suited to allow for graceful degradation of meaning.  
A similar issue is that evidence from lesion studies is mixed. For example, lesions to 
motor regions do not always coincide with measurable conceptual impairments to 
motor concepts and vice versa (Mahon & Caramazza, 2005). That lesion studies 
sometimes do not line up with the predictions of sensorimotor accounts is indeed a 
challenge. One potential criticism of patient studies which is less readily levelled at 
multitasking paradigms is that aggregating data from patients with the “same” lesions 
is fraught with difficulty not least because of the complexity of the human brain and 
its interconnected nature. To avoid this criticism, studies which demonstrate 
modulations of concrete noun processing as a result of controlled interventions to 
sensorimotor areas are needed, interventions such as behavioural multitasking 
experiments.  
A major criticism levelled at the sensorimotor approach concerns neuroimaging 
findings. The charge is that any activation observed in sensory regions putatively as a 
result of semantic processing does not definitively demonstrate that these regions are 
involved in representing the meaning of noun words. It remains logically possible that 
the observed activation results from a number of processes downstream from semantic 
resolution such as post-comprehension explicit mental imagery or automatic spreading 
neural activation (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). If this criticism is correct, the 
activation of sensorimotor areas during semantic tasks could be equally well explained 
by a model of representation in which activation spreads to sensorimotor areas during 
or after conceptual access, perhaps in order to “enrich” cognition, but in which this 
sensorimotor activation is not a part of concepts, i.e., the amodal view. One-way 
researchers try to address this challenge is to show that sensorimotor recruitment 
happens very quickly, thereby indicating that it is automatic and functionally important 
rather than incidental and downstream (e.g., Hoenig, Sim, Bochev, Herrnberger, & 
Kiefer, 2008; Wheatley et al., 2005). While speed is indeed suggestive and 
informative, it still suffers the criticisms that correlated activity (no matter the speed) 
does not definitively indicate that sensorimotor areas are part of conceptual meaning. 
In order to convincingly show that sensorimotor regions are functionally involved in 
object comprehension (i.e., constitutive of meaning), as opposed to incidentally co-
activated (i.e., peripheral or epiphenomenal), non-correlational paradigms must be 
employed. 
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1.4.1 Open questions 
In order to address the above challenges, further work needs to be done to demonstrate 
that sensorimotor areas are functionally related to meaning and that semantic 
processing is not amodal and insulated from other perceptual and motor processing, 
but rather that these processes interact in deep and important ways. As well as 
addressing criticisms, much work needs to be done on unpacking as yet under 
emphasized but nonetheless critical aspects of the sensorimotor theory. One such 
aspect is the need to study sensorimotor concepts “in context”. It is to this topic that I 
now turn.  
1.5 Concepts in context  
Early on, cognitive linguistics (Lakoff, 1987) emphasised the importance of studying 
human cognition in ways sympathetic both to insights about the brain, but also as 
embodied and situated or embedded in social, linguistic and sensory contexts. Much 
of cognitive science now acknowledges the importance of this insight (Clark, 2001; 
Di Paolo, Cuffari, & De Jaegher, 2018; Varela, Thompson, Rosch, & Kabat-Zinn, 
2016). In line with this, the sensorimotor view maintains, in contrast to amodal 
accounts, that the conceptual system is not separated from sensation or action, that 
sensory experience with objects shapes their representations and that ongoing activity 
in perceptual or motor areas affects how meaning is activated (Yee, Chrysikou, & 
Thompson-Schill, 2013). If the nature of object concepts is as suggested by the 
sensorimotor account then they are not clearly-delimited context-free “nuggets” of 
meaning which are reliably and consistently activated each time we read their names. 
Rather, the concepts which underlie the meaning of words are best characterised as 
contextually fluid to a functionally relevant degree. 
While some theorists suggest that thought is so fundamentally dynamic and that even 
the notion of conceptual representations is unnecessary (Chemero, 2011; Elman, 
2009), for the purposes of this thesis I will focus primarily on the more circumscribed 
insight that viewing conceptual representations as stable and context free is a 
problematic oversimplification (D Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015; Connell & Lynott, 
2014; Spivey, 2008; Yee, 2017; Yee & Thompson-Schill, 2016). Specifically, 
considering concepts in context here means: A) studying a person’s immediate sensory 
or motor context and how that interacts with semantic processing i.e., studying the 
dynamics between concurrent sensory and semantic processing. B) Studying personal 
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context: either in terms of an individual’s particular lifetime sensorimotor experience 
with objects and/or fundamental changes in a person’s sensorimotor capacities as a 
result of illness. In the following sections I describe these “contexts” in more detail 
(for further discussion see; Yee & Thompson-Schill, 2016).  
1.5.1 Immediate context 
In the first case, because of resource competition (as in multitasking paradigms), what 
the brain is busy doing at any moment (e.g., sensing, perceiving) can affect other 
processes (e.g., accessing semantics). This means that semantic information retrieved 
at a given moment varies from other moments. Perhaps this is because not all aspects 
of a representation is available, possibly due to interference or lesioning (Bub, Masson, 
& Cree, 2008; Yee, Chrysikou, Hoffman, et al., 2013) or certain featural dimensions 
that are more strongly activated, or perhaps because attention has been directed to them 
as a result of a task (Yee, Ahmed, & Thompson-Schill, 2012). Or particular dimensions 
are under activated because they are not relevant for a particular context (Barsalou, 
1983). More work needs to be done on mapping out the ways that immediate context 
and semantics interact 
1.5.2 Lifetime experience 
Because, at a certain level, people’s lifetime experiences are largely similar, enormous 
progress has been made with “averaging approaches” to studying semantic memory, 
however, as an important prediction of sensorimotor-based accounts of object concepts 
is that an object concept’s representation is (at least partially) constructed from our 
lifetime experiences with that object, it also follows that variability in people’s 
sensorimotor experience with objects should affect, at the individual level, how a 
concept’s representation will be instantiated in the brain. At a fundamental level, 
because individual brains develop and change over the lifetime and because the 
content of language and the brain are interconnected, then the representations 
underlying word meaning are personal. Personal semantics involves representations 
which are labile and shift as we gain new knowledge through sensory and motor 
interactions with objects in the world. Important to note is that while it seems possible 
(and likely) that semantic knowledge can be gained through other experiential paths 
(Renoult, Davidson, Palombo, Moscovitch, & Levine, 2012) e.g., book learning or 
internal thought processes such as mental rehearsal etc., further discussion of these 
topics is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this introduction. 
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According to sensorimotor accounts, as a result of experience, the semantic 
representations of particular concrete objects should be represented to a greater degree 
over brain areas supporting some modalities than others. As a first example, in the case 
of cutlery, our previous experience of using them with our hands should result in their 
representations extending into areas of the brain related to manual manipulation 
However, our representations of clouds, which we almost exclusively experience 
visually, should load very little on manual but rather more heavily onto visual areas of 
the brain. However, many objects are less ubiquitously experienced than cutlery and 
clouds. Objects for which there is more personal variability in experience are good test 
cases for the predictions of sensorimotor accounts. For these objects, over time their 
representations should alter subtly insofar as the distribution of their sensorimotor 
representations would “gravitate” to different modalities as a result of variegated 
individual experience. There is evidence that this is true, with respect to relatively 
long-term experience where it has been found that musicians show differences to non-
musicians in auditory cortex when reading the names of or naming pictures of musical 
instruments (Hoenig et al., 2011; Trumpp et al., 2013), the handedness of people (i.e., 
the hand they use to manipulate objects with) leads to complementary differences in 
the lateralisation of activation of the premotor cortex when naming tools (Kan, Kable, 
Van Scoyoc, Chatterjee, & Thompson-Schill, 2006) and that lifetime tactile experience 
with a variety of everyday objects changes the recruitment of parietal cortex for 
processing their names (Oliver, Geiger, Lewandowski, & Thompson-Schill, 2009). 
Similarly, with respect to relatively shorter-term experience, periods of olfactory, 
visual or manual training on previously unknown objects have been shown to affect 
how objects are represented in related modality specific regions of the brain 
(Bellebaum et al., 2013; Ghio, Schulze, Suchan, & Bellebaum, 2016; Oliver et al., 
2009; Weisberg, Van Turennout, & Martin, 2007). Finally, some convergent evidence 
also comes from a number of behavioural studies which showed that the amount of 
experience a person has with a given object in a particular modality shapes the degree 
to which their personal representation of that object is represented over that modality 
(Chrysikou, Casasanto, & Thompson-Schill, 2017; Yee, Chrysikou, Hoffman, et al., 
2013). 
1.6 The current thesis  
The objective of the experimental chapters reported in this thesis is to examine whether 
sensorimotor areas are functionally (not epiphenomenally) related to semantic 
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representations by employing non-correlational multitasking methodologies which are 
not susceptible to some prominent criticisms levelled at neuroimaging evidence. 
Furthermore, these methodologies allow us, simultaneously, to challenge the amodal 
approach’s tenet; that semantic memory is amodal and modular (i.e., separate from 
other perceptual and motor processing systems), by demonstrating that what the body 
is doing at a given moment influences cognition and by measuring those semantic-
sensory-perceptual interactions. In addition, in order to further extend our 
understanding of semantic memory in a novel direction, these experiments were 
designed to explore the dynamic interplay of context (whether personal; i.e., in lifetime 
sensorimotor experience, momentary or acquired, across three distinct sensory 
modalities) and conceptual processing, to test how the content of distributed 
sensorimotor concepts available for thought varies dynamically; to explore concepts 
in context. The research presented in this thesis departs from much work to date which 
seeks generalizable models of semantics focusing predominately on commonalities in 
cognition; i.e., findings averaged over people and in simplified contexts, and instead 
focuses on the way semantic phenomena vary according to the particulars of individual 





Part 1 – Visual and olfactory modalities 
 
The first two experimental chapters of this thesis report two studies designed to test 
visual and olfactory components of object representations.   
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Chapter 2: Visual experience and object representations 
2.1 Introduction  
Vision is an extremely important perceptual modality for experiencing the world and 
is often vital for object recognition. This is because many objects are most readily or 
commonly differentiated based on visual properties like their form, size or colour (e.g., 
species of animals or tools). Experience with concrete objects is sometimes entirely 
mediated through vision (e.g., moon), else, visual information still commonly forms 
an important part of multimodal experience with objects. Sensorimotor theories predict 
that if objects are visually experienced then their representations should extend over 
brain regions related to visual processing. For these reasons, vision is a promising 
modality in which to test the predictions of sensorimotor accounts. 
As discussed in the general introduction, many neuroimaging (fMRI) studies have 
shown that when people think about the visual features of objects the ventral stream 
(including many areas of the brain responsible for vision) are activated (e.g., 
Anderson, Bruni, Lopopolo, Poesio, & Baroni, 2015; Chao & Martin, 1999; Coutanche 
& Thompson-Schill, 2015; A. Martin, Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, & Ungerleider, 1995; 
Simmons et al., 2007; S. Thompson-Schill, Aguirre, D’Esposito, & Farah, 1999; 
Wheatley et al., 2005). Furthermore, neuropsychological research suggests a 
functional relationship between the semantic representations of objects and these areas 
as lesions in the LOC, an area involved in processing visual objects, lead to 
impairments in the visual recognition of objects (e.g., Wolk et al., 2005). 
Similarly, psycholinguistic research suggests that when language describing objects is 
processed, a rich visual “simulation” of what is conveyed is activated. After people 
hear verbal descriptions of an object, they recognise visually congruent depictions of 
what is described more quickly than incongruent images, i.e., if they hear “the man 
picked up the nail from the table”, a picture of a nail lying in a box is recognised faster, 
or named more quickly, than a picture of one ready to be hammered (Pecher, van 
Dantzig, Zwaan, & Zeelenberg, 2009; Zwaan et al., 2002). Crucially, because the 
sentences imply certain visual properties, but do not explicitly state them, and pictures 
in both conditions (i.e., matching or mis-matching) depict the same object, picture-
sentence match-facilitation is taken as evidence of people routinely activating more 
fulsome visual simulations of the language than provided by the individual words 
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alone. Using such tasks, it has been shown that implied orientation (Stanfield & 
Zwaan, 2001) and shape (Zwaan et al., 2002) information is activated by language.  
Some authors have failed to replicate the orientation simulation effects (Rommers, 
Meyer, & Huettig, 2013) and argue that visual simulation is not automatic and is task 
dependent. However, a large online replication of both the orientation and shape 
effects (Zwaan & Pecher, 2012), and supporting evidence from eye tracking 
(Wassenburg & Zwaan, 2010) suggests, on balance, that rich visual mental simulations 
of what is described by language arise online as we process it, at least for some 
properties (see: Connell, 2007; for evidence that colour information is different).  
While the above experiments involve sentence comprehension, there is further 
behavioural evidence that even single words like object names activate the visual 
features of their referents. In visual search tasks, hearing the name of a target (e.g., 
“cat”) boosts people’s ability to find an image of that item more than non-linguistic, 
but valid, cues like canonically associated sounds (e.g., “miaow”) (Lupyan, 2012) and 
makes people more likely to correctly predict its presence, even when targets are 
placed out of conscious visual awareness using constant flash suppression techniques 
(Lupyan & Ward, 2013). It is also well established that processing the names of objects 
primes us to think about things that have similar shapes (Pecher, Zeelenberg, & 
Raaijmakers, 1998; Schreuder, Flores d’Arcais, & Glazenborg, 1984; Yee, Huffstetler, 
& Thompson-Schill, 2011).  
While these findings are very suggestive, as outlined in the introduction, it is important 
to show that visual areas are functionally related to semantic processing. If, as the 
sensorimotor account maintains, overlapping visual brain regions are involved both in 
visual perception and semantic processing, then concurrent processes, both reliant on 
those regions, should interact with one another. Some research, employing visual-
semantic multitasking paradigms suggests that this is the case. For example, people’s 
sensitivity to identifying the direction of dot array motion is interfered with by 
simultaneously processing “incongruent” language e.g., hearing the verb fall while 
viewing arrays suggesting upwards movement (Meteyard, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 
2007; Meteyard, Zokaei, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2008), or alternatively people’s 
ability to process directional language (verbs) is facilitated by congruent motion 
(Kaschak et al., 2005). While these examples support the view that visual processing 
and semantic processing can interact, at least with sentence or verb processing, little 
work has thus far been done on the question of whether similar effects can be observed 
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when processing single object names. One study found that a short-term memory task, 
designed to tax visual brain areas, made verifying visual properties of an object more 
difficult as compared to a task which taxed the auditory modality (Vermeulen et al., 
2008) and another similar experiment even found that simply presenting probe 
questions visually incurred a processing cost for visual (but not auditory) property 
verification (Vermeulen, Chang, Corneille, Pleyers, & Mermillod, 2013). One recent 
study (Edmiston & Lupyan, 2017) demonstrated that visual interference (quickly 
flashing rectangles) disrupted participant’s ability to verify explicitly probed 
information about visual properties rather than encyclopaedic information about 
objects (though see: Ostarek & Huettig, 2017 for evidence that these effects are task 
dependent). Finally, one study (Rey, Riou, Vallet, & Versace, 2017) observed that a 
visual mask, perceptually absent (but reactivated from visual memory), interfered with 
making semantic judgements on object names and that the magnitude of this dual-task-
interference was correlated with ratings of each item’s visual perceptual strength i.e., 
the relative degree to which visual features are important to that object’s representation 
(see: Lynott & Connell, 2013). It seems, therefore, that accessing object 
representations associated with visual experience can be interfered with concurrent 
visual tasks.  
However, it remains to be seen whether the amount of visual experience a person has 
shapes object representations by determining the degree to which they are represented 
in visual areas. While there is little evidence examining this in the visual modality 
(though see: Davis et al, 2019: a study conducted after the ones described in this 
chapter, which we return to in the general discussion), in the manual modality one 
study (Yee, Chrysikou, Hoffman, et al., 2013) employed two concurrent tasks, 
intended to selectively occupy the motor system or the mental rotation system while 
participants made semantic judgements about objects which varied in how much 
lifetime manual versus visual experience participants had had with them. Promisingly, 
they found that lifetime manual experience with a given object predicted how much 
the manual task interfered with making the semantic judgement. However, their mental 
rotation control task, which might be construed as a visual task, did not cause relatively 
greater interference to the semantic processing of more-visually-experienced objects. 
This may have been because, as the authors pointed out, mental rotation is thought to 
be sub-served by the superior parietal lobe (Isabel Gauthier et al., 2002), which is not 
the part of the visual system that has been commonly linked to visual object 
recognition (i.e., the Lateral Occipital Complex; Farah & Hammond, 1988). If this is 
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the case, then the absence of interference between the retrieval of object semantics for 
more visual objects is not surprising. Thus, it is still unclear whether lifetime visual 
experience influences the representations of concrete objects in the same way as 
suggested for manual experience. Given this gap in the literature, here we sought to 
explore these issues more fully. 
2.1.1 Questions 
In this chapter I report two experiments which were designed to explore central 
predictions of sensorimotor accounts and to gain new insights into the interplay 
between language and perception. Firstly, we wanted to test whether visual brain areas 
are functionally (not incidentally) important for visual components of object 
representations. Therefore, we tested if occupying the visual system with a visual task 
causes greater interference to the processing of words referring to more-visual objects 
than to less-visual object names. Secondly, because we wanted to explore how 
semantic and visual processing mutually interact, we tested if thinking about words 
referring to more-visual objects causes greater interference to doing a visual task than 
less-visual object names. Finally, because we were interested in how personal visual 
experience with objects affects their representations, we used participants’ own ratings 
of lifetime visual experience with items in our analyses.  
2.1.2 Predictions 
If the semantic representations of objects associated with more visual experience 
involve the same brain areas as those employed in the visual task (i.e., visual areas), 
we predict that conceptual processing and visual processing will interfere with each 
other. Furthermore, we predict that interference will relate to the amount of lifetime 
visual experience people have with objects.  
2.1.3 The experiments 
An early analysis of data from the semantic task of experiment 1 was previously 
reported (Boddy & Yee, 2013 unpublished Master thesis). However, multitasking 
interference effects could have manifested in a number of ways in that experiment, 
i.e., in both tasks, only in the semantic task or only in the visual task. Thus, here we 
present an analysis designed to examine a possibility that was not explored in the prior 
work – that interference will manifest in the visual task. To do this, we use a dependent 
variable that was collected, but not analysed in the earlier work, namely participants’ 
responses to the visual task. We also present a re-analysis of the semantic task data 
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from experiment 1. In experiment 2, we present new data from a follow-up experiment 
which modified the procedure of experiment 1 and also included several other 
refinements designed to optimise the experiment’s statistical power to detect any effect 
of concurrent visual task processing on conceptual processing and vice versa. 
2.2 Experiment 1  
2.2.1 Motivation 
Because, at the time of this study, previous work did not observe semantic-perceptual 
interference in the visual domain (Yee, Chrysikou, Hoffman, et al., 2013), we decided 
to use a visual task intended to be more likely to interfere with parts of the visual 
system that support visual object recognition (i.e., the lateral occipital cortex) than a 
mental rotation task: namely Multiple Object Tracking (MOT) (Pylyshyn & Storm, 
1988). This task, which requires participants to track a number of pre-cued moving 
targets in a field of identical distractors over a short period, is broadly similar to those 
used in the literature previously (e.g., moving dot arrays or spirals: Kaschak et al., 
2005; Meteyard et al., 2007), but differs from those tasks in that the movement 
component of the visual task was orthogonal to the content probed in the semantic task 
(i.e., single concrete nouns referring to a wide range of objects not associated with 
canonical directional movement). In our experiment, because the visual stimuli do not 
resemble the tested objects, and motion was not relevant to making judgements, the 
required visual processing demand for the task, per se, was predicted to interfere with 
semantic processing alone. Another benefit of the MOT task is that because continuous 
visual tracking (i.e., sustained visual attention over time) is required for successful task 
completion, it is appropriate for use as an interfering concurrent task to auditory 
language processing, which itself unfolds over time (Connell & Lynott, 2012). Finally, 
performance on the MOT task has the added advantage of providing a measure of 
accuracy, which, as described below, affords an extra dependent variable of interest 
and therefore a more fine-grained way of looking at interactions between concurrent 
semantic and visual processing. Furthermore, there is some suggestive evidence of the 
MOT task interacting with language (Kunar, Carter, Cohen, & Horowitz, 2008) though 




The final study sample consisted of 33 (M age = 23 years, range = 19-36 years, 14 
male) native Spanish speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision who were 
paid for participating in the 1hr study. Exclusion criteria included: physical disability 
or injury to relevant response effectors (hands or feet) or not being a native Spanish 
speaker.  
2.3.2 Ethics statement 
We obtained written informed consent, in compliance with the regulations established 
by the BCBL ethics committee in line with the guidelines of the Helsinki Declaration, 
from all participants before taking part in the study. 
2.3.3 Stimuli  
Semantic task  
Our stimuli were 200 concrete object names (e.g., leaf) and 200 abstract noun words 
(e.g., approval) (The stimuli were in Spanish. See Table 11 in the appendix for a full 
list). The concrete objects included: man-made; tools (56), objects (56) & natural: 
food/plants (44), animals (44). For counterbalancing purposes, we split the stimuli in 
half and created two counterbalance lists, approximately balanced for log-frequency 
and semantic category and equally varied on visual experience ratings2. Each 
participant saw all of the stimuli once, but we arbitrarily allocated the order of 
presentation of each counterbalance list to participants ensuring that one half saw one 
in the concurrent-visual-task condition and the other saw it in the no-concurrent-visual 
task condition. Within both counterbalance lists, words were presented in a pseudo-
randomised fashion with no more than four items of the same category (i.e., concrete 
or abstract) presented in succession. 
                                               
2 We collected preliminary visual experience ratings online from 62 paid participants 
who did not participate in the main experiment. The rating question was identical to 
that described below.  
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Visual task  
For the visual task we created fifty stimuli videos in MATLAB, using the 
Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner, Brainard, & Pelli, 2007; 
Pelli, 1997) with adapted scripts from the Bavelier Brain & Learning Lab (Bavelier, 
Achtman, Mani, & Föcker, 2012).  
2.3.4 Procedure 
The experiment was presented using Presentation® software (Version 18.0, 
Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley, CA, www.neurobs.com) on a CRT monitor. 
Participants performed the experimental blocks in a sound proofed behavioural cabin 
and audio stimuli were presented through headphones. Task instructions, volume level, 
participant distance from monitor and position of response box and keyboard were 
kept constant across participants. Standardised written task instructions and diagrams 
were used during task explanations and were clearly visible to participants throughout 
the experimental blocks. There were 200 trials per experimental block with a pause 
after 100 trials. Each participant performed two experimental blocks: one whilst 
performing the perceptual task and one while not. There was a block of 10 practice 
trials before the concurrent task experimental block during which feedback about 
accuracy and concurrent task performance was given. Because the experiment design 
required a condition in which the visual system was relatively less occupied than in 
the perceptual task condition, in the no-interference blocks participants were instructed 
to close their eyes and wore a sleeping mask while they performed the semantic task. 
The order of interference and non-interference task blocks was arbitrarily determined 
and counterbalanced across participants. At the end of the experimental session, all 
participants rated the concrete noun words according to the following question: “How 
much relative lifetime experience do you have touching this object with your hands or 
seeing it?” from 1 = relatively more experience touching, to 7 = relatively more 
experience looking. Finally, they were debriefed as to the objectives of the study.  
Trial structure 
After 500ms of a white fixation cross on a black background, a large grey circle 
appeared containing ten smoothly moving small yellow circles which bounced off one 
another and the edge of the grey circle on contact. Initially, two of the moving balls 
turned blue, to mark them as targets, before eventually turning yellow after 1000ms. 
At this point the fixation cross became a white question mark and auditory words for 
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the semantic task were presented. While continuously fixating in the centre and 
tracking the two previously-marked targets, participants made concrete/abstract 
judgements on the words, with their toes, as quickly and accurately as possible. When 
they responded, the white question-mark disappeared. After 2500ms from word onset 
the balls stopped moving, one of them turned red, and a red question mark appeared 
in the centre of the screen. Participants had 1500ms to respond, with their toes, if the 
stationary red ball was one of the previously marked targets or not, before the next trial 
began. See Figure 1 and Figure 2 for diagrams.  
 




Figure 2. Visual experiment 1 & 2 visual task. 
2.3.5 Statistical analysis  
We performed analyses using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 
2015) in the R programming environment (R Core Team, 2018). Response times (RTs) 
were submitted to linear mixed effects regression models (LMERs) and errors were 
submitted to generalised linear mixed effects (logistic) regression models (GLMERs). 
The significance of the effects was assessed using the likelihood-ratio tests (i.e., chi-
squared tests of fit) between a model with and one without the critical term. To 
approximate degrees of freedom and p values for individual predictors in the models 
we used the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2017). For 
analyses we report relevant regression coefficients (either RTs or odds ratios (ORs)) 
with 95% CIs and t-values (LMER) or z-values (GLMER).  
As counterbalanced-crossed random effects we always included participant and item 
as intercepts. We also included random slopes of the fixed effects, by subject and by 
item, when they: improved the fit of the model, were theoretically motivated, justified 
by the data and design, computationally converged, and did not lead to underspecified 
estimates (i.e., random effect correlations of >.8/-.8). We aimed to be as maximal 
(Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013) as was warranted without sacrificing parsimony 
(Bates, Kliegl, Vasishth, & Baayen, 2015; Matuschek, Kliegl, Vasishth, Baayen, & 
Bates, 2017).  
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In the semantic task analyses, as fixed effects we entered object-type (a categorical 
variable with two levels: less-visual objects (baseline) and more-visual objects), 
interference condition (a categorical variable with two levels: no-interference 
(baseline) and visual-interference) and their interaction. A significant critical positive 
interaction between object category and interference condition, would indicate more 
relative interference, due to a visual task for objects associated with more visual 
experience than with less. In the visual task analyses, as a fixed effect we entered 
object-type, for which a positive critical main effect would indicate more interference 
on the visual task as a result of processing objects associated with more visual 
experience than with less.  
Because we had no predictions for the abstract “foil” items we did not include their 
data in the analysis. Similarly, because we are interested in the mutual interaction of 
semantic processing and visual processing, in each task’s analysis we include only 
trials in which participants also made correct responses in its corresponding concurrent 
task i.e., those trials where we could be sure either that the semantic information had 
been accessed or visual tracking had succeeded (<9% of total data excluded). In the 
semantic task valid response times (i.e. those logged between 300ms-2500ms of word 
onset) to the semantic task were trimmed, by participant and for each condition, to ±3 
SD of the mean (<1% of total data excluded). In the visual task, latencies are 
uninformative with regards to semantic interference because it involves a delayed 
binary response to a probe based on continuous visual tracking. This means that the 
participants have either tracked successfully and can accept or reject the probe, or they 
have tracked ineffectively and are forced to guess; therefore, we only analysed 
accuracy. Analyses of interference as measured in accuracy for the semantic task in 
both experiment 1 and 2 revealed no differences and are not described further here. 
2.4 Results 
Data Exclusion  
We excluded the data from nine participants (20% of sample), not included in the final 
sample described in the participants section, for the following reasons: lost data (3), 
sleeping during task (1), procedural errors e.g., a cable coming loose from the response 
box (5). Following a preliminary analysis, the data from a further two participants (5% 
of sample) were excluded due to: poor performance on the visual task (i.e., accuracy 
< 50% & > ±3 SDs from the sample mean) (1), low variability in ratings (i.e., 
exclusively values of 1 and 7) making stimuli categorisation impossible (1). 
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Object condition assignment 
Using each participant’s individual experience ratings, by subject we divided the 
objects into two conditions: The bottom tercile of the objects became the relatively-
less-visually-experienced-objects (less-visual) condition (M=2.42, SD=1.34) and the 
top tercile the relatively-more-visually-experienced-objects (more-visual) condition 
(M=6.48, SD=0.79). 
2.4.2 Semantic task 
On the semantic task, overall, participants were (unexpectedly) slower in the no-
interference condition than in the interference condition (RTs ± 1 SD: M = 1222, ± 
191 ms and M = 1119, ± 119 ms respectively), but accuracy was similarly high in both 
conditions (errors ± 1 SD: M = 3.8 ± 3.7 % and M = 4.1 ± 3.8 %, respectively). See 
Table 1 for raw aggregated reaction times and error rates. 
 
Table 1. Visual experiment 1 & 2 results table: By participant aggregated mean RTs and 
% errors for experiment 1 & 2 for the visual and semantic tasks separately, by 
interference context and object-type. Standard error of the mean is given in brackets. 
The results of an LMER model to predict visual-interference in RTs based on object 
category revealed that while participants were indeed about 112 ms (95% CI [58, 166]) 
faster overall in the interference condition than in the no-interference condition 
(t(39.92) = -4.15, p < .001), no main effect of object category was observed (t(160.8) 
= 1.16, p = .25) and the critical interaction of object category and interference 




Figure 3. Visual experiment 1 semantic task RTs: Mean reaction time, by participant, as a 
function of object-type and interference context. Error bars represent within-subject standard 
error of the mean (Morey, 2008). 
2.4.3 Visual Task 
Overall, on the visual task, accuracy was high (errors ± 1 SD: M = 9.4 ± 7.5 %). The 
results of a GLMER model to predict visual task errors based on object category 
revealed a main effect of object category (z = 2.17, p < .03) such that the odds of 
making an error to the video were higher (OR =1.42, 95% CI [1.03, 1.94]) if the word 
concurrently responded to was more-visual than less-visual3. See Error! Reference 
source not found. for an indicative graph. 
                                               
3 Furthermore, using ratings of visual experience (i.e., by item averages) as a 
continuous fixed predictor we observed that errors reliably scaled in proportion to 
rating (z = 3.09, p = .002) such that with each unit increase in visual experience with 
an object the odds of making an error on the concurrent visual task increased (OR 
=1.17, 95% CI [0.85, 1.60]). 
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Figure 4. Visual experiment 1 semantic task %-errors: Mean %-errors as a function of 
object-type. On the right is the 95% CI of the mean of the within-subject-paired 
differences in errors to the visual task after responding to less-manual-objects minus 
more-visual-objects. 
2.5 Interim discussion 
In line with a previous report (Boddy, 2013), following a re-analysis of the semantic 
task data we confirmed that, contrary to sensorimotor predictions, participants did not 
experience significantly more interference to thinking about more-visual-objects than 
less-visual-objects as a result of performing a concurrent visual task. On the other 
hand, in line with sensorimotor predictions, we did observe interference on the visual 
task such that participants made more errors on the visual task after having made 
semantic judgements about more-visual-objects than less-visual-objects. These results 
partially support sensorimotor theories but the fact that we did not observe dual task 
interference effects on the semantic task requires further explanation.  
Results from the semantic task of this experiment (as first reported in : Boddy & Yee, 
2013) were counter to our expectations – participants were faster to respond to the 
semantic task while concurrently performing a visual task than when not. This pattern 
of results was unexpected because, generally speaking, performing two tasks 
simultaneously rather than only one should lead to an overall drop in performance.  
In retrospect we believe this overall dual-task-facilitation to have been due to a feature 
























































































visual task condition, but unavailable in the no-concurrent task condition (because 
participants had their eyes closed). This cue provided 500ms advance notice that a 
word was about to be heard and allowed participants to prepare to make faster 
responses as compared to in the eyes closed condition where a word was heard every 
5100ms with no cuing (this was also a very slow pace, which may have produced an 
atmosphere that was not conducive to rapid responses). If this interpretation is correct, 
then because our design requires that the time-course of processing the words be 
relatively comparable in both interference conditions and the time course of single 
word processing unfolds very quickly, the artificially delayed latencies in the non-
interfering-context may be obscuring any effects on the semantic task. Therefore, in 
experiment 2, we ran an adapted follow up study to test this possibility. 
2.6 Experiment 2  
2.6.1 Motivation  
Following the results of experiment 1, we hypothesised that a number of alterations to 
the experimental design would increase our sensitivity to semantic/perceptual 
interference: a) a larger sample size (i.e., 50 vs. 33), b) 50% fewer abstract-noun catch-
trials, c) limiting abstract nouns to those lacking morphological markers (e.g., suffixes 
such as “-cion” or “–ad”) which could potentially provide clues as to their class (Reilly, 
Hung, & Westbury, 2017). This was intended to discourage strategy-based heuristic 
responses i.e., focusing on these common markers to perform the semantic task. If 
used, these “linguistic shortcuts” could permit participants to avoid “deeply” accessing 
semantic information about the words they hear, in an un-natural way (i.e., normally 
we don’t use pure heuristics to understand words) thereby potentially ameliorating or 
nullifying semantic-perceptual interference (see: Connell & Lynott, 2012, for a 
discussion). Given the suggestive interference effects observed on the visual task in 
experiment 1, but considering the fact that accuracy was generally high, we 
endeavoured to make it more challenging by shortening both the target-marking stage, 
and the response period by 500ms respectively. On each trial we introduced a short 
beep before word onset to ensure that participants in the both conditions were similarly 
primed for word responses. Finally, responses to the semantic task were collected 
using a voice key activated microphone on a headset in order to more closely reflect 
previous studies (Yee, Chrysikou, Hoffman, et al., 2013) and to avoid making 
responses with feet, which is less standard in the field. Aside from these changes, the 
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methods for experiment 2 were the same as those used in experiment 1 when not 
explicitly specified below. 
2.7 Methods 
2.7.1 Participants 




Our stimuli were 210 concrete object names and 68 abstract noun words. The concrete 
objects included: (man-made; tools (54), objects (52) & natural: food/plants (52), 
animals (52)). We used SOS software (a tool for automatically optimising 
experimental lists; Armstrong, 2012), to split the stimuli in half and create two 
counterbalance lists approximately balanced for log-frequency, semantic category and 
visual experience ratings4. See Table 12 in the appendix for a full list of stimuli. 
2.7.3 Procedure  
There were 139 trials per experimental block with a pause after 70 trials. Verbal 
responses were coded as errors in cases of: verbal disfluency, hesitations, false starts 
and non-target responses. 
Trial Structure 
After the initial fixation cross of 500ms participants now heard a beep which cued 
them (in both interference and no-interference conditions) to prepare to hear a word. 
Then, for a period of 500ms (500 ms shorter than in experiment 1) two of the moving 
circles were identified as targets. As before, at this point the fixation cross became a 
white question mark and all the moving circles turned yellow for the 2500ms tracking 
phase. Within the tracking phase participants heard noun words and now made 
concrete/abstract judgements on them by verbally responding “pop” for concrete and 
“too” for abstract. As before, when they responded the white question mark 
disappeared. Lastly, in the final 1000ms of each trial (500 ms shorter than in 
experiment 1), one of the eight circles again turned red and participants had to respond, 
                                               
4 Collected online from 58 new paid participants who did not participate in the main 
experiment. 
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with their toes if it had been a marked target, before the next trial began. See Figure 5 
and Figure 2 for diagrams. 
 
Figure 5. Visual experiment 2 trial structure. 
2.8 Results 
Data Exclusion 
Following a preliminary analysis, we excluded the data from two participants (<4% of 
sample), not included in the final sample described in the participants section, due to 
poor performance (i.e., accuracy < 50% & >±3 SDs from the sample mean) on the 
semantic task (1) and on the visual task (1). 
Object condition assignment 
Using experience ratings from the participants, in the same way as in experiment 1, 
we divided the stimuli into two conditions: less-visual-objects (M=2.39, SD=1.37) and 
more-visual-objects (M=6.73, SD=0.53). 
2.8.2 Semantic task 
On the semantic task, descriptively, participants were slightly faster in the no-
interference condition than in the interference condition (RTs ± 1 SD: M = 1432, ± 
189 ms and M = 1470, ± 135 ms respectively) and made numerically more errors 
(errors ± 1 SD: M = 2.3 ± 3.0 % and M = 3.8 ± 3.1 %, respectively). This suggests that 
our alterations to the experimental methods in experiment 2 were successful in that we 
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did not observe the counterintuitive dual task facilitation in RTs. See Table 1 for raw 
aggregated reaction times and error rates. 
The results of an LMER model to predict visual-interference in RTs based on object 
category revealed no main effect of condition (t(62.7) = 0.44, p = .66), or of object 
category (t(192.7) = 0.004, p = .99) but, as predicted by the sensorimotor approach, 
the critical interaction of object category and interference condition was significant 
(χ2(1) = 3.72, p = .05) indicating that visual-objects suffered more relative interference 
as a result of a visual task than less-visual-objects (26ms, 95% CI [-0.01, 52.90]). See 
Figure 6 for an indicative graph. 
 
Figure 6. Visual experiment 2 semantic task RTs: Mean reaction time, by participant, as 
a function of object-type and interference context. Error bars represent within-subject 
standard error of the mean (Morey, 2008). 
 
2.8.3 Visual task 
While accuracy on the visual task was similar to experiment 1 (errors ± 1 SD: M = 
13.4 ± 8.2 %), the results of a GLMER model to predict errors to the video based on 
object category revealed no main effect of object category (z = 0.64, p = .53) and 
therefore no evidence of visual-semantic interference to the visual task. See Figure 7 
for an indicative graph. 
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Figure 7. Visual experiment 2 semantic task %-errors: Mean %-errors as a function of 
object-type. On the right is the 95% CI of the mean of the within-subject-paired 
differences in errors to the visual task after responding to less-manual-objects minus 
more-visual objects. 
2.9 Interim discussion 
Firstly, the addition of an auditory prime to our experimental design succeeded in 
nullifying the counterintuitive dual-task-facilitation observed in experiment 1. In fact, 
results on the semantic task in experiment 2 indicate, as predicted by sensorimotor 
accounts, that relatively more interference was caused by making judgements about 
more-visual objects as compared to less-visual-objects. In the visual task, on the other 
hand, in contrast to experiment 1, we did not observe that participants made more 
errors on the visual task after responding to more visual than less-visual objects.  
Again, these results provide a degree of support for our initial hypothesis; that a 
concurrent visual task would interfere with thinking about objects with which people 
have had relatively more visual experience, However, our lack of a replication of the 
findings of experiment 1: that performance on a visual task was disrupted by semantic 
























































































2.10 Experiment 1 & 2 collapsed – Cumulative analysis 
2.10.1 Motivation 
With this in mind we decided to compare and collapse the effects of experiment 1 and 
2 in order to see if an increase in power might illuminate whether the effects we 
observe are more or less stable. While experiments 1 and 2 differed in a number of 
ways, they were also very similar in design, and the hypotheses they tested were 
identical. The analyses of both experiments suggested trends in the predicted 
directions5. There was also no evidence of a task trade off i.e., a semantic effect at the 
cost of a perceptual effect or the reverse; there were no correlations between the RT 
interference effect on the word task and the error interference effect in experiment 1 
(r= -0.03, p > .8) or in experiment 2 (r= 0.02, p > .9). Therefore, in exploratory mode, 
using all the data from experiment 1 and 2, we tested whether the effects which were 
reliable in one experiment but not in the other were reliable overall.  
2.11 Results 
2.11.1 Semantic task 
The results of an LMER model to predict interference to the semantic task by object 
category in RTs revealed no interaction between experiment and our critical 
interaction of object category and interference condition (t(10078.952) = 0.78, p = 
.44). Therefore, we collapsed over experiments, while including experiment as a 
control factor. We found that the critical interaction of object category and interference 
condition was significant (χ2(1) = 3.89, p < .05) suggesting that, overall, visual-objects 
suffered more relative interference as a result of a visual task than less-visual-objects 
(18 ms, 95% CI [0.1, 36.2]). 
2.11.2 Visual task 
Similarly, we fit a GLMER model to predict errors to the visual task based on the 
category of the word responded to in that trial. This model also revealed no interaction 
                                               
5 In fact, while in both experiments LME models with simplified random effects 
structures show significant critical effects in our predicted direction, the necessary 
addition of random slopes nullified them. This is most commonly because between 
subject variability in trends are too high for low powered experiments to make reliable 
estimates. One way to address this, is to increase the power of analyses.  
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between experiment and word category (z = -1.32, p = .19), but did reveal a main effect 
of experiment (z = 2.43, p < .02) such that participants were generally more likely to 
make an error in the visual task in experiment 2 (OR =1.72, 95% CI [1.11, 2.65]). Most 
importantly, it also revealed a significant difference in the critical main effect of object 
category (z = 2.092, p = .04) suggesting that, overall, making semantic judgements 
about more-visual object names made making errors on a concurrent visual task more 
likely (OR =1.41, 95% CI [1.02, 1.94]) than when making the same judgement about 
less-visual objects. 
2.12 Interim discussion 
Collapsing over experiments suggests that both the semantic and perceptual effects we 
observe in experiment 1 and 2 are, overall, stable when the data is analysed together.  
2.13 Discussion 
Because amodal accounts treat perceptual and semantic processing as entirely distinct 
they would predict that concurrent visual tasks, if they interfere with semantic 
processing at all, should do so to the same degree for all object representations, 
irrespective of whether they are associated with more or less visual experience. 
However, if as suggested by sensorimotor accounts retrieving visual semantic 
information and performing an unrelated visual task share cognitive resources, they 
should, if performed simultaneously, mutually interact with one another due to 
competition for those resources. Therefore, in two experiments we tested if it is 
relatively more difficult to think about objects with which people have more visual 
experience while simultaneously performing a concurrent visual task and, 
correspondingly, if performing the visual task itself was made similarly more difficult 
by thinking about them.  
We found in experiment 1 that participants did indeed have more difficulty in 
performing a visual task while thinking about objects associated with more visual 
experience than those associated with less visual experience. Then, in experiment 2 
we found that participants’ ability to think about objects associated with more visual 
experience was compromised by the performance of a concurrent visual task. Both 
findings were further supported by a more statistically powerful exploratory analysis 
in which we collapsed over experiments and show complementary findings overall.  
Because these results indicate perceptual and semantic processing are competing for 
cognitive resources, they suggest that semantic representations of frequently seen 
 39 
objects overlap with parts of the brain involved in performing the visual task (i.e., brain 
areas involved in visual processing) and therefore are, at least partly, visual in nature. 
Generally, this suggests the same parts of the brain involved in experiencing objects 
are involved in their long-term cortical representations. Furthermore, because the less- 
and more-visually experienced object categories were assigned, by participant, based 
on their own experience ratings, the semantic-perceptual interactions we observe 
suggest that the degree to which an object’s representation is reliant on visual areas is 
dependent on the amount of lifetime visual experience that a given participant has 
personally had with it. Therefore, individual lifetime visual experience shapes 
semantic representations. These findings support and extend work in the manual 
domain (Yee, Chrysikou, Hoffman, et al., 2013).  
Some recent work has shown that viewing visual noise interferes more with making 
judgements about visual properties of objects than making judgements about 
encyclopaedic properties of them (Edmiston & Lupyan, 2017). Similarly, it interferes 
with making concreteness judgements about concrete concepts more than abstract ones 
(Ostarek & Huettig, 2017). However, because the former study involved making 
explicit judgements about visual properties and the latter implicitly so (because all the 
concrete items were very visualisable in contrast to the abstract ones) it could be 
argued that participants might have been encouraged to use explicit visual imagery to 
perform the tasks. If this is the case, then visual interference could be attributed to 
“downstream” processes such as mental imagery as opposed to core semantic 
processing itself. In our study we observe visual interference between concrete items 
to a task that does not explicitly probe visual information. Even if visual imagery were 
recruited for strategic task-based responses to concreteness judgements (perhaps 
because concreteness is correlated with perceptual strength, e.g., Connell & Lynott, 
2012), it would not explain the interference we observe between the concrete objects 
in the less and more-visually experienced object conditions. All our objects were 
similarly perceivable, and our conditions differed on the amount of visual experience 
participants had with them. 
Because the same words featured (between-subjects) in both interference conditions 
(interference-condition order was counterbalanced across participants and participants 
and items were counterbalance-crossed random effects) our analysis suggests that 
visual semantic interference cannot be attributed to properties of the words themselves. 
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Furthermore, the inclusion of item as a random effect in our linear mixed effects 
models also suggests that our findings should extend to as yet untested items.  
It might be asked why we did not observe both semantic and visual task effects in both 
experiments separately, i.e., why they were only collectively observed in a collapsed 
analysis. We have a number of suggestions for why this might be the case. One might 
be that each experiment, independently lacked sufficient statistical power to detect 
both semantic-perceptual interference effects. While we based our power estimates for 
sample size on the effects observed in previous work in the manual domain (Yee, 
Chrysikou, Hoffman, et al., 2013) it is possible that the size of the effect of visual-
semantic interference is smaller. A methodological reason that this could be the case 
might be relative ease of our visual task compared to other interference tasks. It is 
worth noting that our experiments only tasked participants to track two targets, in 
comparison with conventional standards in the MOT literature in which participants 
typically track four or more (Cavanagh & Alvarez, 2005). Future work could modulate 
the difficulty of the visual task parametrically (as in: Vermeulen et al., 2008) and 
observe if the size of the interference effect varies accordingly.  
A theoretical reason that the size of interference effects may be diminished in the visual 
domain is because of the processing capacity of the visual system itself. As outlined 
in the introduction of this chapter, the visual system is very important for humans. We 
live our waking lives perceiving the world while also using language and thinking 
about objects. If our cognitive resources were not sufficient to regularly handle visual 
and semantic processing simultaneously, then this would not be adaptive. Therefore, 
it is likely that visual bandwidth is large; we are capable of perceiving many objects 
at the same time, whereas in the manual domain we are relatively limited, i.e., we can 
only really handle a couple of things simultaneously. It is therefore possible that the 
visual system is more robust to interference from semantics than is the motor system.  
Another possible reason that these experiments (individually) have weak effects could 
be the fact that all of the concrete objects that we used as stimuli can be (and frequently 
are) experienced multimodally; they are, for example, smelt, touched, heard and tasted, 
meaning that their representations should extend over a variety of sensory or motor 
modalities giving them some “representational redundancy”. This, in turn, could make 
even the objects that were frequently visually experienced relatively resilient to visual 
interference. It could also explain why interference was not catastrophic (i.e., the 
participants still responded correctly), but rather slowed processing. Following these 
 41 
promising results, we have conducted another, well-powered and conceptually similar 
study. It included among the stimuli those with which people have varying degrees of 
visual experience (i.e., like those reported here) as well as things with which we have 
virtually no visual experience e.g. “thunder” (Davis, Joergensen, Boddy, Dowling, & 
Yee, n.d.). This study, which replicates the findings described here, will be discussed 
briefly in the general discussion.  
This work converges with previous research suggesting that the visual-semantic 
interaction occurs when simultaneously performing visual tasks and processing verbs 
(Kaschak et al., 2005; Meteyard et al., 2007, 2008) as a result of their specific content 
(i.e., directional mismatches between word meaning and what is seen). However, it 
shows that unrelated visual processing per se interacts with semantics, presumably as 
a result of object concepts’ experience-driven representational overlap with visual 
areas. Also, similarly, it lends support to studies employing memory-based “visual” 
interference paradigms to the semantic processing of objects (Rey et al., 2017). More 
generally, these findings support the fluid semantics view (Yee, 2017); that the way 
people think about objects changes depending on an interaction between the immediate 
demands of their context and their lifetime experience with those objects, as outlined 
in the introduction of the thesis.  
In conclusion, contrary to amodal accounts, our results show that conceptual and 
perceptual processing mutually interact. This finding suggests that visual properties of 
object representations are stored in a perceptual format, and that visual areas are 
functionally related to accessing object semantics even when simply processing single 
noun words without explicitly probing visual information. We show that online visual 
processing can be influenced by language comprehension, and that because visual 
experience in the world shapes the representational structure of object concepts, the 
outcome of semantic processing differs depending on an interaction of personal long-






Chapter 3: Olfactory experience and object representations 
3.1 Introduction 
While the absolute importance of our sense of smell (or olfaction) may have 
diminished since humans were predominantly hunter-gatherers (Gilad, Man, Pääbo, & 
Lancet, 2003) it is arguable that relatively among the senses, is remains one of the 
most crucial. From an evolutionary perspective, it was hugely important for our 
phylogenetic ancestors because knowledge derived from the chemical senses of smell 
or taste is highly relevant for an organism’s survival; i.e., for seeking nutrition and 
avoiding toxins. Also, olfactory features of objects are often usefully diagnostic of 
their class or condition (e.g., foods) or very important for fully understanding their 
nature (e.g., natural gas, bonfires, perfumes etc.). Therefore, if multimodal sensory 
experience with objects determines their conceptual representations (Allport, 1985), 
then olfactory brain regions6 should play a prominent role in the cortical representation 
of objects associated with odour experience. While research into sensorimotor 
representations of object concepts has increased in recent years (see the thesis 
introduction and e.g., Alex Martin, 2007), much of the work has been focused on visual 
and tactile features of objects and research into features perceived through the 
“chemical” senses (i.e., smell and taste) has been comparatively limited. I briefly 
review relevant findings below.  
Neuroimaging 
Processing the names of objects associated with odours leads to activation of olfactory 
brain areas. For example, making similarity or property verification judgements on 
fruit names leads to activation of bilateral orbitofrontal cortex (R. F. Goldberg et al., 
2006; Robert F Goldberg et al., 2006). Even reading the names of odour associated 
objects (e.g., cinnamon), without any specific semantic task leads to activation of the 
piriform cortex and amygdala (González et al., 2006).  
Neuropsychology 
Neuropsychological research suggests a comorbidity of semantic-olfactory 
impairments such as deficits in odour-naming and the naming of objects typically 
                                               
6 The primary olfactory system in humans centres around the piriform, insula and 
orbitofrontal cortex, however, a more extended olfactory network includes the 
hypothalamus, amygdala and hippocampus (Gottfried, 2010; Zatorre, Jones-Gotman, 
Evans, & Meyer, 1992). 
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associated with odours with some neurodegenerative diseases. This might be due to 
the proximity of primary and secondary olfactory regions and those affected by 
Alzheimer’s, dementia, primary progressive aphasia and Parkinson’s, i.e., 
frontotemporal regions, insula and orbitofrontal cortex (Hudry, Thobois, Broussolle, 
Adeleine, & Royet, 2003; Luzzi et al., 2007; Olofsson, Rogalski, Harrison, Mesulam, 
& Gottfried, 2013). While this suggests a functional relationship between the 
representation of olfactory semantics and these areas, given that frontotemporal 
regions e.g., the anterior temporal lobe (ATL), are also thought to play a crucial role 
in semantic processing, i.e., as convergence hubs for distributed representations (e.g., 
Patterson & Lambon Ralph, 2016) it is difficult to disentangle general semantic 
deficits from olfactory specific ones using patient data such as lesion studies.  
Psycholinguistics 
The relationship between language and online olfactory perception is complicated. For 
example, it is well documented that even in healthy individuals translating olfactory 
information (i.e., smells) into verbal information (i.e., its name) is generally difficult, 
a phenomenon referred to as the “tip-of-the-nose” phenomenon (Cain, 1979). It is 
similarly difficult for people to conjure vivid mental imagery of odours in their absence 
(Crowder & Schab, 1995). On the other hand, linguistic cues significantly improve 
people’s ability to categorise olfactory stimuli; i.e., word labels behaviourally prime 
matching odours in a privileged manner even compared to matching images of an 
odour’s canonical source (De Wijk & Cain, 1994). Furthermore, word-scent matches, 
but not picture-scent matches, lead to activation in the OFC and ATL suggesting that 
olfactory language is particularly closely connected to olfactory brain areas (Olofsson 
et al., 2013). That words are so useful for naming scents suggests that they activate 
specific olfactory features in perceptual regions, just as predicted by sensorimotor 
accounts. 
Although little psycholinguistic work has been done on whether processing the names 
of objects associated with olfactory experience automatically recruits olfactory brain 
areas in service of semantics (as predicted by sensorimotor accounts), two relevant 
behavioural studies appear in the literature. In one study (Cimatti, Flumini, Vittuari, 
& Borghi, 2016) participants read the names of objects associated odours and were 
asked to respond (using buttons near-to or far-from them) whether their odours were 
pleasant or unpleasant. The motivation for the study was the observation that the 
presence of real unpleasant odours unconsciously leads to “avoidant” behaviour 
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(faster near responses) and real pleasant ones to “approach” (faster far responses) 
behaviour. In line with sensorimotor predictions, the authors hypothesised that words 
alone would sufficiently activate their referent’s associated olfactory features to lead 
to measurable action compatibility effects: i.e., relatively faster responses to pleasant-
far matches and unpleasant-near matches. While they did observe such an affect there 
are a few issues with the study which merit mentioning. One concerns the explicit 
nature of the task which required participants to judge the pleasantness of the aroma 
of each object. Given that participant’s attention was directed to the olfactory 
modality, it is unclear whether the putatively activated olfactory information is 
recruited automatically (i.e., as part of semantic processing) or only when specifically 
probed. Further concerns revolve around the analysis strategy of the paper; primarily 
the absence of an analysis of the interaction of near/far, pleasant/unpleasant, a more 
standard way of testing for multitasking interference. Overall, this study might be 
considered suggestive of olfactory-semantic interactions, but its findings are difficult 
to interpret. 
In another study (Speed & Majid, 2018), participants read the name of an object 
associated with an odour and had to retain it in memory. They were then exposed to 
an odour (either matching or mismatching the word’s referent), asked to rate its 
intensity and finally asked to recall the previously seen word. The authors 
hypothesised that if retaining the name of an object in memory leads to sustained 
activation of its distributed representation (and therefore its olfactory features) then 
matching trials should lead to odour recognition facilitation and mismatching trials to 
interference. However, unlike in a comparable experiment involving auditory features, 
the authors observed no such effects and argue that odour words do not lead to 
olfactory simulation. Yet, because their experiment employed word recall as the 
primary dependent variable it is possible that retaining a word in phonological memory 
does not require the sustained activation of its referent’s distributed representation (and 
therefore olfactory areas) but rather could be achieved using auditory short-term 
memory alone. If this is the case, their failure to observe interactions between olfactory 
semantics and word retention is unsurprising. On the other hand, the auditory 
interference condition of their study may have interfered with word retention because 
phonological memory and the auditory brain areas activated in service of semantics do 
overlap. A stronger test of sensorimotor predictions is a paradigm which involves 
online and concurrent semantic-perceptual multitasking such as those described in the 
visual chapter of this thesis. In fact, the authors themselves acknowledge that tasks 
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involving more complex semantic judgements and carefully measured response times 
might be more informative about online olfactory-semantic simulation.  
Experience 
As outlined in the introduction to this thesis, sensorimotor accounts hold that the 
amount of lifetime experience people have with objects through different sensory 
modalities shapes how their knowledge is represented over modality specific brain 
areas. In the olfactory domain there is neuroimaging evidence (for a review see: Royet, 
Plailly, Saive, Veyrac, & Delon-Martin, 2013) that individuals who have a lot of 
experience smelling objects or using olfactory mental imagery such as perfumers 
exhibit functional reorganisation (Plailly, Delon-Martin, & Royet, 2012) and structural 
alterations (Delon-Martin, Plailly, Fonlupt, Veyrac, & Royet, 2013) in olfactory brain 
areas (i.e., orbitofrontal cortex, piriform cortex and hippocampus). However, to date 
there is only one fMRI study which explicitly tested whether smell experience with 
objects leads to olfactory regions becoming active when thinking about them (Ghio et 
al., 2016). In this study, individuals who were trained to recognise novel objects in the 
presence of an ambient aroma showed increased activation in the extended olfactory 
network (anterior hippocampus) when performing a later old/new recognition task as 
compared to participants trained on the same items but without an ambient aroma. 
Together, these results support the idea that olfactory regions are important for some 
object representations and that the degree to which this is true varies according to 
personal olfactory experience.  
Summary 
To summarise, there is limited but converging evidence from neuroimaging and 
neuropsychology and mixed evidence from psycholinguistics that olfactory brain 
regions play an important role in the semantic representations of objects associated 
with odours and odour experience. However, as explained in the general introduction, 
it has been pointed out that putative semantic-sensorimotor imaging results are not 
direct proof that these regions are functionally related to semantics (Mahon & 
Caramazza, 2008). It is logically possible that activation of olfactory regions while 
processing smell related concepts results from peripheral processes. For instance, it 
has been observed that simply the act of sniffing, in the absence of an odour, activates 
the piriform cortex (N. Sobel et al., 1998). Could olfactory-semantic neuroimaging 
findings such as those reviewed above be equally well explained by such non-semantic 
processes? It remains to be demonstrated that olfactory regions of the brain are 
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functionally involved in the representation of objects associated with odour. Similarly, 
that an individuals’ olfactory experience with an object mediates how functionally 
involved these regions are remains to be behaviourally tested.  
3.1.2 Motivation 
One approach to addressing these questions is to use behavioural dual-task paradigms 
to test if occupying (with non-linguistic activity) an area of the brain which is 
important for a concept’s representation influences our ability to access it, due to 
competition for shared neural resources. Furthermore, the amount of lifetime modality 
specific experience an individual has with an object in that modality should determine 
the degree of interference they experience. There is evidence that this approach works 
in the manual (Yee, Chrysikou, Hoffman, et al., 2013) and visual domains (see the first 
experimental chapter of this thesis) and therefore, we set out to test whether it holds in 
the olfactory domain.  
3.1.3 Questions and Predictions 
In this chapter I report the results of one experiment designed to explore whether 
olfactory brain regions are functionally important for the representation of odour 
associated concepts (like garlic) and if so; how object representations are shaped by 
individual lifetime olfactory experience with referents. As in the visual chapter of this 
thesis we used an interference paradigm to test our predictions. We reasoned that if in 
one condition the olfactory system is occupied with a strong odour while participants 
make semantic judgements on the names of objects, then it should interfere more with 
understanding words like “garlic” than words like “hammer, relative to a condition 
with no added aroma. Furthermore, we predicted that interference would scale in 
proportion to the amount of lifetime olfactory experience people have with the objects.  
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
The final study sample consisted of 62 (M age = 24 years, range = 18-35 years, 23 
male) native Spanish speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision who were 
paid for participating in the 1.5hr study. Exclusion criteria included: habitual smoking 
(more than 5 cigarettes a day), olfactory issues such as a cold or anosmia, allergies to 
 48 
essential oils or not being a native Spanish speaker7. The participants in each 
interference condition did not differ on age, gender or VOIQ score. See Table 2 for 
further information. 
 
Table 2. Olfactory experiment participant demographics by interference condition. 
Standard deviations in parentheses. SS = standard score. All p's are t-tests except 
for gender which is chi-squared proportion test. 
 
3.2.2 Ethics statement 
We obtained written informed consent, in compliance with the regulations established 
by the BCBL ethics committee in line with the guidelines of the Helsinki Declaration, 
from all participants before participation. 
3.2.3 Stimuli 
Our stimuli were 200 concrete object names (e.g., cheese), 200 animal names (e.g., 
tiger) and 20 adjectives (e.g., shiny) for 1-back probe trials (taken from: Yee et al., 
2010). The concrete objects included: tools (25), objects (88), food (53), plants (28), 
spices (6). The animals included: birds (39), insects (25), mammals (97), reptiles (16) 
& sea creatures (23). The adjectives included: functional (5), tactile (5), visual (5), 
other (5). See Table 13 in the appendix for a list of stimuli. For counterbalancing 
purposes, we collected preliminary olfactory experience ratings online from 62 paid 
participants who did not participate in the main experiment following as similar 
approach to the methods used in (Lynott & Connell, 2009). Using these we separated 
the concrete objects into two conditions: relatively-less-smell-associated-objects 
(neutral objects) (M rating = 1.27, SD = 0.79) and relatively-more-smell-associated-
objects (smelly objects) (M rating = 3.69, SD = 0.82). Finally we split the stimuli in 
half using SOS software (Armstrong, Watson, & Plaut, 2012) creating two lists 
                                               
7 We eliminated the data from twenty participants (23% of data) for not meeting 
exclusion criteria: cold or smoker (19), non-native Spanish speaker (1).  
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approximately balanced for log-frequency, number of letters and equally varied on 
olfactory experience ratings. Each participant saw all of the stimuli once, but we 
arbitrarily allocated the order of presentation of each counterbalance list to participants 
ensuring that one half saw one first the other saw it second. Within both counterbalance 
lists, words were presented in a pseudo-randomised fashion with no more than 3 items 
of the same category (i.e., animal, neutral-object or smelly-object) presented in 
succession. 
3.2.4 Olfactory interference context 
The interfering strong added aroma was diffused in a similar way to the methodology 
employed in previous studies (Moss & Oliver, 2012) i.e., we soaked 10 drops of 
essential oil into a pad for an aromatherapy fan diffuser and then placed it under the 
desk in the cabin out of sight of the participants. It was switched on at maximum speed 
for 5 minutes and then reduced to medium speed immediately before participant entry. 
The essential oil we chose was cypress based on an informal pre-experiment survey 
which indicated that it was very difficult to identify and un-associated with the aromas 
of any stimuli items. Because in everyday life, olfactory stimulation is always 
occurring (Noam Sobel et al., 2000), i.e., from the experimental cabin, participant’s 
perfume etc., our conditions are best characterised as relatively-less-ambient-aroma in 
the no-interference condition and relatively-more in the interference condition. 
3.2.5 Procedure 
The experiment was presented using Experiment Builder software (Version 
1.10.1063) on a CRT monitor. Participants performed the experimental blocks in a 
sound proofed testing cabin measuring 2 x 1.8 x 2.2 m of which the door was kept 
closed except for participant and experimenter access. During the experiment auditory 
feedback was presented through headphones and participants responded with a 9-
button response box on the table in front of them. Task instructions, volume level, 
participant distance from monitor and position of response box and keyboard were 
kept constant across participants. Standardised written task instructions and diagrams 
were used during task explanations and were clearly visible to participants throughout 
the experimental blocks. There were 400 trials per experimental block with a 30 
second pause after 200 trials. There was a block of 10 practice trials before participants 
entered the cabin during which feedback about accuracy and concurrent task 
performance was given. 
 50 
The interference context was between subjects and therefore we arbitrarily assigned 
half the participants to the no-added-aroma condition (no-interference) and half to the 
strong-ambient-aroma condition (interference). At the end of the experimental session, 
participants rated the object names according to the following question: “When you 
think of this object, how much does its aroma come to mind?” from 1 = very little, to 
7 = a great deal. After rating the objects, participants were asked to complete the 
Vividness of Olfactory Imagery Questionnaire (VOIQ) (Gilbert, Crouch, & Kemp, 
1998) in which they are asked to imagine four specific “odour-scapes” and rate the 
vividness of their mental images from 1 = as real and vivid as perception, to 5 = no 
imagery. Finally, we asked whether participants had any suspicions of what the aim of 
the experiment was, if they had noticed any odour during the experiment, what it was 
and to rate its intensity from 1-7. They were also asked further questions about if they 
had any olfactory issues/colds etc., and then debriefed them as to the aims of the study. 
Trial structure 
After 500ms of a blank screen, a cross appeared for 500ms followed by a word that 
remained on the screen for 300ms. Afterwards, a cross appeared and remained on 
screen until the participants responded or the trial timed out after 2500ms. Participants 
judged if the word on the screen was the name of an animal or not as quickly and 
accurately as possible. If participants responded correctly, the next trial began, 
however, if they made an error they heard a tone before the next trial began. If the trial 
timed out, participants heard a tone and saw a message reading “Faster” on the screen. 
In order to encourage participants to think deeply about the objects and pay attention 
to the task, on approximately 10% of trials, after making an animal judgement on a 
word, participants were then presented with an adjective on the screen for up to 
5000ms. On these 1-back probe trials they had to decide whether the adjective, in their 
opinion, commonly described the object they had just seen. See Error! Reference 
source not found. for a diagram.8 
                                               
8 After performing this animal judgment task, but before rating the objects, participants 
performed two memory tasks for the words they had seen. Our motivation for 
including these memory tasks and analysis/discussion of the results is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
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Figure 8. Olfactory experiment trial structure 
 
3.2.6 Statistical analysis 
We performed analyses using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, et al., 2015) in the 
R programming environment (R Core Team, 2018). Response times (RTs) were 
submitted to linear mixed effects regression models (LMERs) and errors were 
submitted to generalised linear mixed effects (logistic) regression models (GLMERs). 
The significance of the effects was assessed using the likelihood-ratio tests (i.e., chi-
squared tests of fit) between a model with and one without the critical term. To 
approximate degrees of freedom and p values for individual predictors in the models 
we used the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova et al., 2017). For analyses we report 
relevant regression coefficients (either RTs or odds ratios (ORs)) with 95% CIs and t-
values (LMER) or z-values (GLMER). As participants-within-condition-crossed 
random effects we always included participant and item as intercepts. We also 
included random slopes of the fixed effects, by subject and by item, when they: 
improved the fit of the model, were theoretically motivated, justified by the data and 
design, computationally converged, and did not lead to underspecified estimates (i.e., 
random effect correlations of >.8/-.8). We aimed to be as maximal (Barr et al., 2013) 
as was warranted without sacrificing parsimony (Bates, Kliegl, et al., 2015; Matuschek 
et al., 2017).  
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As fixed effects we either entered object-type (a categorical variable with two levels: 
neutral objects (baseline) and smelly objects) or each participant’s olfactory 
experience ratings (a continuous, mean centred variable from 1-7) with interference 
condition (a categorical variable with the no-interference condition as baseline).  
A significant interaction between object-type/olfactory experience ratings and 
interference condition, with a positive slope, would indicate that, as predicted, there 
was more interference due to a strong ambient aroma for objects associated with more 
olfactory experience. Because we had no predictions for the animal “foil” items or the 
adjective judgements, they were not included in our analyses. Valid response times 
(i.e. correct responses logged between 300ms-1800ms of word onset) to the semantic 
task were trimmed, by participant and for each condition, to ± 2.5 SD of the mean 
(<3% of total data excluded). 
3.3 Results 
Data Exclusion 
We excluded the data from five participants (6% of sample), not included in the final 
sample described in the participants section for: sickness (1), experimenter error (2), 
and low accuracy < 2.5 SDs from the group mean (2). We discarded the data from four 
object names (2% data loss) because of experimenter error: two because they refer to 
animals and two because we did not collect participants ratings for them.  
Object condition assignment 
Using each participant’s individual experience ratings, by subject we divided the 
objects into two conditions: The bottom tercile of the objects became the relatively-
less-olfactory-experienced-objects (neutral) condition (M = 1.6, SD = 1.3) and the top 
tercile the relatively-more-olfactory-experienced-objects (smelly) condition (M = 5.4, 
SD = 1.7). 
3.3.2 Response times 
By object category  
Overall, participants were similarly fast to respond in the no interference condition 
(RTs ± 1 SD: 662 ms, ± 108 ms) as in the interference condition (RTs ± 1 SD: 680 ms, 
± 77 ms). The results of an LMER model to predict olfactory-interference in RTs based 
on object category revealed no main effect of condition (t(61.92) = 0.46, p > .6), or of 
object category (t(161.88) = -0.83, p > .4). However, the critical interaction of object 
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category and interference condition was significant χ2(1) = 3.99, p < .05. This indicates 
that smelly objects suffered more relative interference as a result of a strong ambient 
aroma than neutral objects (12ms, 95% CI [0.22, 24]). See Figure 9 for an indicative 
graph. 
 
Figure 9. Olfactory experiment semantic task RTs, by participant. Mean reaction time, by 
participant, as a function of interference condition and object type. Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean. 
By individual rating  
The results of another LMER model, (using all the data) to predict olfactory-
interference in RTs based on the continuous predictor of olfactory experience ratings 
similarly revealed no main effect of condition (t(64) = 0.37, p > .7). There was, 
however, a significant effect of rating (t(2493) = -3.19, p < .005, 95% CI [-5.32 , -
1.3]). More importantly, the critical interaction of olfactory experience rating and 
interference condition was significant (χ2(1) = 5.35, p = 0.021) such that interference 
(i.e., a relative slowing of response times) increased by 3ms (95% CI [0.43, 5.1]) for 
each unit increase in olfactory experience rating. For visualisation purposes, for each 
object name but collapsing over participants, we calculated an overall interference 
effect by subtracting its average latency in the no-interference condition from its value 
in the interference condition and then plotted this effect against average olfactory 
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Figure 10. Olfactory experiment semantic task RTs, by item. Scatterplot (with best fitting 
regression line) showing the relationship between RT interference effect scores (ms) 
(aggregated by word) and olfactory experience ratings. 
3.3.3 Accuracy 
By object category  
Participants made similar percentage errors on the word judgement in the ambient 
aroma condition than in the neutral condition (errors ± 1 SD: M = 5.9 ± 3.8 % and M 
= 6.4 ± 4.3 % respectively). The results of a GLMER model to predict interference to 
the semantic task (by object category) revealed no main effect of condition (z = -0.94, 
p > .3) or of object category (z = 0.03, p > .9). The critical interaction of interference 
by object category was also non-significant (χ2(1) = 0, p > .9).  
By individual rating  
In a GLMER model to predict interference by individual olfactory ratings, there was 
no main effect of condition (z = -0.25, p > .8) or of rating (z = -0.66, p > .5). However, 
there was a significant interaction between rating and condition (χ2(1) = 3.94, p = 
.047), but the direction of this effect was counter to what we would have predicted— 
for each unit increase in olfactory rating, interference (i.e., the relative increase in 
errors) went down (OR = 0.93, 95% CI [0.87, 1.00]). We will speculate about this 
unexpected result below. Overall, our results show, greater response time interference 
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odour context and that this interference scales with individual reports of odour 
experience. 
3.4 Discussion 
If, as sensorimotor theories maintain, there is a continuity between perceptual and 
semantic processing, then accessing the meaning of words which refer to smelly 
objects (but not neutral objects) should be more difficult in the presence of a strong 
ambient aroma because the two processes are mutually engaging the same neural 
resources. Furthermore, the degree of overlap between semantic representations 
should vary at an individual level depending on a person’s lifetime olfactory 
experience with a given item.  
Using an innovative passive olfactory “interference” paradigm, we find evidence that 
a strong ambient smell does make it slightly harder (i.e., slows responses) to think 
about smelly objects relative to neutral objects. This suggests that that the conceptual 
representations of smelly objects do make use of areas of the brain active when they 
are experienced, i.e., olfactory brain areas. Furthermore, because the interference we 
observe scales with ratings of individual participants’ olfactory experiences with those 
objects, this supports the second prediction: that lifetime individual sensory experience 
should influence how a given conceptual representation is distributed over different 
sensory brain regions. In this case, that the amount of olfactory experience a person 
has with an object determines how much interference is observed as a result of 
competition for neural resources and therefore the degree to which its representation 
involves the olfactory system. 
Unexpectedly, in one analysis (predicting errors based on continuous individual 
ratings), we observed that smelly items were responded to more accurately when there 
was a strong and incongruent smell in the room than without it. Given the small 
number of errors that participants made in the experiment, this effect should be 
interpreted with caution, as it may be less reliable or informative than the response 
time results, a dependent variable for which the analysis which is much better powered. 
However, it is possible that the pattern reflects a speed accuracy trade-off, whereby 
participants took longer to respond, as evidenced by the RT interference, but produced 
fewer errors as a result (See: Heitz, 2014 for discussion). If true, this finding does not 
conflict with the predictions of sensorimotor accounts because the presence of a speed 
accuracy trade-off is consistent with increased cognitive load due to the experimental 
manipulation between conditions (i.e., the olfactory context and semantic content of 
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the target word). We believe that this increase in cognitive load is most parsimoniously 
explained by perceptual-semantic multitasking interference. We will explore this 
intriguing finding in future work. 
While one recent study (Speed & Majid, 2018) failed to observe semantic-odour 
interference using a sequential interference paradigm and concluded therefore that 
words do not automatically lead to olfactory simulation, our data suggest that olfactory 
features of objects are automatically activated (or simulated) even when participants 
are simply making animal judgements, a task which does not, in principle, explicitly 
encourage participants towards accessing olfactory features of words more than other 
modalities (as opposed to asking them to make explicit odour judgements). We believe 
this to be because our study, instead of testing whether recall memory for smelly object 
names could be interfered with by using an “olfactory judgement” task between 
encoding and recall, tested the effect of interference between online semantic 
processing and continuous olfactory stimulation. The timing and nature of dual 
interference tasks fundamentally alters whether/how semantic-perceptual processes 
interact (Connell & Lynott, 2012). In the first place, we contend that our semantic task 
(animal judgement) is more “semantic” in that it requires participants to access the 
distributed semantic representations of the word’s referent more than theirs, which 
involved maintaining a phonological/lexical representation in short term memory. In 
short, their perceptual “interference task” was sequential while ours was concurrent 
and concurrent perceptual-semantic tasks more frequently result in mutual interactions 
i.e., interference. Furthermore, on a methodological level, their experiment involved 
fewer experimental trials than ours and their dependent variables (predominately recall 
accuracy) are generally less sensitive than response times.  
Another important difference between our findings and others (Cimatti et al., 2016; 
Speed & Majid, 2018) is that we observe perceptual-semantic interference as a result 
of 1) a passive interfering context which was opaque to participants, and 2) without 
overtly probing olfactory information. First, although the ambient aroma in our 
interference condition was strong, according to post experiment debriefing: of the 31 
participants who were exposed to the strong ambient aroma 24 noticed an odour and 
on average rated its intensity as 3.4 (on a 1-7 rating) and none identified the odour 
itself. Furthermore, when asked explicitly about their thoughts on the experimental 
aims or hypotheses only four mentioned smell in very general terms and none were 
deemed sufficiently close to understanding the manipulation to warrant exclusion. 
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Secondly, other work involves making explicit odour judgements on words clearly 
(and always) associated with odours. In our experiment, however, the semantic task 
was making animal judgements on a wide variety of single concrete nouns and animal 
names, which varied widely in their smell associations. Importantly, participants were 
only asked to make explicit judgements about the olfactory properties of the nouns 
after the main experiment.  
On a practical level, the large number of stimuli we selected were intentionally chosen 
to refer to as diverse a collection of concrete objects from a wide variety of categories 
as possible and to vary widely in their smell associations. While certain categories of 
objects are confounded with their olfactory associations (e.g., foods) we intentionally 
sought to minimise this in our analysis: i.e., in the mixed effects models we used to 
test our hypotheses we always included random intercepts for participants and items 
along with random slopes whenever licensed. This random effect structure ensures that 
parameter estimates are pooled for the effects of experimental participants and 
individual words and makes us confident that the main effects or interactions we 
observe are a result of the experimental manipulation rather than the specific subjects 
or items we sampled or selected.  
The flexible nature of concepts is only just beginning to be investigated. The 
interaction between our individual semantic representations and the context in which 
we activate them varies continuously. Here, the ambient odour context in which people 
think about objects subtly effects the conceptual representation activated. The meaning 
of the word lemon is different when you process it in an incense filled church as 
opposed to an air conditioned and bland office space. These findings are an elegant 
demonstration that when we talk about “meaning” we may need to bear in mind that 
no stable representational outcome for an object’s meaning exists, extrapolated from 
its context. 
Our finding that lifetime olfactory experience with objects shapes their neural 
representations is in line with emerging behavioural findings in other modalities 
(Chrysikou et al., 2017; Yee, Chrysikou, Hoffman, et al., 2013) and with recent 
imaging results (e.g., Bellebaum et al., 2013). This central, but less commonly tested 
prediction of sensorimotor accounts is important, because it moves in the direction of 
studying the differences between peoples’ concepts rather than their commonalities, 
and suggest that concepts can change over time as experience changes (Yee, 2017).  
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In conclusion, the results reported in this chapter support the sensorimotor claim that 
conceptual and perceptual processing are continuous (as opposed to modular) and 
therefore mutually interact. They extend this to the olfactory domain. The mere 
presence of an ambient aroma is sufficient to selectively interfere with thinking about 
smelly objects (but not neutral objects) even when olfactory information is not 
explicitly probed. Furthermore, we observe that the interaction between semantic and 
olfactory processing measurably depends on an individual’s immediate context and 
lifetime experiences. 
Finally, notwithstanding the unexpected effect in errors, our results suggest that 
olfactory sensory areas of the brain are functionally related to semantic processing 
rather than peripheral to it. This important as it converges with imaging evidence (Ghio 
et al., 2016; González et al., 2006) but bolster their findings against criticisms of their 
perspicacity (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). These results are novel because they 
provide support for sensorimotor accounts of conceptual representation and their 







Part 2 – Parkinson’s and the manual modality 
While, in the first two studies of this thesis I tested visual and olfactory components 
of object representations, the following chapters report two studies designed to test 
manual features of object representations. First, I report a behavioural experiment 
designed to test whether deterioration in people’s motor capacities, due to a motor 
disease (namely Parkinson’s disease), impacts their ability to think about objects 
which are frequently associated with motor actions. Second, I report an fMRI study 
designed to explore the neural correlates of any such deterioration.  
Parkinson’s disease  
Parkinson’s disease (PD) is a degenerative disease characterised by motor issues 
including, tremor, rigidity, akinesia (inability to initiate movement) and bradykinesia 
(slowness of movement). It is caused by degradation of the nigrostriatal pathway 
which causes dopamine deficiencies in individuals with PD. These deficiencies lead 
to an imbalance in the motor loop of the brain-based-motor-circuit (including the basal 
ganglia and thalamus) and dysregulation in frontoparietal areas implicated in voluntary 
action generation, i.e., primary motor cortex (M1), supplementary motor area (SMA), 
and pre-motor cortex (pMC) (Rodriguez-Oroz et al., 2009). Specifically, PD has been 
shown to cause hypo-activation in the preSMA, SMA and M1 and hyper-activation in 
the ventral-pMC. This pattern of hyper/hypo-activation has been argued to be a form 
of compensatory activation in individuals with PD (PDs) (Grafton, 2004). Treatment 
for PD involves prescribing levadopa (LDopa) and/or dopaminergic agonists which, 
when taken, restore function to the basal ganglia and alleviate motor symptoms, or, in 
more developed cases, surgical interventions and the placement of electrodes for the 
purpose of deep brain stimulation (DBS) and restoration of motor function. Aside from 
motor issues, PDs also exhibit a number of perceptual and cognitive deficiencies. In 
terms of global cognitive issues, in the later stages of PD development, dementia 
(Pigott et al., 2015) or mild cognitive impairment (Yarnall et al., 2014) is common 
alongside cognitive control pathologies (Cools & D’Esposito, 2011). With regards to 
language, PDs often exhibit speech difficulties e.g., slowness and difficulty to initiate 
speech and dysarthria (poor articulation of speech) (Smith & Caplan, 2018) and global 
impairments, as compared to healthy controls, in the lexical retrieval of nouns and 
verbs (Pell & Monetta, 2008). Interestingly, PDs also seem to have a less keen sense 
of smell (Doty, 2012) and are even known to have visual hallucinations (Sanchez-




Chapter 4: Parkinson’s, manual experience & object 
representations – behavioural  
4.1 Introduction 
While there is strong evidence for motor system involvement in semantically 
processing actions verbs (e.g., “jump”) (Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004), 
sensorimotor models also make analogous, but scarcely tested, predictions concerning 
object concepts (e.g., “typewriter”); i.e., that when people activate the semantic 
representations of manipulable objects, related motor associations will be 
automatically activated in service of semantic access. A modicum of neuroimaging 
evidence supports this. In fMRI, for example, motor areas are activated when seeing 
pictures or processing the names of manipulable objects (Binder et al., 2009; R. F. 
Goldberg et al., 2006; Robert F Goldberg et al., 2006; Alex Martin, 2007; Noppeney 
& Price, 2003) and some studies suggest that detailed knowledge of how objects are 
manipulated is activated (Boronat et al., 2005; Hargreaves et al., 2012; Rueschemeyer 
et al., 2010; Yee et al., 2010). Similarly, in EEG, seeing manipulable objects, even 
where no explicit semantic processing is required, evokes action related potentials 
(Grafton, Fadiga, Arbib, & Rizzolatti, 1997) 
There is also ample psycholinguistic evidence that motor information forms part of the 
conceptual representations of objects. For example, lexical decisions are sped up when 
object names are primed by the names of other objects which are similarly manipulated 
(e.g., typewriter and piano; Myung, Blumstein & Sedivy, 2006) Similarly, for both 
images, visually presented names and auditory names, physical responses to questions 
about objects are facilitated if they are made using the specific grip type typically 
associated with that object (e.g., a clawed hand and a doorknob; Bub et al., 2008; 
Masson, Bub, & Warren, 2008). The balance of evidence thus suggests that the motor 
system is involved in representing manipulable objects and that it is recruited to 
semantically process their names. However, as pointed out throughout this thesis, it is 
logically possible that both priming effects and observed motor activation in 
neuroimaging, putatively arising as a response to semantic processing, could result 
from non-semantic processes (i.e., motor imagery: Jeannerod, 1994) thereby 
challenging the view that these regions form part of semantic representations 
themselves (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). 
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One approach to showing that the motor system is functionally involved in the 
representations of manipulable objects is to test if interruptions to the brain regions 
supposedly recruited in support of semantically processing a given word, perhaps as a 
result of neurological damage to sensory or motor systems, lead to specific semantic 
impairments in processing that word. Essentially, to test if damage to experience-
relevant brain networks selectively impairs associated semantic domains, but spares 
others (Bak, 2013). 
There is some evidence that taxing brain areas (i.e., motor areas) important for the 
representation of manipulable nouns has a measurable impact on processing those 
nouns. For example dual task interference paradigms (Bub et al., 2008; Marino et al., 
2014; Tucker & Ellis, 2004; Witt, Kemmerer, Linkenauger, & Culham, 2010; Yee, 
Chrysikou, Hoffman, et al., 2013) and brain stimulation studies (Cattaneo, Devlin, 
Salvini, Vecchi, & Silvanto, 2010; Gough et al., 2012; Pobric, Jefferies, & Lambon 
Ralph, 2010) have all provided evidence that motor system occupation/interruption 
results in corresponding impairments to accessing motor semantics. Similarly, with 
regards to motor disorders, it has been shown that apraxia (a motor disorder) 
selectively impairs people’s ability to process manipulable objects (Buxbaum & 
Saffran, 2002; Myung et al., 2010), as do lesions to motor areas (Guido Gainotti, 
Silveri, Daniel, & Giustolisi, 1995). 
Because PD is considered to be primarily a motor disorder, it is often viewed as an 
informative testing ground for the predictions of sensorimotor accounts. Specifically, 
PD should selectively affect the motor components of semantic representations. A 
number of studies to date have demonstrated that action-language (i.e., verbs related 
to bodily movement) is indeed impaired in PDs (Birba et al., 2017; Cardona et al., 
2014; for review see: da Silva, Machado, Cravo, Parente, & Carthery-Goulart, 2014; 
García & Ibáñez, 2016; Salmazo-Silva et al., 2017) and, generally, these deficiencies 
have been attributed to disruption of sensorimotor-based semantics in the motor 
system. 
Naming pictures of action verbs (Bertella et al., 2002; Cotelli et al., 2007; Herrera & 
Cuetos, 2012; Patrice Péran et al., 2009; Rodríguez-Ferreiro, Menéndez, Ribacoba, & 
Cuetos, 2009), generating verbs related to a particular action (Patrice Péran et al., 
2003), making lexical decisions on action verbs (Boulenger et al., 2008) and making 
semantic judgements on (hand related) verbs associated with speed (Speed, van Dam, 
Hirath, Vigliocco, & Desai, 2017) are all impaired in PD. Furthermore, making motor 
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responses to manipulable stimuli is modulated in PDs as compared to healthy controls 
(HCs) (Cardona et al., 2014; Ibáñez et al., 2013), which has been attributed to reduced 
frontotemporal connectivity and basal ganglia atrophy in PDs (Melloni et al., 2015). 
While much of the research concerning action language processing and PD has been 
related to single words, a few studies have used more natural stimuli such as simple 
sentences or short texts. One such study looked at the effect of PD on the processing 
of sentences (Fernandino et al., 2013). They manipulated the motor content of 
sentences (i.e., the verbs) and compared: literal, figurative-non-idiomatic, and 
figurative-idiomatic to abstract sentences. They show that sentences involving action 
content were impaired in PDs as compared to abstract sentences. Another study 
assessed PDs reading naturalistic texts and found relative impairments on action texts 
compared to neutral texts (García et al., 2018). Elsewhere, it has been shown that in 
spontaneous discourse PDs rely less on action-related concepts (García et al., 2016). 
In general, PDs have been reported to exhibit a noun and verb processing dissociation 
(with verbs relatively more impaired; Bertella et al., 2002, but see Cotelli et al., 2007 
for evidence of relativly greater noun deficits in PDs vs. HCs). However, many of the 
studies showing this do so by comparing nouns to verbs, despite inherent differences 
in their grammatical complexity. Relatively little work controlling for this difference 
has been conducted exploring whether PD leads to impairments in processing concrete 
noun words. Because sensorimotor theories predict that semantic action content, 
rather than grammatical class is behind language deficits in PD, they predict that 
concrete nouns should be impaired in a similar way to action verbs as long as motor 
content is comparably relevant to the nouns’ representations (Vigliocco, Vinson, 
Druks, Barber, & Cappa, 2011). Below I briefly review some studies which have tested 
noun processing in PDs. 
In one behavioural study (Cotelli et al., 2007), PDs (in the ON state of DRT) and HCs 
named actions and objects which varied in their manipulability. Action naming was 
impaired in PDs but no differences were found for objects, even when the stimuli were 
further categorized into more and less manipulable categories (in a post-hoc analysis). 
Another behavioural study (Bocanegra et al., 2015) showed a clear deficit in PDs 
compared to HCs for nouns in the pyramids and palm trees test. While the authors did 
not control for the motor components of the nouns in the test, they theorised that the 
deficits they observe may be due to the presence of manipulable nouns in the list (65% 
of their trials involved manipulable objects). However, because both of these 
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experiments were not originally designed (and were therefore underpowered) to test 
our specific question of whether manipulable nouns are impaired compared to non-
manipulable nouns in PDs, caution must be taken interpreting their results.  
Two studies comparing PDs treated with STN-DBS (sub-thalamic-nucleus deep brain 
stimulation) to HCs on processing objects have been done. In one, HCs were faster 
and more accurate to name both objects and actions than PDs overall and PDs were 
more accurate and faster to name objects and actions with stimulation compared to 
without. Importantly however, their stimuli objects varied widely in type and 
manipulability making their findings uninformative about the specific question of 
motor content being critical to PD deficits (Silveri et al., 2012).  
In the other study (Phillips et al., 2012), early PDs with STN-DBS were faster than 
controls to name pictures of frequently manipulated objects (but not animals) when 
undergoing stimulation compared to without it suggesting, in general, that naming 
manipulable objects involves parts of the motor system influenced by STN-DBS. 
While these findings are suggestive that motor system interruptions impact the 
semantic processing of manipulable nouns, the lack of a reported interaction between 
naming animals and manipulable objects in PDs (ON/OFF DRT) and HCs is of note. 
Relative differences between groups and stimuli types (accounting for varying 
baseline response differences between groups) are required to support the 
sensorimotor predictions described above. Furthermore, the comparison between 
manipulable objects and animal names is problematic because these categories differ 
in many ways aside from manipulability (i.e., natural vs. man-made, animate vs. 
inanimate, etc.) and it remains possible that category differences in stimuli may be 
influence any category differences.  
Finally, another behavioural study looked at the effect of PD on processing the written 
names or photos of manipulable objects (Buccino et al., 2018). In a go-no-go motor 
response (i.e., a keypress) paradigm, HCs (both young and age matched to PDs) made 
slower manual responses to objects which are frequently grasped with the hands 
compared to infrequently manipulated objects. This effect is interpreted to arise as a 
result of conflict between accessing the motor components of object representations 
and using those same regions to initiate keypress motor responses. In contrast, while 
PD participants performed worse than controls overall, they did not show the same 
pattern as HCs-- rather, they responded to both classes of objects similarly. The 
absence of interference for PDs is interpreted as being due to PD causing difficulty 
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accessing the motor components of object representations (which is what presumably 
causes the resource conflict in HCs), meaning that for PDs there is less interference. 
This finding is suggestive that PD affects motor components of semantics, but is but 
is rather indirect in that it is based on making inferences from a lack of interference. 
4.1.1 Questions 
In this chapter I report an experiment designed to test whether, compared to HCs, 
individuals with motor system impairments (i.e., PDs) have relatively more difficulty 
accessing the representations of objects strongly associated with motor interaction 
(i.e., frequently manipulated objects) compared to objects weakly associated with 
motor interactions (i.e., infrequently manipulated objects). Using an object naming 
behavioural paradigm, we tested whether PDs show more interference (i.e., more 
errors/slower responses) to naming more-manual objects like “hammer” than less-
manual objects like “airplane” than HCs. Importantly, in this study, action semantics 
are not confounded with grammatical class because we are comparing nouns with high 
motor associations to those with low. Furthermore, because we were interested in how, 
according to sensorimotor accounts, language might be impacted by PD, we chose 
object naming as our task because verbal production of words is a more direct test of 
these than other dependent variables such as action compatibility effects.   
4.1.2 Predictions 
If important parts of an object’s distributed semantic representation involve the motor 
system, then a disease which affects those areas, such as PD should lead to selective 
relative impairments to accessing those representations. We therefore predict that PDs 
should experience relatively more difficulty than HCs producing the names of 




PDs were recruited from the Movement Disorders unit of the Hospital Universitario 
Donostia (HUD). HCs were recruited from the BCBL participant pool and 
remunerated for their time. The final study sample consisted of 38 participants: 18 
non-demented PDs and 20 HCs. All participants were right handed native Spanish 
speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Groups were matched in age, 
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gender, years of education, verbal intelligence quotient and cognitive status. See Table 
3 for further information. Exclusion criteria for both groups included: dementia, prior 
cerebral surgery and impulse control disorders. PDs were diagnosed according to the 
UK Parkinson’s Disease Society Brain Bank criteria by HUD neurologists as being at 
stage 1-to-3 on the Hoehn & Yahr scale (i.e., mild- to-moderate) and had been 
diagnosed between 2-to-14 years before testing. PDs were idiopathic and in chronic 
treatment (i.e., two or more years of Levodopa and/or dopaminergic agonists). None 
had brain stimulation treatment. 
 
Table 3. PD behavioural experiment group balancing. Participant demographics and 
cognitive screening. Standard deviations in parentheses. All ps are from two sample t-tests 
except for gender which is from a chi-squared proportion test. 
 
 
4.2.2 Ethics statement 
The study was approved by the Gipuzkoa Clinical Research Ethics Committee and 
written informed consent in compliance with the BCBL ethics committee and the 
Helsinki declaration was obtained from all the subjects prior to participation. 
4.2.3 Clinical and Neuropsychiatric assessment 
Before taking part in the study, all participants underwent assessment for clinically 
relevant dementia, psychosis, impulsivity, addictions, aphasia, language disorders and 
depression. Cognitive status was assessed using the Montreal Cognitive Assessment 
(MoCA) (Nasreddine et al., 2005) and verbal IQ using the WAIS-III vocabulary tool. 
For PDs, all assessments were performed under the effect of the first dose of habitual 
anti-Parkinson’s medication in the morning.  
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The following measures were collected on PDs: Parts I to IV of the Unified 
Parkinson’s Disease rating scale (UPDRS) (Goetz et al., 2008), the Hoehn and Yahr 
staging scale (Hoehn & Yahr, 1967), the Parkinson’s Disease Questionnaire (PDQ-8) 
(Jenkinson, Fitzpatrick, Peto, Greenhall, & Hyman, 1997). Table 4 
provides detailed demographic and clinical information. It includes each individual’s total 
levodopa equivalent dose (LEDDTOTAL), daily levadopa dose (LEDDLDOPA) and daily 
levodopa equivalent dose of dopamine agonist (LEDDA) (Tomlinson et al., 2010) which 
provide a converted and standardised measure of anti-Parkinson’s medication allowing 








Table 4. PD behavioural experiment PD clinical information. ss= standard scores. Yrs = years. Duration = time since diagnosis. Laterality = side 




Experimental stimuli were 179 colour photographs of objects on a white background. We 
obtained most from the bank of standardised stimuli (BOSS) database (Brodeur, Dionne-
Dostie, Montreuil, & Lepage, 2010), but we sourced the images unavailable from there 
online. The concrete objects included: tools (36), food/plants (28), objects (78) and 
animals (37). See Table 14 in the appendix for a full list of stimuli names. Because relative 
image size can have an impact on reaction times (Grèzes, Tucker, Armony, Ellis, & 
Passingham, 2003) we ensured that any sourced images followed the BOSS conventions. 
All images were selected such that they were oriented for use by right handers (Creem & 
Proffitt, 2001). We selected the final stimuli from those which had the highest naming 
agreement in a pre-study conducted on a group of 20 individuals (M age = 22 years, range 
= 18-29 years, 10 male) who did not participate in the current study. Each participant saw 
all of the stimuli once and we arbitrarily allocated participants to one of 10 pseudo-
randomised presentation lists in which no more than four items of the same category (i.e., 
tool, animal etc.,) was presented in succession. 
Ratings 
We collected ratings of manual experience for the names of the stimuli objects online. 
Sixty paid participants (M age = 33 years, range = 19-68 years, 20 male), rated lists of 
half the words according to the following question: “Do you have more experience 
looking at this or touching it with your hands?” 1 = relatively more experience looking, 
to 7 = relatively more experience touching. This process resulted in 28 or 29 ratings for 
each word. 
4.2.5 Procedure 
Participants were seated in a well-lit cabin and wore a headset with a voice activated 
microphone to record verbal responses. Two trained experimenters manually noted 
responses as they were made and we recorded each session using a hand recorder for data 
retention, and checking purposes. Visual stimuli were presented using Presentation 
software on a CRT monitor. After 10 practise trials to familiarise participants with the 
task and to calibrate the voice key, participants saw objects on the screen and named them 
as quickly and as accurately as they could. We asked that they refrain from making any 
other noises in the session. Participants saw a fixation cross before each trial began. After 
200ms of a blank screen, an image was presented on the screen for 4800ms, or until a 
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response was made. Each trial began when an experimenter saw that the participant was 
prepared (see Figure 11 for a visual representation). No feedback on accuracy was 
provided. The experiment lasted around 20 minutes in total. All PDs were tested while in 
the “ON” phase of LDopa medication.  
 
Figure 11.PD behavioural experiment trial structure 
 
4.2.6 Statistical analysis 
We performed analyses using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, et al., 2015) in the R 
programming environment (R Core Team, 2018). Response times (RTs) were submitted 
to linear mixed effects regression models (LMERs) and errors were submitted to 
generalised linear mixed effects (logistic) regression models (GLMERs). The 
significance of the effects was assessed using the likelihood-ratio tests (i.e., chi-squared 
tests of fit) between a model with and one without the critical term. To approximate 
degrees of freedom and p values for individual predictors in the models we used the 
lmerTest package (Kuznetsova et al., 2017). For analyses we report relevant regression 
coefficients (either RTs or odds ratios (ORs)) with 95% CIs and t-values (LMER) or z-
values (GLMER). As counterbalanced-crossed random effects we always included 
participant and item as intercepts. We also included random slopes of the fixed effects, 
by subject and by item, when they: improved the fit of the model, were theoretically 
motivated, justified by the data and design, computationally converged, and did not lead 
to underspecified estimates (i.e., random effect correlations of >.8/-.8). We aimed to be 
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as maximal (Barr et al., 2013) as was warranted without sacrificing parsimony (Bates, 
Kliegl, et al., 2015; Matuschek et al., 2017). As fixed effects we entered object-type (a 
categorical variable with two levels: less-manual objects (baseline) and more-manual 
objects and Group (a categorical variable with two levels and HC as baseline) and their 
interaction. In further analyses we replaced object-type with average experience ratings 
(a continuous, mean centred variable from 1-7). 
A significant critical positive interaction between object-type/manual experience ratings 
and Group would indicate that PDs are relatively impaired, compared to HCs, at naming 
objects associated with more manual experience than less manual objects.  
We coded responses by hand (both online and offline) to ensure that only correct 
responses were included in RT analysis. Errors (% errors ± 1SD: 29.81 %, ± 10.61 % in 
total) include: incorrect names (82.7%), responses made before 100ms and after 4800ms 
of picture onset (8.6%) and verbal disfluencies or hesitations (i.e., incorrect mic trips) 
(8.7%). Response times were calculated from the appearance of an object images to the 
onset of a valid response, they were trimmed, by participant, to ±3SD of the mean (<2%). 
4.3 Results  
Data Exclusion 
We excluded data from two participants (5% of sample), not included in the final sample 
described in the participants section, because of poor microphone calibration meaning 
that either no responses were logged (1) or they were logged incorrectly (1). 
Following a preliminary analysis, we discarded the data from four stimuli (2% of sample) 
because they were too hard to name (i.e., accuracy < 3 SDs from the sample mean) (2), 
or because we did not collect ratings for them (2).  
Object condition assignment 
Using experience ratings collected online we divided the objects into two conditions: The 
bottom half of the objects became the relatively-less-manually-experienced-objects (less-
manual) condition (M = 2.16, SD = 0.60) and the top half the relatively-more-manually-
experienced-objects (more-manual) condition (M = 4.83, SD = 0.82).9 
                                               
9 In the visual and olfactory experiments, we used a tercile split. Due to the limited time 
we had to test each participant, we had fewer items in this study, so in order to maintain 
sufficient statistical power we used a median split.   
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4.3.2 Response times 
Overall, PDs were not slower to name objects than HCs (RTs ± 1 SE: 1102 ms ± 47 ms 
and 1122 ms, ± 45 ms respectively). The results of an LMER model to predict manual-
interference in RTs based on object category revealed no main effect of object-type 
(t(177) = -0.148, p > .8) or group (t(37) = -0.390, p > .6). Further, the critical interaction 
between object-type and group was not significant (χ2(1) = 0.37, p > .5). See Figure 12 
for a visualisation of this comparison and Table 5 for aggregated means. The results of 
an LMER model to predict manual-interference in RTs based on continuous rating 
revealed no main effect of rating (t(46) = -0.88, p > .3) or group (t(38) = -0.356, p > .7) 
and no significant critical interaction between rating and group (χ2(1) = 0.73, p > .3). See 
Figure 13 for an approximate visualisation of this effect. 
 
Figure 12. PD behavioural experiment object naming RTs, by participant. Mean 
Reaction time, by participant, as a function of group and object type. Error bars 

























  less−manual−objects    more−manual−objects  
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Table 5. PD behavioural experiment results table. By participant aggregated mean RTs and 
% Errors for the object naming task by group and object condition. Standard error of the 
mean is in parentheses. 
 
 
Figure 13. PD behavioural experiment object naming RTs, by item. Scatterplot (with best 
fitting regression line) showing the relationship between RT interference effect scores (ms) 
aggregated and manual experience ratings. Interference effect for each object calculated as 
RT HC – RT PD. 
4.3.3 Accuracy 
Overall, PDs did not make more errors naming objects than HCs (% errors ± 1SD: 29.73 
%, ± 12.08 % and 29.89 % ± 10.06 % respectively). The results of a GLMER model to 
predict manual-interference in errors based on object category revealed no main effect of 
object-type (z = -0.191, p > .8) or group (z = -0.05, p > .9) and there was no significant 
critical interaction between object-type and group (χ2(1) = 0.22, p > .2). The results of a 
GLMER model to predict manual-interference in errors based on rating revealed no main 
effect of rating (z = -0.87, p > .3) or group (z = -0.31, p > .7) and there was no significant 
RT (ms) Errors (%) RT (ms) Errors (%)
Healthy Controls 1079 (39) 29.43 (2.42) 1059 (32) 30.34 (2.12)











































































































































































































































































































































1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Manual Rating






















critical interaction between object-type and group (χ2(1) = 2.06, p > .15). Our results 
show no interference either to response times or to accuracy when responding to more 
manual objects than less manual objects as a result of PD. 
4.3.4 Exploratory analysis 
Though our sample was small it had enough variability to evaluate if any interference 
effect could be predicted by individual differences in disease metrics. In order to assess 
the impact of these we calculated an interference effect, by participant, by subtracting the 
average RT or % error for manual objects from visual objects. We then tested whether 
this interference measure scaled in proportion to individuals’ age, time since diagnosis of 
PD, score on the UPDRS-3 scale (a measure of motor skills) and their score on the H&Y 
scale (a measure of motor fluency). We observed that none of these measure correlate 
with interference, see Table 6.  
 
Table 6. PD behavioural experiment correlations of interference effect with factors of 
interest. 
In exploratory mode, following previous studies (Rueschemeyer et al., 2010) we analysed 
subsets of the manipulable objects (n=94) which required the use of either a fine grip 
(n=47) or a grasp (n=47) (functional / volumetric manipulability). The results of an 
LMER model to predict manual-interference in RTs based on grip-type revealed no main 
effect of grip-type (t(82) = 0.193, p > .8) or group (t(38) = -0.015, p > .9) and there was 
no significant critical interaction between object-type and group (χ2(1) = 0.70, p > .4). 
The results of a GLMER model to predict manual-interference in errors based on grip-
type revealed no main effect of grip-type (z = 0.83, p > .4) or group (z = 0.67, p > .7) and 
there was no significant critical interaction between grip-type and group (χ2(1) = 0.45, p 
> .5).  
4.4 Discussion 
According to sensorimotor accounts, sensory, motor and semantic process are not 
functionally distinct, but rather overlap, interact and are supported by the same brain 
r p r p
Age -0.24 .14 -0.33 .17
PDyrs 0.05 .83 0.16 .52
UPDRS3 -0.08 .73 0.02 .93
HY -0.15 .53 -0.07 .79
RT Error
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areas. If so, accessing the conceptual representations referred to by concrete noun words 
should engage the brain areas which are engaged when interacting with or experiencing 
those objects. The behavioural study reported here tested this prediction in PDs and HCs 
by measuring accuracy and response times to naming photos of objects. Sensorimotor 
accounts predict that having PD, which is predominately a motor disease, should interfere 
more with naming frequently manipulated objects relative to infrequently manipulated 
objects, as compared to HCs. This is because the representations of manipulated objects 
are predicted to involve motor areas, access to which are disrupted in PD. On the other 
hand, amodal accounts would predict no differences. 
Firstly, we did not observe that PDs were slower or less accurate than HCs in a 
confrontation naming task overall. That we do not observe such differences in such a 
large and carefully matched sample challenges some previous work (Bocanegra et al., 
2015) and suggests that PD does not necessarily lead to noun impairments compared to 
HCs. However, contrary to our predictions, we found no evidence that PD makes it 
relatively more difficult for people to name frequently vs. infrequently manipulated 
objects compared to HCs. Furthermore, exploratory analyses did not suggest a subtler 
relationship between semantic processing and PD driven by stimuli factors (i.e., by 
subclassifying objects by manipulability type) or influences of individual differences 
between people (i.e., age, time since diagnosis or measures of PD severity). At the outset 
it should be noted that this null result is broadly in line with a number of previous 
behavioural findings in PDs (Cotelli et al., 2007) showing that they are not impaired on 
processing manipulable nouns. However, our finding differs from other work (Buccino 
et al., 2018; Phillips et al., 2012) which has suggested, on the contrary, that such 
impairments exists. While our null result could, clearly, be interpreted as a challenge to 
sensorimotor accounts of semantics, we will now discuss a number of issues pertinent to 
contextualising our results before drawing conclusions from them. 
A major limitation to our study is that, for practical reasons, our PDs were in the ON stage 
of their anti-parkinsonian medication when we tested them. All were being treated with 
dopamine replacement therapy (DRT), predominately Levadopa (LDopa), which 
alleviates the motor deficits associated with PD by restoring underactive neuronal activity 
in primary motor and premotor regions thereby repairing the motor loop through 
improved connectivity between the cortex and basal ganglia (Haslinger et al., 2001). 
Aside from movement improvements, some imaging work has shown that DRT increases 
motor activation during cognitive activities like motor imagery and action processing (P. 
 78 
Péran et al., 2013). A number of studies have assessed the effect of anti-parkinsonian 
treatment on action language impairments, generally reporting that semantic deficits in 
verb processing in PDs are absent or ameliorated due to DRT and/or STN-DBS. For 
example, in picture naming (Herrera & Cuetos, 2012; Herrera, Cuetos, & Ribacoba, 2012; 
Silveri et al., 2012), masked priming (Boulenger et al., 2008) and confrontation object 
naming (Cotelli et al., 2007). Though one study (Cardona et al., 2014) suggests that 
semantic deficits associated with PD persist even in ON state, at least for “action 
compatibility” effects.  
Because it seems possible that DRT could obscure impairments in semantic processing 
(normally present in PDs in OFF stage) by “repairing” any access problems to motor 
aspects of semantic representations, it is possible that our PDs’ motor systems were not 
sufficiently impaired, at time of testing, to interfere with the motor representations of 
manipulable object concepts. If true, the fact that PDs were not relatively more impaired 
in naming manipulable objects in that state is unsurprising. Future work should explore 
this topic more fully by varying the DRT state of individuals and comparing people both 
ON and OFF medication. From the point of view of “fluid” accounts of concepts (Yee, 
2017) that impairments are impermanent or contextual would be highly informative about 
the nature of concepts. This will be discussed further below.  
Aside from the DRT concerns above, there is another concern about using PD as model 
of manual motor impairment. This is because PD is not necessarily a specifically “hand-
related” impairment and, in fact, negatively affects very different regions of the body on 
an individual level. Therefore, it is important to consider whether our PDs can properly 
be considered as homogenously impaired in their manual capacities. An implicit 
assumption of the sensorimotor assumptions outlined above. After all, the “body 
specificity hypothesis” (Daniel Casasanto, 2011), for which there is increasing 
neuroimaging evidence (Willems, Hagoort, & Casasanto, 2010), states that how people 
represent objects in the brain is intimately connected with their personal physical 
capacities. In support of this consideration two studies with PDs have shown specific verb 
deficits (i.e., hand or leg related verbs) to be correlated with corresponding upper vs lower 
limb PD motor impairments (Nguyen, 2013; Roberts et al., 2017). Examining the data 
with respect to the type of motor difficulties present in each individual is a sensible 
approach which may add power to experimental analyses of PD and semantic-motor 
impairments. Unfortunately, however, the motor assessments we collected were not 
sufficiently detailed to allow us to take this approach.  
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On a methodological level, it is worth asking whether our chosen task, object naming, is 
optimally sensitive for measuring sensorimotor-semantic impairments. Of note is that 
previous evidence of manipulable noun impairments in PD (Buccino et al., 2018) comes 
from an action compatibility methodology, which involve a potentially more sensitive 
dependent variable than verbal production, namely keypress latencies. Overall, it may be 
that object naming is not always measurably interfered with by motor impairments 
(Garcea, Dombovy, & Mahon, 2013; Negri et al., 2007; Rosci, Chiesa, Laiacona, & 
Capitani, 2003). This may be because it is possible to name photographs of without 
accessing motor aspects of an object’s representation especially if, given the visual nature 
of the task (seeing colour photographs of the objects), visually diagnostic aspects of an 
object’s representation are naturally given primacy. On the other hand, object naming has 
been successfully used elsewhere to test very similar hypotheses (e.g., Yee, Chrysikou, 
Hoffman, et al., 2013), and sensorimotor research widely suggests that nouns vary in their 
motor content and ones rich in motor associations should be interfered with (Vigliocco et 
al., 2011).  
As discussed in the visual experimental chapter of this thesis, the stimuli we used are 
concrete objects which have relative as opposed to absolute differences in the modality 
they are most frequently associated with (i.e., “visual” vs. “manual objects”). Because all 
the objects are multimodally experienced (i.e., visually, auditorily etc.), according to 
sensorimotor accounts their representations extend widely over the cortex. A given object 
may “load” more onto one modality or another (i.e., computer screens [visual] vs. 
keyboards [manual]) but their representations should involve other modalities too (you 
sometimes carry or adjust screens and we often look at keyboards). Given this, it is 
possible that picture naming might be preserved in PD because it is possible (and even 
felicitous) for the representations of even highly manipulable objects to be accessed using 
other (perhaps less “primary”) sense modalities (i.e., vision) rather than through 
activation of motor information. Future work might elect to contrast noun word 
processing (visually and auditorily) with object naming to see the degree to which 
semantic access relies on the motor system when the task relevant importance of visual 
characteristics is lessened. On the other hand, it should be noted that the suggestion that 
different aspects of representations might be activated depending on the task at hand fits 
nicely with the main thrust of this thesis; namely the importance of contextual factors to 
concepts.  
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A few final comments should be made about the experimental methodology we employed 
with regards to our null result. For practical reasons (time constraints with the clinical 
population) we were unable to collect manual experience ratings from the participants 
themselves. While the group average of ratings collected online are widely used in the 
field, and can be a good proxy for individual ratings, it is conceivable that, because our 
ratings were a) collected from a younger population than our experimental sample, and 
b) collected from healthy individuals, our ratings of experience may less closely reflect 
the particularities of our older PDs’ experiences with objects (e.g., it is possible that PDs, 
perhaps as a result of their impairments, have less manual experience with objects than 
HCs). In future studies, experience ratings provided by the participants themselves may 
reveal more about how personal manual experience interacts with motor impairments and 
the representations of manual objects. 
On a theoretical level, another possible explanation for our null effect presents itself. 
There are (at least) two ways of characterising, from a sensorimotor perspective, the 
predicted sensorimotor-semantic impairments arising from lesions to “relevant” sensory 
or motor areas. One is to argue that, when probed, components of impaired 
representations are either less activated or inaccessible to PDs. Their representations 
extend over the same regions as when they were healthy and now are relatively 
diminished. On this first view, impairments should be measurable in tasks such as ours 
(though not, perhaps if individuals are under DRT). Another possibility is to argue that if 
representations of objects are experience-based, and over time, an individual’s capacities 
and by extension their experience has changed, their representations too should “shift” to 
more readily reflect their current “understanding” of it. There is some recent behavioural 
evidence that individuals after a stroke rapidly adapt their representations of manipulable 
objects to reflect their current situation (Chrysikou et al., 2017). On this conception, it is 
possible that long term conditions such as PD might, over time, lead to sufficient 
“representational shift” for any measurable differences at the level of object naming to be 
ameliorated, as the disease progresses. This possibility could be tested behaviourally by 
tracking patients longitudinally. However, some suggestion in the literature exists 
indicating that PDs exhibit fMRI functional connectivity differences, as compared to 
healthy controls, in processing action language (Abrevaya et al., 2016). It is possible that, 
while we did not observe any differences behaviourally, imaging data may shed some 
light on subtle neural differences. In the following chapter this possibility will be 
addressed.  
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In conclusion, in one behavioural experiment we did not observe either that PDs are 
impaired on noun processing compared to HCs or their predicted relative impairment of 
manipulable object representations. However, as discussed above, there were a number 
of features of our sample and our methodology which make our results complicated to 
interpret. Firstly, the fact that our PDs were treated with DRT and therefore “motorically-
unimpaired” makes it difficult to judge whether PD, in the absence of treatment, would 
lead to relative impairments in naming manipulable objects, as predicted by sensorimotor 
accounts. Secondly, because of the wide variety of motor impairments that are present in 
PD, recruiting a sample of participants who are uniformly impaired in fine hand motor 
control is challenging making PD a suboptimal motor disorder with which to test these 
predictions. Further concerns revolve around the sensitivity of the object naming task 
itself (as opposed to action compatibility effects, for example) as well as its potential to 
encourage people to focus on more visual aspects of representations than less visually 
based tasks. Therefore, further experimental work, perhaps using linguistic stimuli and 
certainly with experience ratings from affected individuals themselves, is required to shed 
light on the relationship between PD and the representation of manipulable objects. This 
work should attempt to tease apart the effect of Parkinson’s medication on “repairing” 
conceptual access, as well as exploring the relationship between long term shifts in 







Chapter 5: Parkinson’s, manual experience & object 
representations – fMRI 
5.1 Introduction 
As outlined throughout this thesis, according to sensorimotor accounts, important 
elements of lexicosemantic content are grounded in perceptual and motor brain areas as 
a result of sensory and motor experience. This means that these accounts predict that the 
conceptual representations of objects associated with actions should involve parts of the 
motor system responsible for the procedural knowledge required to perform those actions. 
In the previous chapter I reported an experiment designed to test these predictions by 
measuring the effect of a motor disease; Parkinson’s disease (PD), on naming frequently 
manipulated objects compared to infrequently manipulated objects. While we found no 
evidence of manipulable-object naming impairments at the behavioural level, this may 
have been because, for practical reasons, the PDs in our sample were all under the effects 
of dopamine replacement therapy. This medication may have restored the motor loop 
function at the time of testing in these people, resulting that impairments to action 
semantics in PDs were either absent or too subtle to be readily detected using a 
behavioural confrontation naming paradigm. In this chapter I report an fMRI experiment 
designed to explore at the neural level if there are more subtle signatures of long-term 
changes to semantically processing the names of manipulable objects and accessing their 
representations due to PD. 
Object representations 
At least two primary networks and one processing hub are commonly identified in 
neuroimaging experiments as being involved in processing concrete objects: one is a 
frontoparietal network, thought to be engaged in service of activating information about 
how objects are usually manipulated; and the second is an occipitotemporal network 
commonly implicated in accessing information about their visual properties (for review 
see: Lewis, 2006; Pulvermüller, 2005; Weisberg et al., 2007). The retrieval of information 
from these networks, in the service of semantic processing, is thought to be mediated by 
inferior regions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) (S. L. Thompson-Schill, D’Esposito, 
Aguirre, & Farah, 1997). According to sensorimotor accounts, the representation of 
concrete objects with both visual and motor associations (e.g., “tools”) should include 
areas in both the frontoparietal and occipitotemporal network. However, those with fewer 
motor associations; i.e., those infrequently manipulated but frequently seen objects (e.g., 
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“sculptures”) should primarily be sub-served by the latter, occipitotemporal network. 
Below I briefly summarise relevant findings related to these networks. 
In healthy participants, a left lateralised frontoparietal network is involved in online 
object manipulation (i.e., active when actually touching and using objects) and includes 
areas such as the: pre-motor cortex (pMC), primary motor cortex (M1), primary 
somatosensory cortex (S1), supplementary motor area (SMA), and parietal cortex (PC). 
Crucially however, this network is also active when people retrieve semantic information 
about manipulable objects offline, for example when viewing pictures of them (Chao & 
Martin, 2000), hearing their names (Rueschemeyer et al., 2010) and naming them 
(Chouinard & Goodale, 2010; Patrice Péran et al., 2010). As is common in other 
processing streams, the frontoparietal network involves a posterior-anterior gradation of 
complexity with more posterior regions such as the anterior intraparietal sulcus (aIPS) 
and the adjacent supramarginal gyrus (SMG) representing more schematic information 
about manipulable objects (Boronat et al., 2005) and more anterior regions such as the 
ventral-PMC representing more elaborated motor semantics, such as those associated 
with complex motor pattern execution (Aziz-Zadeh & Damasio, 2008; Gerlach, Law, & 
Paulson, 2002; Kan et al., 2006). Because selective stimulation of motor regions 
(aIPS/SMG and vPMC) with TMS (Ishibashi, Lambon Ralph, Saito, & Pobric, 2011; 
Pobric et al., 2010), brain lesions (Arévalo, Baldo, & Dronkers, 2012; G Gainotti, 2000; 
Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1997; Tranel, Kemmerer, Adolphs, Damasio, & Damasio, 
2003) and behavioural dual task interference paradigms (Yee, Chrysikou, Hoffman, et al., 
2013) selectively interfere with accessing the meaning of manipulable object noun words, 
the motor regions of the frontoparietal network seem to be functionally, as opposed to 
epiphenomenally, implicated in their representations. 
The second network commonly implicated in representing semantic knowledge about 
concrete objects is the occipitotemporal network. Generally speaking it is related to the 
representation of visual semantics and includes areas such as ventral-occipitotemporal 
cortex including the fusiform and lingual gyri and the lateral occipital cortex (LOC: a 
region sensitive to the visual features of intact, recognisable objects: Grill-Spector et al., 
2001). These regions are thought to feed visual properties of objects forward to key 
semantic areas in posterior temporal and prefrontal cortex (Malach et al., 1995).  
Finally, the retrieval and selection of semantic knowledge about concrete objects from 
both frontoparietal and temporooccipital networks is mediated by the ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) (Alex Martin, 2007; Rissman & Wagner, 2012). One area, the 
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inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) is commonly implicated in the guidance of semantic retrieval 
and selection of contextually valid representations from information stored over the 
cortex (Badre & Wagner, 2007; S. L. Thompson-Schill et al., 1997), and is equally active 
when processing animal names vs tool names (Chouinard & Goodale, 2010). In fact, the 
IFG (and more specifically: BA44 or opercularis and BA 45 or triangularis) has been 
suggested as a major semantics hub at which information from distributed cortical 
networks of object recognition processing come together (Vigliocco et al., 2011). Support 
for this view comes from studies showing that TMS of the left IFG leads to generalised 
deficits in semantic processing (Devlin, Matthews, & Rushworth, 2003). 
Experience & training  
As highlighted throughout this thesis, an under-examined prediction of sensorimotor 
accounts is that sensorimotor representations develop as a result of an individual’s 
sensory and motor experience. There is growing evidence that motor experience with 
objects alters activation in the frontoparietal network. For example, manual training with 
novel objects increases activation in the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and PMC when merely 
viewing images of them in a scanner (Weisberg et al., 2007). Similarly, objects which are 
rated as being commonly interacted with lead to increased activation in the anterior-IPS 
and SMG as compared to objects infrequently interacted with (Hargreaves et al., 2012). 
Basically, the more people have physically used specific objects such as tools dictates the 
degree to which vPMC is recruited, with frequently manipulated objects yielding the 
highest activation (Kan et al., 2006; Oliver et al., 2009). 
Parkinson’s disease 
If personal experience with manipulable objects alters the recruitment of the 
frontoparietal network, and this is attributed to changes in the conceptual content of their 
representations, then impairments to this network should selectively interfere with 
“normally” processing those objects. One way of testing this hypothesis is to measure 
whether individuals who have developed interruptions in their motor network (such as 
PDs), show evidence of altered processing pathways for objects typically reliant on the 
frontoparietal motor network. Such alterations in the frontoparietal network might also 
be accompanied by compensatory variations in the “typical” involvement of the 
occipitotemporal network and/or frontal semantic control regions in PDs.  
PD leads to interruptions in a frontostriatal network comprised of prefrontal, motor and 
basal ganglia regions including motor control circuits looping through the SMA from the 
PMC and M1 areas (Rodriguez-Oroz et al., 2009). The affected frontostriatal network, 
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which significantly overlaps with the frontoparietal network discussed above, is, in 
healthy individuals, responsible for motor control. Growing evidence of action-language 
deficits in PDs has been attributed to disruptions in the frontal motor nodes of these 
networks (Birba et al., 2017). Moreover, frontal networks seem to be a particularly 
important for action language, as motor disorders which do not involve such disruptions 
to frontostriatal function (i.e., neuromyelitis optica and acute transverse myelitis) do not 
lead to comparable action-language deficits (Cardona et al., 2014). 
What work has been done with PD to date? 
In the previous chapter I reviewed the growing behavioural evidence of motor language 
disruption in PDs. However, as far as I am aware, to date, only three fMRI studies have 
been published which report testing sensorimotor hypotheses (primarily concentrating on 
action verbs) in PDs (Abrevaya et al., 2016; Péran et al., 2013; Péran et al., 2009). I review 
these briefly below. 
Univariate analysis 
The first study (Péran et al., 2009) followed previous behavioural work (Péran et al., 
2003) suggesting that PDs are impaired at producing verbs compared to naming objects. 
They tested PDs (N=14) in ON state of DRT without a healthy control (HC) comparison 
group (this limitation is discussed below). Participants were asked to either name or 
generate action verbs for 50 black and white line drawings of objects (either biological 
objects such as foods and animals or manipulable man-made objects such as tools). 
Behaviourally, in accordance with their predictions, they observed that verb generation 
was impaired compared to object naming. However, within object naming there were no 
behavioural differences between manipulable or biological objects. Neuroimaging results 
for picture naming (collapsing over object types) vs. rest showed activation in occipital 
lobe, fusiform gyrus and lingual gyrus; suggesting the engagement of the 
occipitotemporal network related to visual properties of objects (further activation was 
observed in the SMA and STG). Verb production vs rest activated a similar network, 
presumably as a result of the trials involving visually processing identical images, but 
additionally involved a cluster in parietal cortex, suggesting the further involvement of 
the frontoparietal network. While direct comparison of object naming and verb generation 
yielded no differences after statistical thresholding, exploratory, uncorrected results (p < 
.001) tentatively suggest higher activation for action naming in the PFC (IFG-opercularis) 
and anterior cingulate cortex. The authors argued that this may indicate a “non-motor” 
route developed as an alternative to the frontoparietal for processing action semantics in 
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PDs. To bolster this claim, they reported a correlation between standardised measures of 
motor dysfunction and activity in the PFC when generating action verbs suggesting that 
the more an individual with PD has motor impairments, the more they recruit PFC when 
generating verbs to describe images.  
The second study (Péran et al., 2013) was conducted with a small sample (N=8) but report 
repeated measures for each participant, both in OFF state of DRT (after a 12hr “washout” 
period) and in ON state of DRT. Again, no healthy control group was tested and PDs 
engaged in blocks of verb generation, mental simulation of action and object naming, in 
response to the same images as above. In line with their previous study, behavioural 
results showed that participants (irrespective of DRT state) made more errors for verb 
generation than for object naming and no differences appeared in accuracy between 
biological and man-made manipulable object types. Imaging results revealed differences 
for “action semantics” (i.e., both verb generation and mentally simulating an action) 
compared to object naming: namely, increased activation in the PFC, suggesting 
increased semantic processing cost. Overall, ON state of DRT led to comparatively higher 
activation in motor and premotor areas both for producing verbs and mentally simulating 
actions as compared to naming objects. For object naming, no differences appeared for 
the same comparisons (i.e., between OFF vs ON state) and no differences appeared 
between object categories (i.e., between manipulable and biological objects). The authors 
interpreted these results as suggesting that action semantics recruit motor brain areas in 
PDs, and that DRT restores function to these regions. Specifically, they argued that DRT 
influences motor activation not only in motor tasks (e.g., Haslinger et al., 2001) but also 
in motor imagery tasks and, interestingly, in verbal tasks involving action semantics.  
These studies suggest that the behaviourally observed action language impairments in 
PDs have neural correlates in motor areas. Furthermore, they suggest that as a result of 
this, PDs develop alternate “non-motor” processing pathways for action language. 
However, the absence of an HC comparison group in the first study (Patrice Péran et al., 
2009) is a limitation. Essentially, their findings show differences between different tasks 
within PDs. While the correlation they report between motor impairment and PFC 
recruitment is highly suggestive, the optimal test of sensorimotor hypotheses would be to 
show that PDs differ from HCs in the way that they process action semantics. On the other 
hand, the second study  comparing PDs in OFF and ON state of DRT (Péran et al., 2013) 
provides intriguing evidence about the recruitment of motor loop regions in different 
contexts (i.e., whether in ON or OFF state), however, it does not address how long-term 
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motor capacity changes in PDs (compared to HCs) impacts on how they habitually 
process action semantics. 
Functional connectivity in PD  
One way of investigating long-term differences in processing strategy for action 
semantics in PDs is to carry out functional connectivity (FC) experiments comparing HCs 
and PDs while they process action language. While whole-brain (univariate) contrasts 
rely on maximum activation in a given area to gain information about its measure, FC 
methods are sensitive to connections and dynamics across the brain as a result of testing 
long-range correlations of activity during processing. With regards to PD, it is likely that 
long-term differences in processing capacities, perhaps as a result of motor loop 
dysfunction, may result in neural reorganisation whereby the brain forges alternate routes 
for action-semantics processes, which in healthy populations typically involve 
frontoparietal networks. Such subtle changes in functional circuits may be most readily 
detected using connectivity analyses methods. One such fMRI study (Abrevaya et al., 
2016) tested HCs and PDs by comparing correlated brain activation while they listened 
to either action verbs (e.g., “dance”) or the names of concrete-non-manipulable nouns 
(e.g., “house”). They correlated activity in three seeds to the rest of the brain, each 
conforming to a prominent node in a network related to: 1) PD dysfunction: the 
frontostriatal network (seed: putamen), 2) action semantic processing: the frontoparietal 
network (seed: M1) and 3) semantic processing in general: the occipitotemporal network 
(seed: superior temporal cortex). They found that the M1 seed was, for action verbs, 
functionally connected more frontally (i.e., to IFG) in HCs, and more posteriomedially 
(i.e., to the cingulate) for PDs. In PDs, as might be predicted, the putamen seed and basal 
ganglia showed less functional coupling both for verbs and nouns, reflecting frontostriatal 
dysfunction. No differences were observed in the temporal seed. The authors argued that 
their results show that PDs rely on an altered “non-motor” or “a-modal” route to process 
action language via medial areas such as the cingulate as opposed to through the “normal” 
frontoparietal network. This claim is further supported by the finding that the degree of 
M1 posterior connectivity was correlated with BG atrophy.  
Summary 
Overall, neuroimaging studies tentatively suggest that PDs differently rely on prominent 
semantic networks to HCs when processing action semantics. On the other hand, there 
remain many questions concerning sensorimotor accounts and PD. First, the studies to 
date have contrasted action verbs and nouns, as a proxy for “action” vs “non-action” 
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concepts (i.e., using grammatical class as maximally diagnostic of action content). 
However, as explained in the previous chapter, sensorimotor models maintain that motor 
experience associated with a concept (not grammatical class) is what determines action 
content and therefore nouns which refer to frequently acted upon objects (but not those 
referring to relatively-more-visually experienced objects) should be represented over 
motor regions in a similar way to action verbs (Saccuman et al., 2006; Vigliocco et al., 
2011). This prediction remains to be tested using neuroimaging in PDs. Secondly, the 
specifics of “compensatory” non-motor alternate processing routes for action semantics 
in PDs, like those described above (Abrevaya et al., 2016), remain to be replicated and 
further explored. 
Another possibility is that the occipitotemporal (primarily visual) network will “pick up 
the slack” when the frontotemporal (primarily motor) network is compromised. Such 
visuomotor “conceptual compensation” is suggested by eye tracking findings that 
individuals with aphraxia exhibit not only impairments to accessing motor information, 
but also trends towards increased sensitivity to visual aspects of manipulable objects, 
compared to HCs (Myung et al., 2010). It may be the case that PDs, in a similar fashion, 
shift away from the frontoparietal and towards the occipitotemporal networks when 
processing manipulable object names. A further possibility is that the performance of 
such “shifts”, if they occur, would be mediated by frontal semantic control regions. Such 
possibilities are ripe for exploration. Finally, the lack of HC groups in the majority of 
previous studies makes it challenging to draw general conclusions about the long-term 
implications of motor impairments on processing action language. Therefore, we set out 
to address these issues. 
5.1.2 Questions and predictions 
Our primary question is whether, in line with sensorimotor accounts, long-term motor 
loop dysfunction due to PD results in differences in processing the names of manipulable 
objects compared to HCs. To our knowledge no studies feature in the literature which 
have examined the neural correlates of processing the heard names of regularly 
manipulated (manual) vs. regularly seen (visual) objects in both PDs and HCs using fMRI 
connectivity analysis methods. Given this, we decided to carry out whole-brain FC 
analyses from independently functionally localised seeds in the frontoparietal and 
occipitotemporal semantic networks: specifically, our functionally localised seeds were 
located in the SMA (which is related to motor control), and LOC (which is sensitive to 
viewpoint invariant object identity processing), respectively. We hypothesised that the 
 90 
long-term implications of motor loop impairments due to PD would result in functional 
reorganisation within these networks when processing manual nouns compared to HCs.  
Primarily, we predict, that when processing the names of manual objects, HCs compared 
to PDs will exhibit increased coactivation of motor areas in the frontoparietal “action” 
network, suggesting motor-semantics disruptions due to PD. Crucially this effect should 
differ for visual object names, i.e., we do not expect differences for visual object names 
with respect to coactivation in motor regions. Second, given that Abrevaya et al. (2016) 
observed increased functional connectivity for action verbs beween M1 and a 
posteriomedial region, we predict that PDs compared to HCs will show similar increased 
coactivation between frontoparietal motor nodes and more posteromedial (non-motor) 
regions for manual names, suggesting the development of non-motor processing routes 
for action semantics. 
A further, more speculative possibility is that non-motor aspects of the representations of 
manual objects such as their visual properties (which are more reliant on the 
occipitotemporal network), will become relatively more important for PDs compared to 
HCs, i.e., PDs will exhibit some conceptual compensation in order to process manual 
objects via “non-action” routes. Therefore, our third (exploratory) prediction is increased 
“compensatory” coupling between key nodes within the occipitotemporal network in PDs 
for manual nouns. Because such functional reorganisation might be mediated by semantic 
control areas in the IFG reflecting changes in the control of semantic selection following 
representational reorganisation in PDs, our fourth (exploratory) prediction is divergent 
coactivation between HCs and PDs of frontal semantic control areas (e.g., IFG) and the 
occipitotemporal and frontoparietal seeds. 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Participants 
PDs were recruited from the Movement Disorders unit of the Hospital Universitario 
Donostia. HCs were recruited from the BCBL participant pool and remunerated for their 
time. The final study sample consisted of 34 participants: 15 non-demented PDs and 19 
HCs. All participants were right handed native Spanish speakers with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. Groups were matched in age, gender, years of education, 
verbal intelligence quotient and cognitive status (see Table 7 for further information).  
Exclusion criteria for both groups included: dementia, prior cerebral surgery and impulse 
control disorders. PDs were diagnosed according to the UK Parkinson’s Disease Society 
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Brain Bank criteria by HUD neurologists as being at stage 1-to-3 on the Hoehn & Yahr 
scale (i.e., mild-to-moderate) and had been diagnosed between 2-to-14 years before 
testing. PDs were idiopathic and in chronic DRT treatment (i.e., two or more years of 
Levodopa and/or dopaminergic agonists). None had brain stimulation treatment. Testing 
occurred in the ON stage of anti-parkinsonian medication (i.e., DRT) because this study 
was conducted at the same time as another study which required participants to be under 
the effects of treatment. 
 
Table 7. PD fMRI experiment group balancing. Participant demographics and 
cognitive screening. Standard deviations in parentheses. SS = standard scores. All p's 
are from two sample t-tests except for gender which is from a chi-squared proportion 
test. 
PD group HC group p  values
(n = 15) (n = 19)
Gender (% male) 86.7 84.2 .8
Age (years) 61.4 (8.3) 63.1 (9.4) .6
Education (years) 12.7 (5.5) 15.1 (5.5) .2
IQ (WAIS-III) (ss) 13.2 (2.4) 14.4 (2.1) .12








Table 8. PD fMRI experiment PD clinical information. PD’s clinical information. ss= standard scores. Yrs = years. Duration = time since diagnosis. 
Laterality = side (i.e., left or right) first affected. Init.maifestation = initial manifestation (i.e., Rigidity or Tremor). 
Patient Age Sex PD duration Side Init.Man UPDRS-I UPDRS-II UPDRS-III UPDRS-IV H&Y PDQ-8 MOCA WAIS-III LEDD TOTAL LEDD DA LEDD LDOPA
P1 65 M 5 L R 2 10 30 2 2 4 21 10 880 480 400
P2 62 M 4 L R 4 6 10 0 1 4 25 14 400 300 0
P3 49 M 2.5 L R 6 3 12 2 1 4 30 14 750 0 750
P4 75 M 5 L T 6 0 13 0 1 3 29 16 400 0 300
P6 66 M 10 R T 11 16 19 3 1.5 8 24 14 1664 300 1064
P7 55 M 13 R R 6 7 12 2 2 8 25 15 1032 300 732
P8 68 M 2 R R 4 9 19 0 1.5 9 23 12 700 300 300
P9 52 F 6 L R 4 10 18 0 1.5 3 25 12 620 320 300
P10 60 M 7 R R 11 10 16 0 1.5 3 27 15 792 160 532
P11 61 M 4 R R 3 9 12 1 2 4 28 15 840 240 600
P12 60 M 4 R T 4 7 14 0 2 6 27 11 600 300 300
P13 64 M 8 R R 11 16 25 8 2.5 11 29 15 1607.5 360 1147.5
P14 64 F 14 L T 6 7 17 4 2 4 23 8 1164 0 1064
P16 74 M 10 L R 7 10 29 2 2.5 2 26 16 1404 240 1064
P18 46 M 8 R T 1 4 18 0 2 0 27 11 250 0 150
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5.2.2 Ethics statement 
The study was approved by the Gipuzkoa Clinical Research Ethics Committee and written 
informed consent in compliance with the BCBL ethics committee and the Helsinki 
declaration was obtained from all the subjects prior to participation. 
5.2.3 Clinical and Neuropsychiatric assessment 
Before taking part in the study, all participants underwent assessment for clinically 
relevant dementia, psychosis, impulsivity, addictions, aphasia, language disorders and 
depression. Cognitive status was assessed using the Montreal Cognitive Assessment 
(MoCA) (Nasreddine et al., 2005) and verbal IQ using the WAIS-III vocabulary tool. For 
PDs, all assessments were performed under the effect of the first dose of habitual anti-
parkinson’s (i.e., DRT) medication in the morning. The following measures were 
collected on PDs: Parts I to IV of the Unified Parkinson’s Disease rating scale (UPDRS) 
(Goetz et al., 2008), the Hoehn and Yahr staging scale (Hoehn & Yahr, 1967), the 
Parkinson’s Disease Questionnaire (PDQ-8) (Jenkinson et al., 1997). Table 8 provides 
detailed demographic and clinical information. It includes individuals’ total levodopa 
equivalent dose (LEDDTOTAL), daily levadopa dose (LEDDLDOPA) and daily levodopa 
equivalent dose of dopamine agonist (LEDDA) (Tomlinson et al., 2010) which provide a 
converted and standardised measure of anti-Parkinson’s medication allowing for 
comparisons between people on different regimes. 
5.2.4 fMRI paradigms 
The stimulation protocol consisted of three tasks: manual localiser, visual localiser and 
main functional word processing task: 
Manual Localiser 
We used a finger tapping functional localiser for motor regions. Specifically, areas of the 
brain related with fine movement of the fingers (Drobyshevsky, Baumann, & Schneider, 
2006). The localiser conformed to a blocked design and included eight 12s activation 
blocks with eight 16s rest-fixation periods between them to allow the hemodynamic 
response function to return to baseline. During activation blocks participants were 
instructed to sequentially touch the fingertips of one hand to the tip of their thumb starting 
from their index finger and progressing to their pinkie finger and back to their index finger 
at a self-paced comfortable rate. The hand to use (i.e., right or left) and for how long was 
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indicated to participants with arrows on the screen. For the purpose of the study we were 
interested in the contrast right & left > rest-fixation to localise manual motor cortex in the 
frontoparietal network. 
Visual Localiser  
We used a functional localiser for the visual cortex (Hindy, Solomon, Altmann, & 
Thompson-Schill, 2015). Subjects were presented with 1) five 18s activation blocks 
presenting 18 objects on a white background and 2) five 18s activation blocks of 
scrambled images of the same objects. Scrambled images were generated by separating 
the images into a 60*60 grid and randomly permuting the sections (except for a weighting 
to preserve centre coherence). The localiser conformed to a block design and included the 
presentation of an 18s rest-fixation period between each of the 10 activation blocks to 
allow the hemodynamic response to return to baseline. Within each activation block, each 
of the images were presented on the screen for 490ms, followed by a 490ms ISI. During 
the activation blocks, the participants had to detect item repetitions (i.e., 1-back) and press 
a button when an item was repeated. Only 2% of the items were repeated along the entire 
functional localiser. For the purpose of the study we were interested in the contrast objects 
> scrambled to localise late visual cortex areas related to whole object processing in the 
occipitotemporal network. 
Main functional word processing task 
Stimuli selection  
In a previous normative study, we collected online ratings of manual experience for the 
names of the stimuli objects. Sixty paid participants rated a preliminary list of words (to 
prevent fatigue, each participant rated only half the N words) according to the following 
question: “Do you have more experience looking at this or touching it with your hands?” 
1 = relatively more experience looking, to 7 = relatively more experience touching. This 
process resulted in 28 or 29 ratings for each word.  
Based on this normative study, 40 object names were selected as referring to relatively-
less-manually-experienced (visual) objects (e.g., “windmill”) and 40 to relatively-more-
manually-experienced (manual) objects (e.g., “pencil”). Using the SOS stimuli 
optimisation tool (Armstrong et al., 2012) stimuli were distributed so that, within each 
condition: the amount of relative manual experience associated with the objects varied 
uniformly, but that between conditions, it differed maximally, while remaining balanced 
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for log-frequency, word duration, and number of syllables. See Table 15 in the appendix 
for a full list of word stimuli and Table 9 for balancing comparisons. 
 
Table 9. PD fMRI experiment stimuli balancing, by condition. Standard deviation in 
parentheses. All ps are from two sample t-tests. 
 
 
For catch trials, sixty well-known brand names (e.g., “Ford”) were chosen as being 
widely representative of different types of companies and products and extremely 
recognisable to participants. To ensure this, a separate group of twenty healthy 
participants were recruited and asked to identify the brands. They correctly recognised 
the brands 88.75% of the time (SD=8.67). All the words were recorded by a female native 
Spanish speaker with a local accent. Recordings were equalised in sampling rate and 
amplitude-modulation and trimmed so that word onset was at the beginning of each file. 
Eleven pseudo-randomised counterbalance lists of stimuli presentation order were created 
and randomly assigned to participants. Participants heard each word once over the course 
of the experiment. 
Task  
The main functional word processing go/no-go task conformed to a fast-event-related-
design wherein participants heard single words and were instructed to press a button when 
they heard a brand name. Importantly, the brand name identification task was orthogonal 
to our experimental manipulation: experience of manipulating objects. So as to maximise 
our efficiency of estimating participants’ blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) 
responses, the order of presentation of experimental conditions (i.e., visual object words, 
manual object words or brand name catch trials) and the inter-trial intervals (jitter 
fixation) for each functional run were determined by using the Optseq-II algorithm (Dale, 
1999). See Figure 14. The task lasted approximately 16 minutes. Interspersed among the 
80 visual and manual items of interest and the 60 brands there were 160 words included 
as part of a separate study that is not part of this thesis.  
visual manual p  values
Rating 2.54 (0.69) 5.48 (0.54) .00
Log frequency 0.74 (0.54) 0.92 (0.53) .16
Duration (seconds) 0.91 (0.17) 0.87 (0.17) .36
Syllables 3.08 (0.76) 2.88 (0.88) .28
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Figure 14. PD fMRI experiment structure. Main functional word task run schematic 
 
5.2.5 MRI data acquisition procedure 
Scanning was conducted in the morning when PDs´ cognitive functions have been shown 
to be optimal (Bruguerolle & Simon, 2002) and PDs were under the effects of their usual 
DRT medication. Before entering the scanner, participants were familiarised with the two 
localisers and the main functional word processing tasks. In scanner, due to variability in 
hearing ability in some participants and scanner noise, we ensured participants were able 
to clearly hear and repeat back a practise word list before experimental scanning began. 
Data were obtained at the Basque Center on Cognition, Brain and Language (BCBL) 3T 
Siemens Magnetom TIM Trio MRI scanner (Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, 
Germany) using a 32-channel array head coil. Visual stimuli were presented using 
Presentation software (Version 18.0, Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley, CA, 
www.neurobs.com) by way of a head-coil-mounted mirror and a rear-projection video 
display (Panasonic SXGA+ 7000). Auditory stimuli presentation involved S14 insert 
earphones (Sensimetrics) in ear, MRI compatible, pneumatic, noise cancelling 
headphones. Responses were collected using 4-button optical response pads (Current 
Designs). Additional snugly-fitting headphones (MR Confon, Magdeburg, Germany) 
were used to dampen background scanner noise and to enable communication with 
experimenters. To limit head movement, the area between participants’ heads and the coil 












frequency (RF) pulses were time locked to the start of each functional run using a 
synchronisation box (NordicNeuroLab SyncBox). 
Imaging Parameters 
High-resolution structural T1-weighted images were acquired with a MPRAGE sequence 
with TR = 2530ms, TE = 2.97ms, inversion time = 1100ms, FA = 7°, FoV = 256x256mm, 
176 slices and voxel size = 1mm3. Functional echo-planar images (EPI) for the word task 
were acquired in two separate runs using a gradient-echo echo-planar pulse sequence with 
the following acquisition parameters: TR = 2500ms, time echo (TE) = 28ms, 41 
contiguous 3mm3 axial slices, 10% inter-slice gap, flip angle (FA) = 90°, field of view 
(FoV) = 192 x 192mm. In total 225 volumes were collected per functional run but to 
allow for T1-equilibration effect, four volumes were discarded from the start and four 
from the end of the run. For the localisers the same EPI sequence was used except for a 
TR of 3000ms. For the visual localiser 128 volumes were collected and for the manual 
localiser 83 volumes were collected. Four volumes were removed from the start and four 
from the end of those runs respectively. 
Imaging Pre-processing 
Standard pre-processing routines and analyses were carried out using statistical 
parametric mapping (SPM8) software (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, 
London). Images were corrected for differences in timing of slice acquisition and were 
re-aligned to the first volume by means of rigid-body transformation. Then, functional 
images were spatially smoothed using a 4-mm full width at half-maximum (FWHM) 
isotropic Gaussian kernel. Next, motion parameters obtained from realignment were used 
to inform a volume repair procedure (ArtRepair; Stanford Psychiatric Neuroimaging 
Laboratory) that identified bad volumes on the basis of within-scan movement (i.e., scan-
to-scan motion exceeding 0.5mm) and signal fluctuations (i.e., variation in global 
intensity exceeding 1.3%), and then corrected bad signal values via linear interpolation 
between the nearest non-outliers time points (Mazaika, Hoeft, Glover, & Reiss, 2009). 
We ensured that not more than 20% of the total volumes were corrected/interpolated in 
any participant. Three subjects, not included in the sample described in the participants 
section above (2 HCs & 1 PDs), were excluded due to excessive motion/signal fluctuation 
i.e., having either more than 20% to-be-repaired functional volumes or drifts over 3mm 
in any of the functional runs. After volume repair, structural and functional volumes were 
co-registered and spatially normalized to T1 and echo-planar imaging templates, 
respectively. The normalization algorithm used a 12-parameter affine transformation 
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together with a non-linear transformation involving cosine basis functions. During 
normalization, the volumes were sampled to 3-mm3 voxels. Templates were based on the 
MNI305 stereotaxic space (Cocosco, Kollokian, Kwan, Pike, & Evans, 1997). Then, 
functional volumes were spatially smoothed with a 7-mm FWHM isotropic Gaussian 
kernel. Finally, a 128 sec high-pass filter was used to eliminate contamination from slow 
drift of signals. Brain coordinates are reported in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
atlas space (Cocosco et al., 1997). 
fMRI Statistical Analysis  
Statistical analyses were performed on individual participants’ data using the general 
linear model (GLM). The fMRI time series data were modelled by a series of impulses 
convolved with a canonical haemodynamic response function (HRF). Motion parameters 
for translation (i.e., x, y, z) and rotation (i.e., yaw, pitch, roll) were used as covariates of 
non-interest in the GLM. Trials were modelled as events, time-locked to the onset of each 
word. The functions resulting from visual object and manual object conditions were used 
as covariates in a GLM designed to examine neural changes restricted to the two task 
conditions and rest-fixation periods in whole-brain contrasts and functional connectivity 
analyses.  
The least-squares parameter estimates of the effect for each study condition were used in 
whole-brain pairwise contrasts whereby contrast images, computed on a participant-by-
participant basis were submitted to group analysis. At the group level, whole-brain 
contrasts between conditions were computed by performing one-sample t-tests on these 
images, treating participants as a random effect. The standard statistical threshold for 
whole-brain maps involving all participants and contrasting experimental conditions (i.e., 
visual/manual object words > rest-fixation in the main word processing task, right & left 
> rest-fixation in the manual localiser and objects > scrambled in the visual localiser) was 
a voxel-wise corrected false discovery rate (FDR) set at q < .01. See Figure 15 for a 




Figure 15. PD fMRI experiment whole-brain contrasts. Brain renderings showing activation in 
whole- brain contrasts across all subjects at a statistical threshold of q < .01 FDR voxel-wise 
corrected for multiple comparisons. A) Visual localiser. B) Manual localiser. C) Main functional 
word-processing task– Visual objects. D) Main functional word-processing task – Manual objects. 
Data from the two functional localisers were analysed in order to independently 
functionally determine seeds in the frontoparietal and occipitotemporal networks for use 
in connectivity analyses. Seed region of interest (ROI) creation was achieved with the 
MARSBAR toolbox for use with SPM8 (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002) and 
resulted in 5mm-radius spheres centred at the global maxima of active voxels identified 
from whole-brain contrasts across all participants at a threshold of q < .01, FDR corrected 
voxel-wise. The right & left > rest-fixation contrast of data from the manual localiser 
resulted in a global maximum in SMA [-3, -4, 55]. objects > scrambled contrast of the 
visual localiser yielded a global maximum in LOC [-45, -76, -14]. See Figure 17 for 
visualisations of seed ROIs. 
We assessed FC via the beta correlation method (Rissman, Gazzaley, & D’Esposito, 
2004) implemented in SPM8 with custom Matlab scripts. The canonical HRF in SPM 
was fit to each occurrence of each condition and the resulting parameter estimates (i.e., 
beta values) were sorted according to the study conditions to produce condition-specific 
beta series for each voxel. In these analyses the beta series associated with each 
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tion show similar patterns￿ If n t￿ then it may be related to on- ine de￿cits￿
Our sample was relatively small￿ though pretty good for the literature￿
We lack in scanner behavioural results and in future research it should be
included￿ Spanish sample￿ Could be done in English￿
However￿ we were interested to test ￿￿￿
￿￿￿Chapter ￿￿ The Neural Correlates of Manual Experience and Sensorimotor
Representations
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functionally localised seed were correlated with voxels across the whole brain to create 
beta correlation images for each subject. Group-level two-sample t-tests were performed 
on the resulting subject manual object-words > rest-fixation or visual object-words > rest-
fixation contrast images for the SMA and LOC seeds respectively for the comparisons 
HC > PD (q < .01, cluster-wise-FDR corrected). Since the correlation coefficient is 
inherently restricted to range from −1 to +1, an arc-hyperbolic tangent transform was 
applied to these beta-series correlation values (r-values) to make its null hypothesis 
sampling distribution approach that of the normal distribution to allow for statistical 
inference based on the correlation magnitudes. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Main functional word processing task – Behavioural 
Accuracy was high on the main functional word processing go/no-go brand name 
recognition task (HC accuracy M = 85%, SD = 14%, PD M = 78%, SD = 25%) indicating 
that participants were concentrating on the words they were hearing. Accuracy did not 
differ between the groups: two-tailed-two-sample-t(32)=1.07, p>.29, 95% CI[- 6.5, 21.1].  
5.3.2 Test for gray-matter structural differences between groups  
To examine potential between-group differences in gray matter at the structural level that 
could determine functional differences, we used participants’ T1-weighted images to run 
Freesurfer’s (Fischl, 2012) mri_glmfit on gray-matter volume, cortical thickness and 
surface area. These analyses revealed no significant between-group differences. 
5.3.3 Univariate whole-brain analysis  
In order to test for differences in functional activation that might contribute to functional 
connectivity differences, we conducted a series of whole-brain functional contrasts (see 
Figure 2). For PDs and HCs separately, we contrasted: manual > rest-fixation, visual > 
rest-fixation and manual >/< visual. No differences were observed which survived 
statistical thresholding using appropriate multiple comparison corrections. Similarly, 
second level comparisons (i.e., the interactions) showed no significant differences 
between PD-visual > rest-fixation vs HC-visual > rest-fixation or PD-manual > rest-
fixation vs HC-manual > rest-fixation. These analyses suggest that potential differences 
in functional connectivity may not be determined by differential regional engagement 
between conditions, nor between groups. 
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5.3.4 Functional connectivity  
In order to check the overall patterns of functional connectivity for each group when 
processing object names which contribute to the group comparisons reported below, we 
visualised whole-brain FC from the functionally defined seeds (LOC & SMA) for all 
words combined: i.e., visual & manual > rest-fixation in PDs and HCs separately (see 
Figure 16). The results visualised are those that survived cluster-wise FWE correction for 
multiple comparisons (p < .01). While overall patterns of connectivity are in line with 
expectations, in general, PDs show less FC than HCs in all conditions, which is probably 
due to more variability within the PD sample. This may have some bearing on the 
interpretation of the main findings reported below and will be further considered in the 
general discussion.  
 
Figure 16. PD fMRI experiment overall whole-brain FC. Whole-brain FC from 
functionally defined seeds for all-objects (i.e., manual & visual > rest-fixation) (p < 
.01, FWE cluster-wise corrected for multiple comparisons). Panel A: the 
frontoparietal (SMA) seed for 1) HCs, 2) PDs. Panel B: the occipitotemporal (LOC) 
seed for 1) HCs, 2) PDs. 
 
 
In order to test our main hypotheses, we examined dissimilarities between PDs and HCs 
in functional coupling between the manually localised seed in the frontoparietal network 
(SMA) and the visually localised seed in the occipitotemporal network (LOC) and all 
other voxels in the brain, for manual object-words > rest-fixation and visual object-words 
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> rest-fixation conditions respectively. The results reported here are those that survived 
cluster-wise FWE correction for multiple comparisons (p < .01). See Figure 17 for a 
visualisation of these results and Table 10 for cluster information. 
 
Figure 17. PD fMRI experiment whole-brain FC contrasts. FC differences between PDs and 
HCs. Colours indicate clusters where connectivity with a seed was significantly higher (p < .01, 
FWE cluster-wise corrected at for multiple comparisons) for HCs than PDs. Panel A: the 
frontoparietal (SMA) seed when processing 1) manual object-names 2) visual object-names. 




Table 10. PD fMRI experiment whole-brain FC cluster information. HC > PD. p < .01, FWE- 
cluster wise. 
 
We first describe results from analyses using the frontoparietal network seed (SMA) 
established from the manual functional localiser: With respect to processing nouns 
referring to manual objects, in HCs, as our primary hypothesis predicts, there was higher 
functional coactivation compared to PDs between the seed in the frontoparietal network 
and two closely distributed clusters: one in ventral motor areas (t=4.05, voxels=74, 
maxima=[-39, 5, 10]) and another in frontal semantic control regions / basal ganglia 
(t=3.86, voxels= 89, maxima=[-39, 35, -2]) (see: Figure 17, panel A.1). With respect to 
processing nouns referring to visual objects, in HCs, as expected, there was no 
appreciable increase compared to PDs in functional coactivation between the 
frontoparietal SMA seed and other motor areas. However, there was an unexpected 
increase in functional coupling in one cluster in right posterior visual regions (t=4.24, 
voxels=116, [24, -97, 10]) (see Figure 17, panel A.2.). Crucially, the fact that manual 
object names result in changes in motor region connectivity but visual object names do 
not, is consistent with sensorimotor theories. We will elaborate on this point in the 
discussion 
We now turn to results from the analyses using the occipitotemporal network seed (LOC) 
established from the visual functional localiser: Contrary to our predictions, for HCs, 
relative to PDs, processing manual object words involved more functional coupling 
between the (LOC) seed in the occipitotemporal network and a cluster in dorsomedial 
Condition Network seed Brain areas Cluster extent Voxels t  value
x y z
Frontoparietal seed (SMA) L IFG Triangularis 27 3.9 -39 35 -2
L IFG Orbitalis 15 3.2 -39 29 -11
L Insula 16 3.6 -27 11 -14
L Temporal Pole 5 3.2 -48 17 -17
L Putamen 9 2.8 -24 11 -5
L IFG Opercularis 15 4.1 -39 5 10
L Rolandic Operculum 23 3.9 -60 -7 13
L Precentral gyrus 25 2.5 -54 -4 19
L Postcentral gyrus 18 3.0 -51 -13 19
L Temporal pole 8 3.0 -54 11 -11
Occipitotemporal seed (LOC) R SMA 28 3.92 12 20 46
L medial SFG 33 3.7 -6 26 55
Frontoparietal seed (SMA) R Cuneus 10 4.24 24 -97 10
R Middle Occipital gyrus 61 3.6 39 -82 19
R Lingual 9 3.4 15 -97 -8
Occipitotemporal seed (LOC) L IFG Orbitalis 45 4.22 -39 26 -11








motor areas (SMA and SFG) (t=3.9, voxels=80, [12, 20, 46]) (see Figure 17, panel B.1). 
This result suggests that visual and motor information about manual objects may be more 
tightly coupled for HCs than PDs. This finding runs counter to our exploratory hypothesis 
that there would be increased (compensatory) functional coactivation of occipitotemporal 
regions in PDs when processing manual object words. With respect to visual object 
words, HCs show higher connectivity between the (LOC) seed in the occipitotemporal 
network and one cluster in frontal semantic control regions (LIFG orbitalis) (t=4.22, 
voxels=89, [-39, 26, -11]) (see Figure 17, panel B.2.) indicating that for HCs there is 
relatively more functional connectivity from areas in the occipitotemporal network and 
semantic control regions when processing visual-object names. 
5.4 Discussion 
Sensorimotor accounts predict that changes in the availability of sensory or motor brain 
areas to language processing should lead to interrupted access to semantic information 
which is putatively represented in those areas. Furthermore, if such areas are less well 
integrated to semantic processing over extended periods of time (i.e., months or years) 
then it is likely that changes in the routine exploitation of their neural real estate, in service 
of semantics, should occur in a process called “representational shift” or “conceptual 
compensation” (Gallese, 2009). For example, prolonged degradation in motor system 
function (such as that arising from PD) should result in the motor components of manual 
object representations being down-regulated when they are accessed, and may be 
accompanied with compensatory up-regulation of non-motor areas. Therefore, in this 
study we evaluated the neural underpinnings of semantic processing in PDs and HCs by 
comparing FC in key semantic networks while they were processing the names of 
frequently-manipulated (manual) and infrequently-manipulated (visual) objects. Overall, 
our findings provide support for sensorimotor accounts in that motor brain regions are 
involved in processing the names of manipulable objects, a novel finding. However, we 
observe no evidence of experienced-based conceptual compensation in PDs for 
processing action semantics via non-motor/amodal routes. 
In line with our first prediction, we observed significant FC differences between PDs and 
HCs in the way that they coactivate key semantic networks in the brain when processing 
manual nouns. Of particular interest is the finding that HCs coactivate a node in the 
frontoparietal network and ventral motor regions more than PDs for manual objects. This 
suggests that the frontoparietal (action) network is involved in processing the names of 
manipulable objects. Further, the fact that PDs and HCs did not exhibit coactivation 
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differences in this network for visual objects suggests that its coactivation is semantically 
driven, i.e., attributable to differences in the manual experience associated with different 
categories of objects. 
However, contrary to our second prediction we did not observe higher FC for PDs than 
HCs between the frontoparietal seed and posteromedial regions, meaning that we did not 
replicate one suggested compensatory “amodal” processing route for action language 
(Abrevaya et al., 2016).  
With regards to our third (exploratory) prediction, we did not observe increased FC within 
the occipitotemporal network for PDs than HCs when processing manual nouns, which 
might have suggested another route for conceptual compensation; i.e., increased reliance 
on visual aspects of objects’ representations instead of motor aspects, via the 
occipitotemporal stream.  
We observed mixed evidence of our fourth (exploratory) prediction; i.e., variations in FC 
between frontal semantic control regions (IFG) and the frontoparietal and 
occipitotemporal networks which interact with group and word type. We observed higher 
SMA-IFG FC for HCs when processing manual but not visual object names which may 
suggest that the importance of the motor system for processing action language has been 
“downgraded” in PDs relative to HCs and that this is IFG controlled. On the other hand, 
we did not observe stronger LOC-IFG FC for PDs for manual object names, which might 
have been suggestive of PDs “upgrading” the importance of the occipitotemporal stream 
to process them. Finally, for visual object names, we did not observe FC differences 
between HCs and PDs between SMA-IFG. This could be interpreted in line with the view 
that with respect to visual items, PDs and HCs should not differ in their reliance on the 
frontoparietal (action) network. On the other hand, we did see tighter FC for HCs than 
PDs between LOC-IFG suggesting that differences may exist.  
Similar to previous FC work with PDs (Abrevaya et al., 2016) we observe relatively 
greater frontoparietal connectivity in HCs (compared to PDs) between our SMA seed and 
IFG and motor areas for action language but no differences (in either group) in 
connectivity in the occipitotemporal network. However, in contrast we did not see any 
compensatory PD > HC FC differences in the cingulate for action language. 
Overall, FC within the networks involved when processing manual and visual object 
names differed between HCs and PDs, with action language involving less coactivation 
of motor regions in PDs than HCs. Because the atypical coactivation of regions in the 
frontoparietal network in PDs is particular to manual as opposed to visual objects it seems 
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to be semantically driven, and best attributed to differences in the manual experience 
associated with manual and visual objects i.e., the semantic content of their 
representations, in line with sensorimotor accounts.  
Considerations and limitations 
Given that the analyses pursued here were specifically intended to examine potential 
differences in coactivation between the different groups, it might be asked if the 
differences in PDs we observe arise as a result of structural damage to their brains or an 
overall inability to co-activate relevant brain regions. While we presume that there are 
structural differences between the brains of the PDs and the HCs that we tested, several 
factors lead us to believe that these differences are unlikely to be the sole cause of the 
functional connectivity differences that we observed. First, although it is certainly 
possible that baseline differences in co-activation in general influence our results, our 
finding that when processing manual, but not visual object words, PDs showed less 
coactivation with other portions of the motor network, suggests that semantic processing 
interacts with any such limit on co-activation and mitigates these concerns. Further, our 
grey matter comparisons show that there are no structural alterations in grey matter in 
PDs vs. HCs, therefore, it is not the case that the affected regions are structurally affected, 
but that the areas in the networks are differently coactivated during processing. Finally, 
we did observe lower whole-brain FC when processing nouns in PDs compared to HCs, 
which is likely due to more variation in FC.  
Another consideration concerning this study (as outlined in the previous chapter) is that 
our participants were all in ON state of DRT at time of testing and therefore were not 
experiencing motor system dysfunction. We tested patients ON DRT for two reasons: 
first, this is common practice when measuring PDs in MRI scanners, because it helps to 
reduce head motion artefacts, and second it was not practically possible for us to 
manipulate their medication regime because they were participating in further studies at 
the same time which required DRT. Although being in the ON state of DRT could 
certainly have influenced our ability to detect differences in FC, we believed that our tests 
might still reveal differences arising from long-term, experience-based alterations in the 
functional dynamics of network recruitment during semantic processing.  
Second, from a sensorimotor perspective, it is likely that in populations for whom medical 
intervention can restore function to relevant sensory or motor areas, (such as PD with 
DRT therapy), a gradual shift away from reliance on motor areas when processing manual 
objects is more likely than catastrophic semantic deficits. With this in mind, it is 
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unsurprising (and in line with previous work: Péran et al., 2013; Péran et al., 2009) that 
activation analyses with appropriate statistical thresholding did not reveal differences 
between PD and HC groups in processing manual words.10 That connectivity analysis 
did, suggests it may be a more sensitive method of measuring long-term experience-
driven representational-shift. Furthermore, because this situation creates a more 
challenging scenario to test sensorimotor theories, the fact that we do see selective 
recruitment of different circuits in spite of what might be partially “normalised” motor 
loop function makes our findings all the more intriguing. 
Another consideration concerns study design. Due to time limitations we were obliged to 
keep the task short and therefore we tested using relatively few trials. Future studies 
should seek to increase statistical power by including more items. Similarly, while on the 
one hand our smaller sample reflects the fact that we were limited in the number of PDs 
we had access to, on the other hand our sample is comparable to published research in the 
field.  
It should be noted that the analytical strategy adopted in this experiment was largely 
determined by the conservative nature of our mixed effects. The strongest test of our 
hypothesis would be to test the interactions of group and object category; however, for 
power reasons our data do not permit reliable inferences to be drawn based on these 
contrasts. Nonetheless, the differences we observe in whole-brain FC are both 
theoretically interesting and statistically reliable. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, in this chapter we provide neuroimaging evidence that differences in 
people’s motor capacities shape the brain networks they activate when processing 
frequently handled objects. While we did not observe impairments to processing the 
names of manipulable objects at the behavioural level (see Chapter 4:) we observe 
divergence at the neural level. The findings reported here support sensorimotor accounts 
of conceptual representation and suggest that an individual’s lifetime experience (i.e., 
their context) shapes their understanding of the objects that they have experience of.   
                                               
10 While our primary interest was FC it is interesting to compare our activation results to previous studies. As in our results, the Perán 
study (2009) did not observe differences between action naming and object naming with appropriate statistical thresholding. However, 
in exploratory analyses (p < .001 uncorrected) they observed higher activation in PDs for Verbs > Objects in PFC and ACC, which 
they refer to as a “non-motor”. Similarly, we also observe uncorrected differences in activation for PDs manual > visual in the SFG 





Chapter 6: General Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
The overarching goal of the current thesis was to extend our knowledge about the nature 
of long-term conceptual representations of concrete objects in semantic memory. These 
representations not only underlie the meaning of noun words but also include and 
“ground” perceptual and action related knowledge about their referents. In a break from 
current orthodoxy, the work reported here sought to provide evidence that concepts are 
best considered as both grounded in sensorimotor systems and contextually sensitive. 
There were three main experimental objectives in this thesis: First, to test predictions of 
sensorimotor accounts of sematic processing – specifically that functionally important 
parts of the conceptual representations of concrete objects are represented over widely 
distributed modality specific regions of the brain, active during perceptual or motor 
experience with them. Second, to examine whether, as a result of this, semantic and online 
sensorimotor processing are mutually interdependent and functionally interact. Finally, 
to interpret my findings in the light of an as-yet relatively understudied prediction of 
sensorimotor accounts: namely that the content of multimodal semantic representations 
varies as a result of context; here defined as both immediate context and personal context 
i.e., an individual’s personal history of experiences with objects over their lifetime. These 
predictions are incompatible with amodal accounts which maintain that the 
representational format of concepts and semantic processing is amodal, functionally 
distinct from sensory and motor processing, and that the core contents of conceptual 
representations are reliably reproduced units of meaning that are infrangible and 
contextually inert. To this end we ran four experiments, using behavioural-
psycholinguistic and neuroimaging techniques in healthy and clinical populations. Below 
I present a brief overview of relevant findings. 
6.2 Part 1 summary – Visual and olfactory modalities 
The first experimental chapter in this thesis demonstrated that occupying the visual 
system by engaging in a visual task and concurrently making semantic judgements on 
object names resulted in mutual interference to both processes. Crucially, interference to 
both tasks was relatively greater for words referring to objects with which particular 
individuals had accrued more lifetime visual experience than those more frequently 
manipulated. The second experimental chapter extended our visual findings into the 
olfactory modality. We demonstrated that if the olfactory system is occupied with a strong 
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odour while participants make semantic judgements on the names of objects, then it 
interferes more with understanding the names of frequently smelled objects like “garlic” 
than more neutral words like “hammer”. Furthermore, we observed that interference 
scales in proportion to the amount of lifetime olfactory experience people have with the 
objects. Both chapters show that online perceptual processing can be influenced by 
language comprehension, that lifetime sensory experience shapes the representational 
structure of object concepts, and that the outcome of semantic processing differs 
depending on an interaction of personal experience and people’s immediate perceptual 
context. 
6.3 Part 2 summary – Parkinson’s and the manual modality 
The second half of the thesis shifted to testing sensorimotor predictions in the manual 
domain. Experimental chapter three reports a behavioural experiment in which we tested 
whether motor system degradation due to Parkinson’s disease lead to impairments in 
naming manipulable objects compared to healthy controls. Contrary to our predications, 
we found no behavioural evidence of semantic-motor impairments. However, because the 
PDs were under the effects of their anti-parkinsonian medication (i.e., their motor loop 
function had been restored) at time of testing, this null result is difficult to interpret. It 
may be the case that PD does not lead to impairments in processing concepts for 
manipulable objects, but it may also be the case that treatment status interacts with any 
such impairments. If so, it is worth noting that this would be in line with the thrust of this 
thesis, namely that context is key in understanding concepts, in this case, treatment 
context might lead to variations in conceptual content. With this in mind, in experimental 
chapter 4 we report an fMRI experiment designed to explore if, at the neural level, motor 
impairments due to PD interact with the networks involved in semantically processing 
the names of manipulable objects. In line with our predictions we observed semantically-
influenced connectivity differences between HCs and PDs when processing the names of 
manipulable-objects specifically. In particular, we observed relatively decreased 
functional connectivity for manipulable object names for PDs in brain networks 
associated with acting on objects. This pattern of results is suggestive of subtle variations 
in the processing of manipulable objects due to a motor disorder, in line with sensorimotor 
predictions. The fact that we do not observe effects in the behavioural study but see 
differences in the fMRI study might be for a number of reasons. First, fMRI measures 
can be more sensitive than accuracy or reaction-time measures to subtle differences in the 
processes underlying task performance and the functional connectivity methods we 
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employ are able to capture theoretically relevant long-term differences in processing 
strategies. Secondly, because participants had motor-loop-function restored (as a result 
of DRT) in both experiments it is likely that motor components of manipulable objects 
were not impaired at time-of-testing, however, Parkinson’s is a chronic illness which 
involves frequent periods of motor system impairments (e.g., between doses). Over time 
it is likely that such impairments lead to gradual shifts in reliance on the motor system 
when accessing representations. That our findings are observed in functional-connectivity 
measures, and we didn’t observe differences in activation analyses supports this view. 
Further research is needed to explore these issues more fully.   
6.3.1 Holistic summary 
The results of my experiments, viewed as a whole, lend support to sensorimotor accounts 
of conceptual representation. First, the fact that tasks that modulate activity within visual 
and olfactory brain areas can selectively interfere with accessing object representations 
that are putatively reliant on those same areas, suggests that these processes share neural 
resources. Second, such functional interplay between semantic and sensory/perception 
processes strongly suggests that semantic knowledge has a variegated and multimodal 
representational format and not a unitary amodal code. Third, that individual lifetime 
olfactory and visual experience predicts the degree of interference shows that individual 
context has a meaningful impact on a concept’s representation. Finally, while on the one 
hand, we did not observe behavioural differences in the way PDs access the 
representations of manipulable objects, this may be due to their treatment context. On the 
other hand, the neuroimaging evidence we report suggests that changes in people’s motor 
capacities does lead to measurable alterations in the way that they process action 
semantics.  
6.4 Theoretical implications 
Overall, our findings suggest that functionally relevant aspects of semantic 
representations are not “amodal” in nature. Rather, following cognitive linguistics 
(Lakoff, 1987), they support sensorimotor accounts which provide a biologically 
plausible description of semantics with no clear distinction between action, perception 
and semantic processing, in which language is brain-based and semantic memory is not 
a separate module of cognition from perception and action. 
Our results in the visual and olfactory modalities complement previous neuroimaging 
evidence showing that content-specific sensory and motor areas are engaged when 
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processing the names of concrete objects (e.g., Alex Martin, 2007) and behavioural 
studies demonstrating measurable interactions between perceptual contexts and semantic 
processes (e.g., Yee, Chrysikou, Hoffman, et al., 2013). That individual experience 
modulates semantic-perceptual interference (as shown in our visual and olfactory 
experiments) also aligns with studies showing that personal experience shapes conceptual 
representations both as a result of expertise (e.g., I Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, 
& Gore, 1999), as a result of training (Bellebaum et al., 2013) and over the lifetime 
(Chrysikou et al., 2017). The fMRI results in PDs we report similarly suggest that long-
term impairments in people’s sensory or motor capacities shape how people process 
object names. While we did not observe behavioural evidence that having PD affects 
semantic processing of action related objects, this might have been because of DRT status 
and could be interpreted as evidence of contextual variation in conceptual processing. 
Overall, our results are in line with more recent accounts of “fluid” concepts which deny 
that conceptual representations are bounded and reliably reproduced units of meaning, 
but rather a context-dependent process. Considering conceptual knowledge in this way 
hints that the content of an elicited conceptual representation at a particular moment in 
time differs from the content of a similarly elicited representation at another moment, that 
content depends on the dynamical interplay of what else the brain is busy doing at the 
same time as accessing a representation and the nature and amount of people’s long-term 
sensory or motor experience with a concept’s referent (e.g., D Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015; 
Connell & Lynott, 2014; Spivey, 2008; Yee, 2017). 
6.5 Strengths 
The work reported in this thesis is novel and noteworthy in a number of ways. First, our 
results were obtained from three sensory domains; i.e., visual, manual and (the largely 
neglected) olfactory domain. That we observe similar patterns across different modalities, 
using novel paradigms, strengthens our conclusions considerably. Second, our finding 
that dual-task interference in the olfactory and visual domains scaled with individual 
lifetime experience is of particular note. Many studies testing similar hypotheses make 
use of experience ratings averaged over participants, or obtained from ratings studies or 
corpora. In contrast, we show our effects at the individual level. Third, our dual task 
interference methodologies are non-correlational demonstrations of a functional 
relationship between sensory and semantic processing and therefore free from the 
criticism, often levelled at neuroimaging evidence, that activation in sensory or motor 
areas is unrelated to semantic processing, i.e., downstream, epiphenomenal or spreading 
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activation. Forth, the neuroimaging evidence we do report in experimental chapter 4 
improves on previous work because it includes a HC group and therefore is informative 
about differences in semantic processing due to PD. It also employs functional 
connectivity methods which may provide a more informative window into questions of 
conceptual compensation and shift due to long-term changes in people’s capacities than 
activation approaches. Finally, a great deal of work into sensorimotor hypotheses 
concentrates on studying verbs as canonical examples of “action” semantics, but here, we 
examined an underexplored prediction of sensorimotor theories, - everyday concrete 
objects with which people have varying experience in many domains. 
6.6 Limitations 
Of course, there are a number of limitations to the evidence reported here which are worth 
consideration. First, in the visual and olfactory modalities we do not show that the 
selective perceptual-semantic interference we observe (to frequently-seen or frequently-
touched stimuli respectively) disappears for the same stimuli in a different context, such 
as an interference task or ambient context designed to tax or occupy a modality which is 
not though to underlie their representations (e.g., an auditory task), but appears for other 
items which are reliant on the newly taxed modality for their representation (e.g., musical 
instruments). Showing such a double-dissociation would allow us to make the strongest 
claim about a functional relationship between the visual and olfactory modality and 
frequently seen or smelled objects respectively (and in the above example, the auditory 
modality), we do not see its absence as critically problematic for our conclusions for a 
couple of reasons. First, in the case of the visual chapter, the experiment itself can be 
considered as following on from a previous experiment (Yee, Chrysikou, Hoffman, et al., 
2013) which successfully showed that a manual task selectively interfered with 
processing the names of frequently-manipulated objects. Furthermore, follow up work 
recently published by our group (Davis et al., n.d.) reports a double dissociation between 
visual and manual modalities. In the case of olfactory interference, we are running another 
study incorporating a control interference task. However, while we can’t rule out that a 
non-olfactory interfering context would have caused a similar selective relative 
interference effect only to smelly objects, our findings are, in our view, most 
parsimoniously explained as supporting sensorimotor predictions. 
Another concern might be the small effects that we observe. On the one hand, while they 
are of the same order as previous research, it must be acknowledged that participants were 
not rendered unable to conceive of, for example; “the moon” while performing our visual 
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task, nor incapable of identifying, e.g., a lemon while in a smelly room. As suggested 
throughout the thesis, this is not too damning a criticism when the redundancy of 
sensorimotor representations is considered; all of the concrete objects that we used as 
stimuli are commonly experienced multimodally; i.e., smelt, touched, heard and tasted, 
so their representations should extend over a variety of sensory or motor modalities. If 
one source of representational knowledge is interrupted, it should still be possible to 
activate enough of a representation to perform the task. In fact, our recent publication 
(Davis et al., n.d.) was conceptually similar to the visual experiments reported here, but 
included primarily things with which we have virtually no visual experience e.g. 
“thunder”, and report similar results to those reported here. Given that we used less 
“extreme” stimuli it might be argued that this reduced the likelihood that we would have 
observed an effect and that we did is noteworthy.  
6.7 Future directions 
There are a number of promising avenues for future study which arise out of the work 
reported here. For example, the boundary conditions of the contextual effects that we 
observe should be carefully explored and demarcated which could be achieved by 
parametrically manipulating the difficulty or nature of the interference tasks/contexts and 
observing any resultant changes. Second, it would be interesting to explore whether 
different types of experience affect the representations people have of objects. For 
example, if perceptual simulations, which arise as a result of reading descriptions of 
objects or mental rehearsal, are comparable to direct perceptual experience or whether 
the representations arising from such “experience by proxy” is differently reliant on 
sensorimotor areas or less susceptible to interference than that which was perceptually 
gained (e.g., Edmiston & Lupyan, 2017; cf: Günther, Dudschig, & Kaup, 2018). Finally, 
a question that the implications of context-sensitive sensorimotor models raise is that of 
interpersonal agreement. If the conceptual representations of objects reflect everybody’s 
personal experience, how might such agreement be possible? It is likely that to the extent 
that experiences are the same, which they often are, we can communicate well enough (if 
not perfectly), and to the extent that they differ, we may have communication difficulties. 
Such possibilities are ripe for further exploration.  
6.8 Final conclusions 
Taken together the experiments presented in this thesis provide evidence that the content 
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Table 11. Visual experiment 1 stimuli 
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Table 12. Visual experiment 2 stimuli 
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Table 13. Olfactory experiment stimuli 
Spanish English Spanish English Spanish English Spanish English Spanish English
abeja bee hiena hyena aguja needle fregona mop afilado sharp
aguaviva jellyfish hipopótamo hippo pulsera bracelet condón condom peligroso dangerous
águila eagle hormiga ant bandera flag asfalto tarmac frágil delicate
albatros albatross hurón ferret flecha arrow rotulador pen rápido fast
alce elk iguana iguana nube cloud resina resin valioso valuable
almejas clam jabalí boar reloj clock azalea azalea silbido whistling
anaconda anaconda jirafa giraffe sol sun cerilla match ruidoso noisy
anguila eel koala koala anillo ring pólvora gunpowder agrio sour
araña spider lagarto lizard trípode tripod goma rubber robusto sturdy
ardilla squirrel langosta lobster estatua statue pies feet dulce sweet
armadillo armadillo larva maggot molino windmill fuego fire pesado heavy
armiño stoat lémur lemur calavera skull serrín sawdust liso smooth
asno ass león lion lupa magnifying glass almendra almond suave soft
atún tuna leopardo leopard enchufe plug ginebra ginger sólido solid
avestruz ostrich libélula dragonfly farola streetlight brie brie arrugado wrinkled
avispa wasp liebre hare linterna flashlight sándalo sandal radiante bright
babuino baboon lince lynx luna moon mazapán marzipan curvo curved
bacalao cod lirón mouse cactus cactus establo cowshed llano flat
ballena whale llama llama hacha axe tomillo thyme grasiento greasy
bicho beetle lobo wolf maletín briefcase pachulí patchouli redondo round
bisonte bison loro parrot pluma feather betún bitumen
bogavante lobster mamut mammoth silla chair pasto hay
buey ox manatí seacow volante steering wheel mojito mojito
búfalo buffalo mandril mandrill ábaco abacus espárragos asparagus
búho owl mangosta mongoose botón button azahar orangeblossom
buitre vulture mantis mantis buzón mailbox plátano banana
burro donkey mapache raccoon croquis sketch chicle chewingGum
caballo horse mariposa butterfly mesa table lejía bleach
cabra goat mariquita ladybird puente bridge cereza cherry
cacatúa cockatoo marmota groundhog satélite satellite lima lime
cachalote spermWhale medusa jellyfish silbato whistle tomate tomato
cachorro puppy mofeta skunk trofeo trophy regaliz liquorice
caimán alligator mono monkey brújula compass pera pear
calamar squid morsa walrus cincel chisel aguarrás turpentine
camaleón chameleon mosca fly martillo hammer laurel bayleaf
camello camel mosquito mosquito rastrillo rake churro donut
canario canary mula mule avión plane panceta bacon
cangrejo crab murciélago bat campana bell huevo egg
canguro kangaroo musaraña shrew flauta flute melocotón peach
caniche poodle nutria otter ordenador computer coco coconut
caracol snail ñu gnu mando remoteControl pintura painting
carnero ram okapi okapi cuello neck sobaco armpit
castor beaver orangután orangutan sobre envelope salchichón sausage
cebra zebra orca orca tambor drum ambientador airFreshener
cebú zebu oruga caterpillar tanque tank ananas pineapple
cerdo pig oso bear raqueta racket cloaca sewer
chacal jackal ostra oyster cremallera zipper frambuesa raspberry
chimpancé chimpanzee oveja sheep pila battery esmalte nail varnish
chinchilla chinchilla pájaro bird puerta door cuero leather
ciempiés centipede paloma pigeon llave key fresa strawberry
ciervo deer panda panda piedra rock cilantro coriander
cigarra cicada pangolín pangolin tijeras scissors pegamento glue
cigüeña stork pantera panther valla fence té tea
cisne swan papión baboon vaso glass anís anise
cobaya guineapig pato duck ancla anchor colonia cologne
cobra cobra pavo turkey bastón walkingStick paella paella
cocodrilo crocodile pelicano pelican cámara camera alcanfor camphor
codorníz quail perdiz partridge fagot bassoon rosa rose
colibrí hummingbird perezoso sloth burbuja bubble barniz varnish
comadreja weasel perro dog cerebro brain romero rosemary
conejo rabbit petirrojo robin rodilla knee heces faeces
cordero lamb pingüino penguin turbina turbine jazmín jasmine
cotorra parrot piojo louse trébol clover limón lemon
cucaracha cockroach piraña piranha fuente fountain orina urine
cuervo crow polilla moth violín violin menta mint
dálmata dalmatian pollito chick globo balloon petróleo petrol
delfín dolphin poni pony concha shell vino wine
dinosaurio dinosaur pulpo octopus montaña mountain mierda shit
dodo dodo puma puma arena sand eucalipto eucalyptus
dromedario camel rana frog hoja leaf vómito vomit
elefante elephant rata rat bellota acorn marihuana cannabis
emú emu ratón mouse helecho fern sudor sweat
erizo hedgehog reno reindeer hiedra ivy chorizo chorizo
escarabajo beetle rinoceronte rhinoceros sal salt vinagre vinegar
escorpión scorpion rottweiler rottweiler roble oak basura rubbish
faisán pheasant ruiseñor nightingale girasol sunflower caca poo
flamenco flamingo salamandra salamander moneda coin lavanda lavender
foca seal saltamontes grasshopper libro book canela cinnamon
gacela gazelle sapo toad barro mud mango mango
gallina hen sardina sardine berenjena aubergine orégano oregano
gallo cockerel serpiente snake ola wave amoniaco ammonia
gamba prawn suricato meercat tofu tofu vainilla vanilla
ganso goose tapir tapir arbusto shrub queso cheese
garceta egret tejón badger vapor steam flor flower
garrapata tick terrier terrier árbol tree pan bread
garza heron tiburón shark dinero money palomitas popcorn
gatito kitten tigre tiger sauce willow chocolate chocolate
gato cat topo mole lechuga lettuce atún tuna
gaviota seagull toro bull rábano radish excremento excrement
geco gecko tortuga turtle narciso daffodil mentol menthol
gibón gibbon tritón newt maíz corn naranja orange
gorila gorilla trucha trout ternera beef jabón soap
gorrión sparrow tucán toucan zanahoria carrot pizza pizza
grillo cricket ualabí wallaby margarita daisy incienso incense
grulla crane urraca magpie cedro cedar ajo garlic
guepardo cheetah vaca cow calabaza pumpkin cigarrillo cigarette
gusano worm víbora viper guisante pea gas gas
halcón falcon yegua mare leche milk café coffee
hámster hamster zarigüeya opossum patata potato cebolla onion
hipocampo seahorse zorro fox postre dessert perfume perfume
 Animals Objects Adjectives
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Table 14. PD behavioural experiment stimuli(picture names).  
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Table 15. PD fMRI experiment word stimuli
Spanish English Spanish English Name Product
candelabro chandelier bolígrafo pen iberia airline
trofeo trophy cuchillo knife lufthansa airline
valla fence lápiz pencil ryanair airline
árbol tree cuchara spoon duracell batteries
furgoneta van teléfono telephone visa bank
arbusto shrub peine comb BMW cars
violín violin taza cup ferrari cars
antena aerial puerta door ford cars
bisturí scalpel manzana apple mercedes cars
motor engine escoba broom mitsubishi cars
monóculo monocle pañuelo handkerchief porsche cars
narciso daffodil plátano banana renault cars
trombón trombone cámara camera seat cars
saxofón saxophone libro book bershka clothes
acordeón accordion lechuga lettuce cartier clothes
bomba bomb espátula spatula levis clothes
hámster hamster cinturón belt prada clothes
tuba tuba cebolla onion zara clothes
cobayo guinea pig melón cantaloupe amazon computing
televisión television maletín briefcase microsoft computing
ancla anchor portátil laptop colgate cosmetics
molino windmill margarita daisy kleenex cosmetics
avión airplane cremallera zipper neutrogena cosmetics
hormiga ant maíz corn sanex cosmetics
araña spider cacahuete peanut tampax cosmetics
ratón mouse pepinillo pickle endesa energy
paloma pigeon auriculares earphone iberdrola energy
canario canary hierba grass bimbo food
ganso goose champiñón mushroom colacao food
rana frog rábano radish dominos food
cactus cactus estufa stove fanta food
lagarto lizard alicates pliers heineken food
montaña mountain espárragos asparagus kas food
cuervo crow buzón mailbox kelloggs food
paracaídas parachute cachorro puppy lays food
satélite satellite gatito kitten nestle food
helicóptero helicopter navaja razor pringles food
semáforo stoplight escaleras stairs repsol fuel
águila eagle cajero cash point ikea furniture
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